G.R. No. 176129, August 24, 2011
HEIRS OF RODOLFO CRISOSTOMO (EUPROCINIA, ROYCE AND IRISH CRISOSTOMO), PETITIONERS, VS. RUDEX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
which dismissed outright the petitioners’ Petition for Review dated
September 13, 2006 for being filed one day beyond the 15-day extended
period granted by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Euprocinia,
Royce, and Irish, are the wife and children, respectively, of the late
complainant, Rodolfo Crisostomo, who died during the pendency of the
case. [4]
The respondent, Rudex International Development Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.[5]
On
December 17, 2001, the Crisostomo spouses were offered a house and lot
at Patricia South Villa, a subdivision developed by the respondent in
Anabu II-F, Imus, Cavite. After seeing the model house on Block 8, Lot
3, the Crisostomos decided to buy the property priced at ?833,000.00 on
installment basis. On the same day, they paid ?10,000.00 as down
payment and signed a Reservation Agreement. On December 21, 2001, the
couple paid an additional ?50,000.00, executed a promissory note, and
issued 36 postdated checks to cover the monthly amortizations on the
property. The Crisostomos were then given a Key Acceptance, Walk
Through, and Final Turnover Certificate.[6]
On
February 10, 2002, the Crisostomo family moved in to their new house;
however, they started to notice several construction defects on the
house and inadequate facilities in the subdivision. Thus, on March 22,
2002, the late Rodolfo asked his wife Euprocinia to discontinue paying
their monthly amortizations and to ask for a rescission of the
contract. On May 17, 2002, Rodolfo personally delivered a letter of
complaint to the respondent, wherein he rescinded their Contract to Sell, demanded the refund of all the payments he had made, and reiterated that he would no longer pay the monthly amortizations.[7]
On May 27, 2002, Rodolfo filed a Complaint[8]
for violation of Presidential Decree Nos. 1344 and 957, and Board
Resolution No. 579 of 1995, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB).
In view of respondent’s failure to answer the Complaint, it was declared in default on November 26, 2003.[9]
The
HLURB conducted an ocular inspection in Patricia South Villa on March
12, 2003 and found Rodolfo’s allegations to be supported by its
findings. The HLURB held that under Section 20 of Presidential Decree
No. 957, its findings justified the right of Rodolfo to demand
rescission of his contract with the respondent. Thus, on July 7, 2003,
the HLURB issued its Judgment by Default,[10] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
rescission of the contract to sell as valid and ordering the respondent
to refund the total payments in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest
at 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint until full payment.After full payment, complainant is directed to peacefully surrender the subject property in favor of the respondent.
Further,
respondent is directed to pay complainant P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees
and to pay this Board P10,000.00 by way of administrative fine for
violation of Section 20 in relation to Section 38 of P.D. 957.[11]
On August 26, 2003, the respondent asked the HLURB to review[12]
its July 7, 2003 Decision. It alleged that Rodolfo’s allegations were
concocted to get out of their contract because he could no longer pay
his monthly amortizations on the property. On August 17, 2004, the HLURB rendered a Decision[13] on respondent’s Petition for Review, to wit:
Wherefore, the decision of the office below is hereby modified to read as follows:
Wherefore
premises considered, judgment is hereby rescinding the reservation
agreement of parties and subject to legal compensation or offsetting,
ordering respondent to refund the total payments in the amount of
P71,650.00 with interest at legal interest from the time of the filing
of the complaint; ordering complainant to turn over possession of the
unit to the respondent and ordering complainant to pay respondent
reasonable compensation for the use of the unit in the amount of
P4,000.00 per month until possession of the unit is turned over to the
respondent.Further, respondent is directed to pay complainant
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay this board P10,000.00 by way of
administrative fine for violation of section 20 in relation to section
38 of P.D. 957.[14]
This was appealed[15] by the petitioners, who substituted Rodolfo upon his death, to the Office of the President. On November 18, 2005, the Office of the President decided[16] in their favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated
August 23, 2004 is hereby reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby
rendered:
- Declaring the contract of sale entered into between the parties as rescinded;
- Appellants are hereby ordered to turn over possession of the property to the Appellee;
- Appellee
is hereby ordered of refund to the appellants the latter’s total
payment in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from
June 10, 2002 (time of the filing of the complaint);- Appellee is likewise ordered to pay appellants P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
- Appellee is ordered to pay appellants P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
- Appellee is ordered to pay administrative fine in the amount of P10,000.00.[17]
The respondent asked for a reconsideration[18] of this decision and on May 9, 2006, the Office of the President granted respondent’s motion and reinstated the August 17, 2004 decision of the HLURB.[19]
The
Office of the President, in resolving the issue of whether it properly
deleted the previous award of rentals by the HLURB, held that “P.D.
