EDAURDO SANCHEZ ET. AL. PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN, PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This case is before us on appeal by the plaintiffs from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The facts as found by the
trial court are as follows: The defendant municipality, appellee
herein, is the owner of a triangular strip of land situated between the
site of the municipal school building and the provincial road,
measuring 42 x 26% x 46 meters. On that land appellants, with the
knowledge and. implied consent of the municipality, constructed
temporary stores and buildings of light materials shortly after the end
of the last war. Between 1952 and 1959 they paid rents to appellee.
When a new local administration took.over after the elections of
November 1959 the municipal council passed a resolution notifying the
occupants of the land that the same was needed for certain public
purposes, such as parking space, expansion of school grounds, widening
of the road and Waiting area for pedestrians. Appellants were therefore
advised to vacate on or before May 15, 1960, some.five (5) months after
the date of notice. Instead of moving, hpwever, appellants filed a
petition for prohibition with the court a quo on May 10, i960 to
prevent the municipality from ejecting them from the land, with the
alternative prayer that should” they be ejected, appellee be ordered to
reimburse to them the rents which they had paid, in the total sum of
Pl,178.20. There was also a demand for damages and attorney’s fees.
After trial, the court dismissed the petition and ordered appellants to
vacate the laud, with costs.

Appellants, first contention here is that the land in question
belongs to the Province of Pangasinan and therefore appellee has no
right to order their ejectment. The premise of the contention is
incorrect, or the clear and specific finding of the court a qua is
that the said land is owned by the Municipality of Asingan. This is a
factual, conclusion that is no longer open to review in the present
appeal. The additional statement by the court “that it is part of the
broad shoulder of the provincial road” does not make the land
provincial property, such statement being merely descriptive of its
location and not indicative of its ownership.

The next issue raised by appellants is with reference to the sum of
Pl,178.20 paid by them as rents from 1952 to 1959. They claim the right
to be reimbursed in case they should be ejected; and cite the case of
Rooas vs. Municipality of Cavite, 30 Phil. 607, where this Court, after
declaring null and void the lease of a public plaza belonging to the
said municipality and ordering the lessee to vacate the same, ordered
the municipality reimburse the rentals collected. It should be noted
that while the property involved in that case was clearly devoted to
public use, and therefore outside the commerce of man, and could not
under any circumstance have been the object of a valid contract of
lease, appellee’s position herein is that the land in question is
patrimonial in character, not being included in any of the categories
of municipal properties for public use enumerated in Article 424 of
the.Civil Code, namely: “municipal streets, squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades and public works for public service in said
municipality.” There is indeed nothing in the decision appealed from or
in the briefs of the parties to show that the land was devoted to any
of those purposes when appellants began  their occupancy.
Consequently, the implied agreement of lease with them was not null and
void, although terminable upon the notice, as appellee herein elected
to terminate it. That being so, there is no ground on which
reimbursement of the rents may be ordered.

In any event, even granting that the land in question is for public
use and therefore the municipality of Asingaii could not legally lease
it to private parties, we see no justification for the stand maintained
by appellants that after having occupied said land and derived benefits
therefrom they should still be entitled to recover what they have paid
as a condition for their ejectment. That would be to enrich them unduly
to the prejudice of appellee. Besides, it may be said that when they
built their temporary structures on the land with the latter’s
knowledge and implied consent they both treated it as municipal
patrimonial property. Insofar as the rents already paid by them are
concerned appellants are estopped from claiming otherwise in order to
obtain a recovery.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Coneepci&n, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.