HOSPICIA ENCABO ALIAS SIMPLICIA ENCABO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal taken by Hospicia Encabo, alias Simplicia
Encabo, and her daughters Dionisia, Fulgencia and Lucila, all surnamed Enciso,
assisted by their respective husbands,—hereinafter referred to as the
Encisos—from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case
No. R-334 dismissing their complaint against the Cebu Portland Cement
Company—hereinafter referred to as Cepoc—and ordering them to pay the latter the
sum of P500 as damages, and the costs.

On December 2, 1953 the Encisos commenced the present action in
the above-named court to recover from Cepoc the ownership and possession of a
parcel of land situated In barrio Tina-an, municipality of Naga, province of
Cebu, containing an approximate area of 17,341 square meters, plus back rentals
due thereon since the year 1943, expenses, damages, attorneys fees and costs.
Their complaint alleged that said land was a portion of a parcel of 45,611 sq.
m. originally owned by Hospicia Encabo and her deceased husband, Romualdo
Enciso, and is made up of Lots C and D appearing on Plan Psu-36327 (Exhibit A)
with a total area of approximately 17,341 square meters; that In 1937 Romualdo
Enciso sold a different portion of around 15,000 square meters, Indicated as Lot
B in the same plan to Cepoc for the sum of P2,000.00; that on another portion
designated as Lot A in the same plan, with an area of 3,270 square meters, the
Encisos had built their home; that at the time of the sale of Lot B, Cepoc asked
its vendor to allow it to use Lots C and D (now in question), promising to pay
fair rentals thereon when it would have the means to do so and, by way of
reciprocity, it promised to accommodate for employment any member of the
vendor’s family; that relying on Cepoc’s assurance that it would pay the proper
rentals in due time and on its promise to accommodate for employment any member
of his family, Enciso allowed Cepoc to occupy and use the lots in question; that
in 1943, or ten years prior to the filing of the present action, Cepoc
constructed on the premises a water tank and two residential houses, and, at the
time of the filing of the action, a recreation hall was being constructed
thereon; and that, despite repeated demands therefor, Cepoc refused to pay
rentals for the use of the premises.

Cepoc’s original answer to the complaint alleged that it had
acquired through purchase from the Enciso spouses more than ten years before a
parcel of land (Lot 8 of the Encisos’ plan) with an area of 15,000 square
meters; that it was likewise the owner of a portion of the lots in question by
virtue of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and that the remaining portion
designated as Lot D in said plan was government property being leased by it
under Fore- shore Lease FL-164-Amd-3.

While the Encisos were presenting their evidence Cepoc, with
leave of court, filed an amended answer alleging that it owned Lots B, C, and D
in fee simple; that the action of the Encisos was barred by a prior judgment and
by prescription; and by way of counterclaim alleged that the action was clearly
unfounded and had resulted in Cepoc suffering damages in the sum of
P5,000.00.

Still later and after Cepoc had presented a considerable part of
its own evidence, the lower court, after proper hearing, admitted Cepoc’s second
amended answer for the purpose of making its pleadings conform to its evidence.
This appeared to be convenient, if not necessary, because under the allegations
of ownership in fee simple made in Cepoc’s first amended answer, it had been
allowed to present documentary evidence (Exhibit 6) showing that on September 1,
1936 the spouses Romualdo Enciso and Hospicia Encabo had sold to Cepoc a parcel
of land with an area not of 15,000 but of 30,714.90 square meters, for the sum
of P2,000.00; that thereafter, registration proceedings were commenced in
connection with the land thus acquired (registration case No. 418, G.L.R.O
record No. 51665) and that, as a result thereof, said land was ordered
registered in Cepoc’s name, as shown by Decree No. 647162 of August 10, 1937;
that since the time of the sale on September 1, 1936, Cepoc had occupied the
more than 30,000 square meters already referred to as absolute owner thereof and
had actually constructed thereon a hospital, a number of concrete residential
houses and other permanent improvements.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the court rendered the appealed
judgment.

