REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, TRUSTEE AND APPLICANT, WITH ITS EXECUTIVE MINISTER ERAÑO MANALO AS CORPORATE SOLE, RESPONDENT.

Republic of the Philippines versus Iglesia ni Cristo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Iglesia ni Cristo, which applied for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land in Currimao, Ilocos Norte, with its Executive Minister Eraño Manalo suing as corporate sole. The Republic opposes the application on a single question of law: whether the applicant's possession may be counted from a time before the government declared the land alienable and disposable. The case matters because it settles a conflict between two lines of decisions and fixes the reckoning of the thirty-year possession required for registration of public agricultural land.

Procedural History

Iglesia ni Cristo filed its application for registration of title before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Paoay and Currimao, Ilocos Norte, sitting as a cadastral court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City, entered its appearance and filed an opposition. After publication, notification, posting, and hearing, the trial court granted the application in a decision dated April 26, 2005. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court in toto in its decision of October 11, 2007. The Republic then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, raising a pure question of law.

Facts

The subject lot formed part of a bigger parcel owned by Dionisio Sabuco, who had inherited it from his parents and who possessed it well before June 12, 1945. In 1952 Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to Iglesia ni Cristo, which built a chapel on it. Sabuco later sold the rest of the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio, except the portion already sold to the church. In 1959 Badanguio in turn sold another small portion to Iglesia ni Cristo. These two purchases together made up the subject lot, which was surveyed as Lot 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre, containing 4,201 square meters.

On September 7, 1970, Badanguio executed a deed of sale formally conveying the subject lot to Iglesia ni Cristo, although the lot was still covered by his tax declaration for the bigger parcel. Tax declarations were thereafter issued in the name of the church, successively replaced in 1974, 1980, and 1985. The possession of Sabuco, of Badanguio, and of the church was open, continuous, and in the concept of owner, and was never disturbed, as attested by the applicant's witnesses, among them a tenant of the bigger lot since 1965.

The government certified the subject lot as alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on May 16, 1993. Iglesia ni Cristo filed its application for registration on November 19, 1998, a little over five years later. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the lot openly, continuously, and peacefully in the concept of owner for more than forty years.

Issues

• Whether or not a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may prosper when the subject property was declared alienable and disposable only after June 12, 1945, and in this case only on May 16, 1993.
• Whether or not the period of possession required for registration is reckoned from the date the property was declared alienable and disposable, such that possession before that date is excluded from the computation.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply.--The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This is the provision under which the applicant claims registration, and its interpretation is the very question the Court resolves.

Section 48, paragraph b of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act, as amended, is the parallel provision discussed by the Court, which treats it as virtually the same as Section 14, paragraph 1:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

The Court reads this provision as requiring possession since June 12, 1945, but not that the land have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the application may prosper. It noted that the Republic relied on Herbieto, which ruled that possession is counted only from the date the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, while the applicant relied on Naguit, which held that it is enough that the property be alienable and disposable at the time the application is filed. The Court adopted Naguit and abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto, following its recent decision in Heirs of Mario Malabanan versus Republic. It explained that the phrase "since June 12, 1945" qualifies the antecedent phrase "under a bona fide claim of ownership," not the requirement that the land be alienable and disposable, invoking the maxim that qualifying words restrict only the words immediately associated with them. It also saw an absurdity in the contrary view, since lands declared alienable after June 12, 1945 would never be registrable no matter how long the possession, rendering the provision virtually inoperative.

On the second issue, the Court held that the period of possession is not reckoned from the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable. It quoted with approval the reasoning of Naguit:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court added that this interpretation is more in keeping with the spirit of the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree, which were enacted to encourage the distribution of alienable public lands in the name of social justice. Applying the rule, the Court found that the applicant's possession, tacked on to that of Sabuco and Badanguio, was open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership, and that the findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive on this Court.

Doctrine

Under Section 14, paragraph 1 of the Property Registration Decree, it is enough that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed. The applicant need not show that the land was alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, nor during the entire period of possession. The phrase "since June 12, 1945" qualifies only the bona fide claim of ownership, and the period of possession is not reckoned from the date of the government's declaration. Possession by the applicant may be tacked on to that of its predecessors-in-interest, and the findings of fact of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, bind the Supreme Court.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in toto, so that Iglesia ni Cristo prevailed and its application for registration of title over the subject lot stood granted.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the land need only be alienable and disposable at the time the application is filed, not since June 12, 1945. Examiners use this case to test the conflict between Herbieto and Naguit and the reckoning of possession in judicial confirmation of imperfect title.