IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO AND CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVE…

Santiago versus Santiago

The Case

This is the story of a testate estate that refused to end. Basilio Santiago died in September 1973 leaving a will that gave his heirs their shares but forbade any partition of the rice mill, the animal feeds factory, and the lands for twenty years from his death. His daughter Ma. Pilar and his son Clemente were named to manage those properties. When the twenty years lapsed, the heirs of the second and third marriages asked the probate court to terminate the administration, compel an accounting, and transfer the titles to the named legatees. Ma. Pilar and Clemente resisted, insisting the estate had long been closed and that an earlier judgment barred the move. The Supreme Court's answer matters to every bar candidate because it draws the line between the two aspects of res judicata and reminds us that a probate proceeding is one continuous action that ends only upon final settlement and distribution of the whole estate.

Procedural History

After Basilio died testate in September 1973, Ma. Pilar filed a petition for probate of his will before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, sitting in probate. The will was admitted to probate, Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix, and the children of Basilio's first marriage, the Soco oppositors, were allowed to intervene. The probate court approved the will and the final accounting, partition, and distribution, and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the titles in the names of Ma. Pilar and Clemente. The oppositors' complaint in intervention was dismissed.

The heirs of the first marriage then filed a separate complaint for completion of legitime before another branch of the Bulacan court, which ruled in their favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals annulled that decision on the ground of res judicata and ordered that the decree of distribution remain undisturbed. That ruling was affirmed when the Supreme Court denied the petition for review, and the denial became final in April 2003.

Meanwhile, in October 2000, the heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate court a motion for termination of administration, for accounting, and for transfer of titles in the names of the legatees. The probate court granted the motion in September 2003, holding that the twenty year prohibition had expired and that res judicata did not apply because the probate proceeding is continuing in character. Ma. Pilar and Clemente appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. They then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

Basilio Santiago contracted three marriages. With his first wife, Bibiana Lopez, he had two children, Irene and Marta, and Marta's children are the Soco oppositors. With his second wife, Irene Santiago, he had six children, among them Zoilo, Felicidad, and Ma. Pilar. With his third wife, Cecilia Lomotan, he had three children, among them Clemente and Cleotilde.

Basilio died testate in September 1973. His will devised the rice mill, the machines, and the animal feeds factory to Cecilia and eight named children in equal shares, and devised all the lands except the Manila house and lot to Cecilia and the same children. But the will expressly forbade partition of these properties for twenty years from his death, and placed their management in the hands of Ma. Pilar and Clemente. The Manila house and lot was to be transferred to Ma. Pilar and Clemente not as a legacy to them but only so that they might administer and preserve it, so that any child, grandchild, or descendant who wished to study in Manila would always have a place to stay.

The probate court approved the will and the final accounting, partition, and distribution, and the titles to the Bulacan lots and the Manila lot were transferred in the names of Ma. Pilar and Clemente. When the twenty year period expired in September 1993, the heirs of the second marriage moved to terminate the administration, render an accounting, and transfer the titles to the legatees. The probate court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the earlier judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirmed by the Supreme Court, holding that res judicata barred the complaint for completion of legitime, also bars the present motion for termination of administration, accounting, and transfer of titles.
• Whether or not the probate court may order the transfer of the Manila house and lot to the legatees despite the testator's intent that no one should own it.

Applicable Provisions

Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

This provision supplies the two aspects of res judicata, bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment, which the Court uses to test whether the earlier ruling forecloses the present motion.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides:

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

This provision, together with Articles 870 and 1083, fixes the statutory limit on any prohibition against partition, which the Court applies to the testator's twenty year restriction.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that neither aspect of res judicata applies. The judgment in the earlier case resolved the oppositors' claim of preterition and reduction of legitime, while the present motion concerns the termination of administration, accounting, and transfer of titles to the legatees of the second and third marriages. There is no similarity of claim, demand, or cause of action. Even as between the same parties, conclusiveness of judgment cannot be invoked because the earlier judgment would only estop the parties on the issue of preterition, which is not even raised in the present petition. The Court stressed that the probate court's order of September 2003 is a proper and necessary continuation of the earlier order approving the accounting, partition, and distribution, which had not yet become final pending the whole settlement of the estate. Final settlement would culminate only after twenty years, when the prohibition to partition was lifted.

On the second issue, the Court held that the testator clearly intended the Manila house and lot to be transferred to Ma. Pilar and Clemente for administration only, with the property owned by the heirs in common. But the condition of indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. The Court agreed with the appellate court that to sustain the petitioners' contention without qualification would violate Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, under which a prohibition to divide property held in co-ownership may last only twenty years, and that it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond that period.

Doctrine

First, res judicata has two aspects. Bar by prior judgment proscribes a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action already settled. Conclusiveness of judgment ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in a future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Both are embodied in Section 47 of Rule 39.

Second, a probate proceeding is a continuing proceeding. It terminates only after final distribution and settlement of the whole estate in accordance with the will. An order approving an accounting, partition, and distribution does not close the estate where the will itself forbids partition for a fixed period.

Third, a testator may not impose an indivision beyond the period allowed by law. Under Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, a prohibition against partition may last only twenty years, and co-ownership beyond that period is contrary to public policy.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals, with costs against the petitioners, so that the administration was terminated, the accounting ordered, and the titles transferred to the named legatees.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a probate proceeding is continuing in character and ends only upon final settlement and distribution of the whole estate, so an earlier approval of a partition does not bar a later motion to terminate administration once the period of indivision fixed by the will has lapsed. Examiners use this case to test the two aspects of res judicata under Section 47 of Rule 39 and the twenty year statutory limit on any prohibition against partition under Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code.