🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ AND EDWIN VALDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 175602. February 13, 2013 February 13, 2013

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People versus Valdez

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted two brothers, Police Officer Two Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, for the killing of three members of the Sayson family at a jai alai betting station. The case matters for two reasons. First, it teaches how treachery must be pleaded in the information, and why a killing charged as murder may be reduced to homicide when the information merely recites the word treachery without the facts. Second, it applies the rule that an appeal taken by one of several accused benefits those who did not appeal, whenever the appellate judgment is favorable and applicable to them, even if their own convictions have already become final.

Procedural History

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, in Quezon City. After trial, the trial court convicted them as charged, imposed reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay the heirs of each victim actual damages, civil indemnity, and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the convictions, but modified the awards to civil indemnity, moral damages, temperate damages, and exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.

The accused then came to the Supreme Court on final appeal. Edwin Valdez later filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted, so his appeal was deemed closed and terminated. On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide instead of three counts of murder, and imposing on him for each count an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Edwin then wrote a letter to the Court Administrator, invoking Section 11, paragraph (a), of Rule 122, and asking that the same favorable judgment be applied to him. The Solicitor General interposed no opposition. The Court granted the plea.

Facts

The two accused, then armed with short firearms, went together on a single motorcycle to the jai alai betting station of Moises Sayson. They confronted Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth, who was then busy attending to bettors inside the booth. Because the accused were calling Rubio to come out, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises, saying, in effect, that he would shoot Moises first. Moises replied, "Huwag," meaning no. Immediately after, Eduardo Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground, and Eduardo continued firing at the fallen Moises.

Ferdinand Sayson rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin Valdez shot Ferdinand in the head. Somebody shouted to Joselito Sayson to run, but Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back, and Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots were apparently fired from short distances. The testimonial accounts of the State's witnesses jibed with the physical evidence. The medico-legal evidence showed a gunshot wound in Ferdinand's head, two gunshot wounds entering Joselito's back and the right side of his neck, and a gunshot wound in Moises's head and four gunshot wounds in his chest. The National Bureau of Investigation medico-legal officer opined that the marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the wounds were inflicted at close range.

Both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. They went together to the betting station on one motorcycle, jointly attacked the unarmed victims, and fled together on the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose. The informations, however, alleged only that the accused, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, assaulted and shot the victims, without setting forth the particular acts and circumstances showing how treachery attended each killing.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the conviction of the accused for three counts of murder.
  • Whether or not the informations sufficiently alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance so as to sustain a conviction for murder.
  • Whether or not Edwin Valdez, whose conviction had already become final after he withdrew his appeal, may still benefit from the favorable judgment rendered in the appeal of his co-accused Eduardo Valdez.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11, paragraph (a), of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

This is the provision that allows Edwin Valdez, who did not pursue his appeal, to receive the benefit of the judgment favorable to his co-accused.

The Court also quoted its earlier ruling in Lim versus Court of Appeals, which construed the same provision:

A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.

This ruling extends the benefit of the provision even to an accused who had appealed but whose conviction had already become final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the conviction of Eduardo Valdez for the killings supported by the evidence, but held that he could not be convicted of murder. The testimonial accounts of the State's witnesses jibed with the physical evidence, and the congruence between them rendered the findings conclusive. Conspiracy existed, because the two accused acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns, as shown by their going together on a single motorcycle, their joint attack, and their fleeing together. To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution, nor know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator.

On the second issue, the Court held that the informations did not sufficiently allege treachery. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. The averments that the accused, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, assaulted and shot the victims did not set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each killing. Merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. The use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, and the use of the term treachery, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law. Hence, Eduardo was guilty only of three counts of homicide, with the penalty applied in its medium period, and the indeterminate sentence taken from prision mayor as minimum to the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.

On the third issue, the Court held that Edwin could not be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes and the resultant lighter penalties, despite the finality of his convictions due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading was definitely favorable to him. To deny him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibility would be highly unfair, considering that the Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy. The Court applied Section 11, paragraph (a), of Rule 122, and the ruling in Lim versus Court of Appeals that the benefit extends to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, so long as the judgment is favorable to them.

Doctrine

First, every element of the offense, including any qualifying circumstance such as treachery, must be stated in the information. The real nature of the charge is determined by the actual recital of facts, not by the caption or by the designation of the offense, which are mere conclusions of law. Merely using the word treachery, without averring the particular acts and circumstances constituting it, is insufficient, and the accused may be convicted only of the lesser offense of homicide.

Second, under Section 11, paragraph (a), of Rule 122, an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. This benefit extends to an accused whose conviction has already become final, whether because he did not appeal or because he withdrew his appeal, so long as the judgment is favorable and applicable to him, especially where the evidence against the accused is inextricably linked and their liability is equal under the principle of conspiracy.

Disposition

The Court granted the plea of Edwin Valdez and applied to him the judgment finding Eduardo Valdez guilty of three counts of homicide, with the same indeterminate sentence and the same awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages for each count.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is this: treachery must be averred by its facts, not merely by its name, and a favorable appellate judgment redounds to the benefit of a co-accused whose conviction has already become final. Examiners like to use this case on the sufficiency of the information in alleging qualifying circumstances, and on the application of Section 11, paragraph (a), of Rule 122 to an accused who withdrew his appeal.