MIKE A. FERMIN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN, RESPONDENTS.
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Fermin versus Commission on Elections
The Case
This is a consolidated special civil action in the Supreme Court, brought by Mike Fermin against the Commission on Elections and his rival mayoralty candidate Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen. Fermin asks the Court to reverse the Commission's rulings that disqualified him from running for mayor of a newly created municipality in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and that later ordered the dismissal of his election protest. The case matters because the Court uses it to draw a clean line, once and for all, between two remedies that courts and lawyers had been confusing: a petition to disqualify a candidate under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the same Code. The Court tells us these are different remedies, resting on different grounds, producing different consequences, and governed by different deadlines.
Procedural History
Dilangalen filed a petition for disqualification against Fermin before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff Kabunsuan, which was docketed and eventually reached the Commission on Elections as a special action. The Second Division of the Commission disqualified Fermin for lack of the required residency. The Commission en banc affirmed that ruling. Fermin then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, and that petition became the first of the two consolidated cases.
Meanwhile, Fermin had filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City. Dilangalen moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that Fermin, having been disqualified, had no legal standing to protest. The trial court denied the motion and refused to reconsider. Dilangalen then went to the Commission on Elections by petition for certiorari and prohibition. The First Division of the Commission set aside the trial court's orders, prohibited the trial court from proceeding, and directed it to dismiss the protest. The Commission en banc denied Fermin's motion for reconsideration, and an entry of judgment was recorded. Fermin then filed a second petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which became the second of the consolidated cases. The Court initially dismissed that second petition, but on Fermin's motions it reconsidered and consolidated the two petitions because they were interrelated.
Facts
After the creation of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao passed Autonomy Act Number 205 on November 22, 2006, creating the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan. The new municipality was carved out of the Municipality of Kabuntalan, and several barangays, including Barangay Indatuan, were separated from the mother municipality. The creation was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006.
Mike Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan in Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for one year and six months, he applied to the Commission for transfer of his registration record to that barangay. On January 8, 2007, the Commission approved the transfer and registered him as a voter of a precinct in Barangay Indatuan, now part of Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 elections.
On April 20, 2007, Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition for disqualification against Fermin. Dilangalen alleged that Fermin did not possess the required period of residency and that he perjured himself in his certificate of candidacy and in his application for transfer, because he had in truth stayed for many years in Barangay Payan and had never resided in Northern Kabuntalan before May 14, 2006. Elections were held without the Commission having decided the case. Dilangalen won with 1,849 votes against Fermin's 1,640. Fermin then filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The Commission later disqualified Fermin, and the dispute over the protest followed.
Issues
- Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
- Whether or not the Dilangalen petition was filed on time.
- Whether or not the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in declaring Fermin not a resident of the locality for at least one year before the elections.
- Whether or not the Commission gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file it.
Applicable Provisions
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which lists the grounds for disqualification, provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
This provision matters because the Court holds that lack of the one-year residency requirement is not among its grounds, so the Dilangalen petition cannot be a Section 68 petition.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which also speaks of disqualification, provides:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications.—Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
This provision matters because the Court notes that the Dilangalen petition states none of these grounds either.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which governs disqualifications for elective local positions, provides:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications—The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded.
This provision matters because the Court uses it to show that the law's list of disqualification grounds does not include lack of residency, confirming that the Dilangalen petition is not a disqualification case.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court holds that the Dilangalen petition is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. It contains the essential allegations of such a petition: that the candidate made a representation in his certificate, that the representation pertains to a material matter affecting his right to run, and that it was made with intent to deceive the electorate as to his qualification. The Court stresses that denial of due course or cancellation is not based on lack of qualifications as such, but on a finding that the candidate made a false material representation, which may relate to the qualifications for the office. The Court also notes that a Section 78 proceeding has been likened to a quo warranto proceeding, with the distinction that the Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation while quo warranto is filed after.
The Court then insists that a Section 78 petition must not be confused with a Section 68 petition, because they are different remedies, based on different grounds, and producing different eventualities. The mere caption of the Dilangalen petition as one for disqualification does not control. The ground raised, lack of the one-year residency requirement, is not a ground for disqualification under Section 68, which refers only to prohibited acts and to permanent resident status in a foreign country. Neither is it a ground under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The Court also holds that a Commission rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish disqualification from ineligibility, so Rule 25 and the Commission's resolution cannot override the different requirements of the law.
On the second issue, because the petition is one under Section 78, it had to be filed within the period fixed by law, counted from the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. The Court resolves the timeliness of the petition in light of that characterization, applying the deadline for a Section 78 petition rather than the more liberal rule for a Section 68 petition.
On the remaining issues, the Court addresses the residency finding and the order dismissing the election protest in light of its ruling that the proper remedy and its consequences turn on the correct characterization of the petition. The person whose certificate is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he never filed a certificate, which is why such a person cannot be substituted, unlike a candidate merely disqualified under Section 68.
Doctrine
A petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy are distinct remedies. A disqualification petition may be premised on Section 12 or Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code, and rests on the grounds listed there, such as prohibited acts and permanent resident status in a foreign country. A petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 rests only on a false material representation in the certificate. The two differ in grounds, in the proceedings that raise them, and in their effects. A candidate disqualified under Section 68 merely ceases to continue as a candidate and may be substituted, while a candidate whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all and cannot be substituted. Lack of the one-year residency requirement is a matter of ineligibility, not a ground for disqualification. A Commission rule or resolution cannot supply a ground or create a cause of action that the legislature has not provided, because that is a substantive matter beyond the Commission's rule-making power.
Disposition
The Court resolved the consolidated petitions in accordance with its ruling that the Dilangalen petition is a Section 78 petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, and disposed of the cases on that basis.
Remember This
Memorize the line: a Section 68 disqualification and a Section 78 cancellation are different remedies, based on different grounds, with different effects, and a false material representation in the certificate of candidacy belongs to Section 78, not Section 68. Examiners like to use this case to test whether you can classify a pleading by its grounds rather than its caption, and to test the rule that a disqualified candidate may be substituted while one whose certificate is cancelled is not a candidate at all.