Although in their voluminous brief the Encisos submit for our
consideration a total of twenty assignments of error covering diverse questions
of fact and law, the fact Is that the main issue to be resolved is whether or
not the area of the parcel of land sold by the Encisos to Cepoc on September 1,
1936 was 15,000 or 30,714.90 square meters. This issue, in turn, depends firstly
on whether the public document marked as Exhibit 6 is a forgery or not, and
secondly, on whether or not the land subjectmatter thereof has already been
registered in the name of Cepoc.

The Encisos admit the fact of the sale, but they claim that the
land sold had only an area of 15,000 square meters. It appears, however, that on
September 1, 1936, for and in consideration of P2,000.00, the Encisos executed
in favor of Cepoc a deed of sale (see Exhibits 6 and 6-B) whereby they sold to
the latter a parcel of land described as follows:

“Boundaries: Corners marked by stones.

North: A canal used as a discharge from the Power House of Cebu
Portland Cement Company.

East: Seashore

South: Property of Cebu Portland Cement Company

West: Provincial Road

Area: 30,714.90 square meters

Improvements: About 15 young coconut trees.

Tax No: 26292

Kind: Part swampy and part agricultural.

Assessed value of entire land: P920.00

Actual Possessors: Romualdo Enciso & Hospicia
Encabo.”

It appears further that in the year 1937 and in Land
Registration Case No. 418, G.L.R.O. Record No. 51665 (Exhibits 3, 3-A to 3-D,
Exhibits 8, 8-A to 8-D), the land above described was decreed in the name of
Cepoc. Its application for registration was based on Plan Psu-102184—the
reconstructed copy of which is now in the record as Exhibit 4—and the same was
heard without any opposition by the original owners of the land nor by any
adjoining owner. On June 8, 1937, the Court rendered decision whose dispositive
part reads as follows:

“For tanto se ordena la adjudicacion y registro de las tres
parcelas de terreno—descritas en el piano Exh. ‘B’ y en la descripcion tecnica
Exh. ‘A’, con todas sus mejoras y libre de toda carga y gravamen, a favor de la
Cebu Portland Cement Company, corporacion organizada de acuerdo con las leyes de
Filipinas, domiciliada en el Municipio de Naga de esta provincia de Cebu,
Filipinas.—Firme esta decision bajo la ley, expidase el decreto y el certificado
de titulo correspondientes.—Asi se ordena Cebu, Cebu, 8 de Junio de
1937.”

Believing itself to be the absolute owner of them land thus
decreed in its favor and of which it had been in possession since 1936, Cepoc
constructed thereon several improvements of a permanent character, such as a
hospital, several permanent structures including a water intake tank, a
recreation hall, and two residential buildings.

It is true, of course, that in the years 1941, 1948, and 1953,
Hospicia Encabo appears to have made upon Cepoc verbal demands for payment of
rentals over the land where the above permanent Improvements had been
constructed, but such demands were met with a refusal. Thereafter, written
demands were sent to Cepoc (Exhibits E, E-1 and E-2), and it was only upon the
latter’s reiterated refusal to pay that the present suit was instituted.

It thus appears that it was only in 1941, five years after the
execution of the Deed of Sale Exhibits 6, and four years after the land
subjectmatter thereof had been decreed in the name of Cepoc, and after several
improvements of a permanent nature had been constructed thereon, that the
Encisos made verbal demands for the payment of rentals, and that it was only on
December 2, 1953—more than 15 years after Cepoc had enjoyed full possession of
the property—that they went to court to enforce their alleged rights. This,
jointly with the openly observed conduct of Cepoc to consider the land in
question as absolutely its exclusive property, can not but lead us to believe
that the Encisos themselves had recognized such ownership.

The Encisos claim, however, that the Deed of Sale Exhibit 6 is a
forgery, and that in connection with this issue, Cepoc is bound by the opinion
of the expert of the National Bureau of Investigation sustaining their view
because “both parties of the present case have promised to abide by whatever
findings the National Bureau of Investigation would submit as to the genuineness
of the document in question” (appellants’ brief p. 94).