[No.] 957 does not authorize oppression of perceived unscrupulous
subdivision developers, each time a home buyer cries foul or alleges any
infirmity on the former.”[20]
Agreeing with the respondent that the deletion of the award of rentals
would result in unduly enriching the petitioners, the Office of the
President held:
By staying at the questioned premises
for free and without compensation, to the prejudice of [respondent], it
is clear that [petitioners] unduly enriched themselves at the expense
of another.Rental payments are legally supported by virtue of
the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Eventhough the same is not prayed
for by herein appellee, it could still be recognized and awarded by our
Office considering that said issue, or award thereof, is inextricably
linked to the issues involved as well as the facts proven in the case,
and it is necessary for a just and equitable determination of the case.[21]
The petitioners sought for a reconsideration[22] of this Order,[23] but this was denied by the Office of the President on August 2, 2006.
On
September 15, 2006, the petitioners filed their Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals. However, this was dismissed outright in a
Resolution[24] for being filed
out of time, the deadline being September 14, 2006. The Court of
Appeals said that the petitioners were already granted a 15-day
extension and yet no justification or reason was given to explain why
they still filed beyond the extended period. The Court of Appeals held:
We
have no more jurisdiction to entertain the Petition much less to alter
the judgment which has become final and executory. We only have the
power to dismiss the appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances
to warrant such delay.[25]The petitioners sought reconsideration of this dismissal but the Court of Appeals found their motion to be “bereft of merit.”[26]
The
petitioners are now before us, seeking not only that we give their
petition due consideration, but also that we declare the HLURB August
17, 2004 Decision as null and void. They submit the following issues
for our resolution:
5.1. AN APPEAL IS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE COURTS SHOULD PROCEED WITH CAUTION,
SO AS NOT TO DEPRIVE THE PETITIONERS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL,
PARTICULARLY, IF THE APPEAL IS MERITORIOUS.5.2. THE HLURB APPEAL
BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF HLURB PROPER
GRANTING RELIEF WHICH WAS NOT PRAYED FOR ALLEGED IN THE PLEADINGS, AND
NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.5.3. THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD HAS NO
JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT OF HLURB PROPER,
AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIKEWISE HAS ACTED, IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED EN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD.[27]
Discussion
We
shall limit our discussion to the core issue of whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
petitioners before it, on the ground that the petition was filed late.
The
petitioners are claiming that their one-day delay in filing their
petition before the Court of Appeals constitutes excusable negligence in
the absence of an intent to delay the administration of justice. The
petitioners explained that their petition was ready as early as
September 13, 2006, with only the annexes to be attached. Their counsel
assigned her secretary to arrange and attach these annexes but without
their counsel’s knowledge, the secretary did this in a vacant room
outside their office. The following day, the secretary, a single mother
of two small children, failed to report for work because she had to
take her kids to a doctor as they had been sick since she found them
home, abandoned by their nanny, the night before. It was only late in
the afternoon that the secretary remembered that she forgot to leave
instructions about the petition in their office.[28]
The
petitioners are asking that this Court exercise its equity jurisdiction
since their delay was neither intended nor prejudicial to respondent.[29]
Ruling of this Court
We grant the petition.
This
Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal
is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of
justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element of intent
to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to
petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their petition’s
dismissal.[30]
In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales v. Pennisi,[31] this Court elucidated on the rules on reglementary periods, to wit:
The
general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the
judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of
exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to
appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a
grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the
period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration
of justice and to put an end to controversies.[32]
In Samala v. Court of Appeals,[33] we said:
The
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical
matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this
liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid
to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from the courts.[34]
In
this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on
September 13, 2006. The petitioners entrusted the drafting of their
petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the attaching of the
required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary
resigned from her job sometime later to avoid giving her employer
“problems for unexpected absences in the future.”[35] Aside from this, the petitioners also submitted an Affidavit[36]
from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she was
not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A
certification from the doctor of one of the secretary’s children was
also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children
to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for filing the
petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
In light of the
foregoing, we are inclined to give the same consideration in this case
pursuant to the rules on justice, equity, and fair play.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 6, 2006 and January 5, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95920 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CA-G.R. SP No. 95920 is ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] 1997 Rules of Court, Rule 45.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 45-46; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with
Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[3] Id. at 39-42.
[4] Id. at 10.
[5] Id. at 222.
[6] Id. at 22.
[7] Id. at 23-25.
[8] Id. at 53-62.
[9] Id. at 65-66.
[10] Id. at 93-97.
[11] Id. at 97.
[12] Id. at 98-112.
[13] Id. at 185-188.
[14] Id. at 187.
[15] Id. at 191-220.
[16] Id. at 260-273.
[17] Id. at 272-273.
[18] Id. at 274-282.
[19] Id. at 290-293.
[20] Id. at 291.
[21] Id. at 292.
[22] Id. at 294-309.
[23] Id. at 317.
[24] Id. at 45-46.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 40.
[27] Id. at 26.
[28] Id. at 26-27.
[29] Id. at 27.
[30] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, 511 Phil. 486, 498 (2005).
[31] G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 292.
[32] Id. at 301.
[33] 416 Phil. 1 (2001).
[34] Id. at 8.
[35] Rollo, p. 51, Resignation Letter.
[36] Id. at 48-49.