DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DCD Construction versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is DCD Construction versus the Republic of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari brought by a corporation whose application to judicially confirm its title over a parcel of land in Danao City was granted by the trial court but struck down by the Court of Appeals. The case matters because it is the Court's cleanest teaching on the two things every applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove — that the land is alienable and disposable, and that possession under a bona fide claim of ownership runs from June 12, 1945 — and on why a mere notation in a survey plan is not the kind of proof the law demands.

Procedural History

DCD Construction filed a verified application for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25, sitting as a land registration court. After the jurisdictional requirements were complied with and evidence was received, the trial court, in a decision dated August 22, 2002, confirmed the applicant's registerable title over the lot and ordered its registration. The Republic appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated June 25, 2007, reversed the trial court, holding that the land's alienable and disposable character was not shown and that the required possession was not established. The applicant's motion for reconsideration was denied by a resolution dated September 10, 2007. DCD Construction then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

On January 19, 2001, DCD Construction, through its president and chief executive officer, filed a verified application to register a parcel of land in Taytay, Danao City, with an area of 4,493 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot Number 5331-part. The applicant claimed that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land in a continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious manner for more than thirty years.

The chain of title began with Vivencio Batucan and Paulina Batucan, who bought the land after the Second World War. They died in 1967 and 1980, respectively. Their six children inherited the land, possessed it, and declared it for tax purposes, and on December 22, 1993, they sold it by a deed of extrajudicial settlement with absolute sale to Danilo C. Dira, Senior, the petitioner's father. The property passed through the Dira family's estate settlements, and on June 26, 2000, the mother, brothers and sisters of Danilo Dira, Junior, sold it to the petitioner, which then declared it for tax purposes, paid realty taxes, and assumed a mortgage obligation with the Land Bank of the Philippines.

To prove the land's classification, the petitioner relied on a notation in the survey plan stating that the lot was verified to be within the alienable and disposable area, signed by the chief of the map projection section of the environment department's lands management services. The witness from that office, however, admitted on cross-examination that she had no part in the approval of the survey plan and could not testify to the correctness of the notation. On possession, the earliest tax declaration presented was issued only in 1988, and the witness for the family gave only a bare account that her father had bought the land after the war.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner proved that the land applied for is alienable and disposable, and specifically whether the notation in the survey plan and the testimony of the lands management services officer constitute the incontrovertible evidence the law requires.
• Whether or not the petitioner proved open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or since time immemorial.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, provides:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.

This is the starting point: all lands not clearly shown to be of private dominion presumptively belong to the State, so the applicant carries the burden of proving that the land has been released as alienable and disposable.

Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, on the proof of public documents, provides:

When the record of a public document referred to in Section 19(a) is admissible for any purpose, it may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.

The Court uses this to explain why certifications from subordinate environment department officers, unsupported by the original classification approved by the department secretary, have no probative value on the character of the land.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. An applicant must prove that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, and incontrovertible evidence must be presented. The notation in the survey plan, signed by the chief of the map projection section, is not such evidence. The Court stressed that the survey plan was offered to prove the identity of the land and the technical correctness of the survey, not its classification, and that the witness from the lands management services expressly disclaimed any participation in the approval of the plan. The Court recalled its consistent holding that notations in a subdivision or survey plan stating that the lot is within the alienable and disposable area do not constitute the proof required by law, because a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. It added that the certifying officer never testified on her findings, and that the petitioner failed to establish her authority to issue certifications on land classification for registration proceedings. Following its earlier ruling, the Court required the applicant to prove that the department secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and to present a copy of the original classification approved by the secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no compliance with the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. The words adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support, and the burden is on the applicant to prove them by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The bare statement of the witness that her family possessed the land from the time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice. The tax declaration in the father's name was issued only in 1994, the petitioner's own declaration only in 2000, and the earliest declaration of the predecessors was for 1988, long after both parents had died. The witness never described any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance, nor how her father acquired the land. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that the law speaks of possession and occupation, and that the word occupation serves to highlight that the applicant's possession must not be a mere fiction.

Doctrine

An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove two things: first, that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and second, that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or since time immemorial. Under the Regalian doctrine in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, all lands not clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State, and incontrovertible evidence is required to show that the land has been released as alienable and disposable. A notation in a survey plan, even one signed by an officer of the environment department's lands management services, is not proof of classification, because a surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain; the applicant must show a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation, an executive order, an administrative action, or a statute, and must present the original classification approved by the department secretary, certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Possession must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence of actual acts of dominion, not by bare conclusions of law, and tax declarations are only indicia of possession in the concept of owner, not conclusive proof of ownership.

Disposition

The petition was denied, the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were affirmed, and costs were assessed against the petitioner.

Remember This

Memorize the two-fold burden: alienable and disposable land, proved by a positive government act and the secretary's approved classification, plus possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, proved by actual acts of dominion. Examiners use this case to test whether a survey plan notation or a subordinate officer's certification can substitute for proof of land classification — the answer is no.