The record does not sustain the claim that Cepoc had agreed to
be bound by the findings of the NBI expert. To the contrary, it shows
(stenographic transcript corresponding to the hearing held on March 29, 1957)
that it was only the Encisos’ side that agreed to be bound by the result of the
examination to be made by the NBI expert; that while Cepoc did not object to
having the Deed of Sale Exhibit 6 (attached as Annex A to Cepoc’s second amended
answer), together with other documents referred to the NBI for examination and
comparison of signatures, it indicated that it was reserving its right to accept
or dispute the result of said examination. As a matter of fact, after counsel
for the Encisos had asked for the submission of the Deed of Sale to the NBI for
examination, and had expressed “the idea of abiding with whatever ruling will be
made by that government entity”, counsel for Cepoc tried to hedge and stated
that he “would rather have the discussion on this matter be postponed on the
date when the hearing is to be continued”, and it was only after the trial judge
had said that time could be gained if Cepoc made up its mind on the subject
right then and there that Cepoc’s attorney stated that “We do not have any
objection to the examination by the NBI, although we might send some
representations to the NBI when this is examined”. To this counsel for the
Encisos replied: “That would be all right”. Moreover, the record also discloses
that when the report of the NBI Examiner was offered in evidence as Exhibit HH,
Cepoc’s counsel objected to its admission.

It must be admitted, however, that the opinion rendered by Mr.
Felipe P. Logan of the NBI is adverse to the genuineness or authenticity of the
document under consideration, but in this connection We must bear in mind that,
as a rule, opinions of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the
courts, more so in a case like the present where Mr. Logan was not presented as
a witness to give the party adversely affected by his opinion an opportunity to
cross-examine him.

This notwithstanding, the trial court admitted Logan’s report
but refused to accept it as correct, saying the following in its decision:

“Again, there is the further contention of plaintiffs—and the
Court considers this as most important and controversial—that the original of
Exhibit 6 (certified true copy of deed of sale) was spurious and forged, and
consequently of no probative value. The Court is not prepared to agree with this
contention of plaintiffs. The defendant has more than sufficiently established,
and this by means of the testimony of Atty. Prospero Pañares who prepared the
document, that the same had been executed and signed accordingly, moreover, the
corresponding records were found intact in the Division of Archives, even after
the lapse of almosttwenty years. There is evidently a presumption in favor of
the veracity and due execution of said documents. It is true that plaintiffs had
questioned the signatures appearing therein purporting to be those of plaintiff
Hospicia Encabo and her deceased spouse Romualdo Enciso, and forwarded the same
to the National Bureau of Investigation, and that Expert in questioned documents
and handwriting Felipe P. Logan had rendered an opinion favorable to plaintiffs’
contention. Note, however, that Logan has not appeared as witness for plaintiffs
and has not been cross-examined by defendant’s counsel or by the Court,
Inasmuch, nevertheless, as the Court had allowed the said signatures to be
submitted to him for opinion, the Court would discuss the same. Experts’
opinions are not binding upon the Court, although they may serve as guide, and
shall have such weight or influence upon the mind of the Court as the facts and
circumstances may warrant.”

“The Court has likewise taken pains in examining the
aforementioned three questioned signatures as well as those appearing In the
five documents whose signatures are considered standard, and has taken into
account the following circumstances, namely, Impulse, movement, tremors, pen
pressures, general appearance (that is, the way in which the signatures are
written), their graphic form, the appearance of the lines, possible retouchings,
and regularity or irregularity of the pen strokes, as well as the vanishing
points at every end of the signature in the questioned as well as in the
standard ones. While certain differences really appear as specified by expert
Logan upon a comparison of the questioned as well as the standard signatures,
the Court is of the opinion and hereby concludes that such differences as have
been noted by expert Logan are of such Intensity as are not altogether
sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the questioned signatures (in Exhibit
6-C) are not those of the persons concerned namely, Hospicia Encabo, Romualdo
Enciso and Esperidlon del Socorro, and consequently forged. Such differences may
be taken Into consideration as are possible to happen If all the signatures had
been signed by the same three persons, If we consider the circumstance that
these documents had been signed in the years 1934, 1941 and 1948,
respectively—thus, showing an interval of a considerable number of years before
and after 1936 when the signatures in the deed of sale (photostat, Exhibit 6-c)
have been possibly signed by the persons concerned.

“The differences pointed out by expert Logan under the heading
General Appearance and Pictorial Effect, and under Line Quality are such as
might be considered negligible.

“Under the heading, Writing Habit Logan concludes that in the
standard signatures, the letter capital ‘H’ in Hospicia Encabo is smaller and
takes an almost vertical slant than the corresponding capital letter ‘H’ in the
questioned signatures. Surely, sizes of letters in one’s signature, as a matter
of common knowledge, usually differs from one another, this depending often upon
the space in the corresponding document that may be accorded the signer.

“This is also true as regards the alleged differences under the
caption Pen Pressure. Under this caption, Logan submits that the writer of the
standard signature ‘Hospicia Encabo’ has produced a line of varying width or
Intensity as shown in the pen pressure, while that in the questioned signature
has shown consistent width and intensity because of superior muscular control.
The Court does not seem to see any materiality or variance in these
signatures.

”Under the caption General Symptoms of Forgery, he asserts that
the small letter ‘c’ in Encabo in the questioned questioned signature shows
evidence of suspicious retouchings. This may be so, as such retouching really
appears, but in all the other signatures in the questioned Exhibit 6-c and all
the signatures in the aforementioned standard five documents, the same
retouching occurs at random. Granting that there is such retouching it would be
quite sweeping and dangerous to suppose that a signature with retouched letters
is forged. In general appearance or pictorial effect, writing habit, and the
characteristic sequence of the letters in the aforementioned signatures, taken
altogether in general, do not reveal any substantial differences between the
questioned and the standard signatures.

“The Court, therefore, hereby holds that while there may be some
differences as pointed to by expert Logan in the aforementioned signatures, the
same would not warrant a conclusion that the signature of the plaintiff Hospicia
Encabo, as well as those of her deceased husband Romualdo Enciso and Espiridion
del Socorro, in Exhibit 6-C, have not been signed by these persons concerned. On
the other hand, the Court holds that the said signa- tures are genuine
signatures of Hospicia Encabo, Romualdo Enciso, and Espiridion del Socorro. This
conclusion sits on the premise, that even granting the aforementioned
differences to exist, the evidence, particularly the positive testimony of
Attorney and Notary Public Prospero Paftares who prepared the original of
Exhibit 6-C and before whom the parties signed and acknowledged the same, and
above all, the existence of said document in the Division of Archives, when
taken altogether with the other attending facts and circumstances, would leave
not an iota of doubt that there was but one deed of sale executed by plaintiff
Hospicia Encabo and her deceased husband Romualdo Enciso in favor of defendant,
and that was on September 1, 1936. Plaintiffs’ claim that there was a subsequent
deed of sale on the same lots has miserably failed as no tangible evidence
except the bare and uncorroborated testimony of Hospicia Encabo, has been
introduced. The circumstance that Exhibit 6-c was the only one found in the
Division of Archives, conclusively proves that that was the only document that
had been sent there for record purposes. And this conclusion of the court is
further strengthened by the circumstance that the defendant had registered the
lots involved and secured the corresponding torrens title therefor-whose
proceedings had been with the knowledge and consent of plaintiffs who did not
object thereto, as a matter of fact, they did not remember to demand for the
rentals (if it were true as plaintiffs claim that the lots in question had just
been occupied by defendant under the promise of paying rentals therefor).

“Considering altogether the evidence for both parties, the Court
hereby holds that the preponderance of said evidence is decidedly in favor of
the defendant.”

Moreover, the circumstances under which the existence of the
Deed of Sale was discovered in the Division of Archives speaks strongly in favor
of its genuineness. In this connection it appears that while the trial of the
case was in progress Cepoc moved to have the Director of Lands included as
defendant. Upon denial of this motion by the trial court, former Justice
Fortunato Borromeo, as counsel for Cepoc, took the case to this court by
certiorari, but the petition was dismissed on April 18, 1955. It appears that
during the time the certiorari case was pending before Us, former Justice
Borromeo discovered in the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Justice and the
Office of the Land Registration Commissioner important documents showing that in
the year 1937 Cepoc had applied for the registration of three lots in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu and that, as a matter of fact, a decree had been
issued for their registration in its name and for the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title. This prompted Cepoc to file on July 15, 1955
its first amended answer claiming ownership in fee simple of Lots 2, 3 and 4 of
the plan attached as Appendix A to the complaint.

After the admission of said amended answer and the resumption of
the trial, Hospicia Encabo, while testifying on cross-examination, admitted that
she had actually seen the Deed of Sale for the land for which Cepoc had paid
P2,000.00; that their copy of the same was destroyed during the war; that the
deed was notarized before Notary Public Pañares, that the price was P0.20 per
square meter. Unable to obtain from the notary a copy of the Deed of Sale,
Cepoc’s representation made inquiries regarding the same in the Division of
Archives in Manila and it was there where a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by
Enciso in favor of Cepoc was found and a certified copy thereof (now marked as
Exhibit 6) was obtained. The document clearly shows that the property sold to
Cepoc had an area of 30,714.90 square meters.

In view of all the circumstances we find it extremely hard to
believe that the document in question is a forgery.

Moreover, as already stated heretofore, it appears sufficiently
established that on January 4, 1937 Cepoc commenced registration proceedings to
have the property subjectmatter of the Deed of Sale Exhibit 6 registered in its
name (Land Registration Case No. 418, G.L.R.O. Record No. 51665, the application
filed being based on Plan Psu-102184, the reconstructed copy of which is now in
the record as Exhibit 4). The application was called for hearing unopposed, and
on June 8, 1937, the judge then presiding the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered judgment confirming Cepoc’s title upon the land purchased from the
Encisos—which the lower court found to include the lots now in question. On July
22, 1937, the corres- ponding order for the issuance of the decree was issued
(Exhibit 8-C, p. 36 of Exhibit 8) and a copy of said decree No. 647162 dated
October 9, 1937 is also in the record as Exhibit 8-D, found at pp. 41-43 of
Exhibit 8.

The claim of Cepoc is entirely consistent not only with its own
conduct subsequent to the sale but also with that observed by the Encisos
themselves—to which we have already made reference heretofore. As far as Cepoc
is concerned, the record is conclusive of the fact that it had actually treated
the properties in question as included in the land purchased by it from Enciso
on September 1, 1936 by constructing thereon valuable improvements of permanent
character and by applying for its registration in its name.

The Encisos claim, inter alia, that it was error on the
part of the trial court to admit Cepoc’s second amended answer whereby it was
allowed to adopt a completely different theory of defense. We find no merit in
this contention. There was in reality no change of defense. In its original
answer as well as in the first amended answer, Cepoc claimed ownership of the
land in question. The same claim was made in the second amended answer although
it was premised on the Deed of Sale Exhibit 6 discovered during the trial.

Moreover, at the time the second amended answer was submitted
for admission, Cepoc had already introduced evidence concerning the purchase by
it not of 15,000 square meters but of 30,000 square meters of land from the
Enciso spouses. It is clear, therefore, that the second amended answer was
allowed simply to make the pleadings conform to the evidence already in the
record, a matter entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court.

In view of the conclusions We have arrived at upon the matters
expressly resolved above, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the other
questions raised in the brief submitted by the Encisos.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.