🎧 Case Brief Lecture

ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, PETITIONER, VS. NESTOR P. VILLASIN, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 174929. June 27, 2008 June 27, 2008

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Feliciano versus Villasin

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 brought by Engineer Ranulfo Feliciano against Nestor Villasin, the man the Leyte Metropolitan Water District Board of Directors installed as General Manager after the Civil Service Commission ordered Feliciano to vacate that office. Feliciano had earlier filed a petition for quo warranto before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, asking to be restored to the General Manager position and to have Villasin removed. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of a cause of action, and Feliciano came to the Supreme Court. The case matters because it teaches the two things a quo warranto petitioner must always remember: an individual who sues in his own name must actually aver and prove his own right to the office, and a petition for certiorari must be directed against the tribunal that issued the challenged orders.

Procedural History

Feliciano filed a petition for quo warranto before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Leyte, seeking restoration to the General Manager post and the ouster of Villasin. The trial court, in an Order dated 28 July 2006, dismissed the petition, holding that where the fundamental basis of the petition is absent, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of the respondent, and that for lack of a cause of action amounting to want of jurisdiction the petition must be dismissed. Feliciano moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated 8 September 2006, adding that the quo warranto petition was premature because his separate petition for review on certiorari involving the earlier Civil Service Commission resolutions was still pending. Feliciano then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing both orders.

Facts

Feliciano was appointed General Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District on 11 June 1975 by its Board of Directors. In March 1990, the Local Water Utilities Administration took over the management and policy-making functions of the district because of its default on obligations, acting under Presidential Decree No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. A take-over General Manager was appointed, and administrative charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming an official were filed against Feliciano. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel found him guilty and recommended dismissal, and the Interim Board of Directors approved the findings in full on 11 November 1991.

The take-over was lifted in July 1998, and the new regular Board of Directors ordered Feliciano to re-assume the post of General Manager, which he accepted in September 1998. He then appointed three employees and submitted their appointments to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, which disapproved them because Feliciano himself did not hold a Commission-approved appointment. The Commission, in a resolution issued in September 2000, affirmed the disapproval, treating Feliciano as a mere de facto officer, and denied his motion for reconsideration in January 2001. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied, and this Court denied his petition for review.

In February 2005, the Commission issued a resolution declaring Feliciano a mere de facto officer between June 1999 and February 2001, and a usurper or intruder from February 2001 onward, ordering him to vacate the position of General Manager. While his separate petition challenging that resolution was pending, the Board declared the position vacant. After a temporary restraining order lapsed, the Board appointed Villasin as the new General Manager in June 2005. Feliciano's separate petition was eventually dismissed, and this Court denied review with finality, with entry of judgment made in November 2006. Feliciano then filed the quo warranto petition that led to this case.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Feliciano's petition for quo warranto.
  • Whether or not Feliciano, as an individual suing in his own name, sufficiently averred and proved his own right to the office of General Manager.
  • Whether or not Feliciano was denied due process when the trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the requisites of certiorari, provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This provision fixes the requisites the Court checked, including that the writ must be directed against the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, on quo warranto by an individual, provides:

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name.

This is the very remedy Feliciano invoked, and it requires that he claim and prove entitlement to the office.

Section 10 of Rule 66, on judgment where usurpation is found, provides:

When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

This shows the relief that presupposes a petitioner's own established right to the office.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition must fail on procedural grounds. Feliciano did not implead the Regional Trial Court, the tribunal that rendered the assailed orders, as a nominal public respondent. One of the requisites of an independent civil action for certiorari is that it must be directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and failure to comply is a sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court also restated the requisites of certiorari: the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; such tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

On the second issue, the Court held that even on the merits the petition must fail. In a quo warranto action by an individual in his own name, the petitioner must prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office; otherwise, the holder has a right to its undisturbed possession. The complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

The person instituting quo warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute.

Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Because this Court had denied with finality Feliciano's petition against the Commission resolution declaring him a usurper and ordering him to vacate, and entry of judgment had been made, Feliciano lost any legal standing to pursue his claim by quo warranto. There was thus no obstacle to the Board's appointment of Villasin.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the due process argument. The trial court had set a hearing with notice to the parties, but Feliciano failed to attend, and the court then submitted the case for resolution. The dismissal rested on the face of the petition and the final rulings against him, not on a denial of hearing.

Doctrine

A petition for quo warranto filed by an individual in his own name must aver and prove that the petitioner is entitled to the public office in dispute; without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage, and the holder of the office has a right to its undisturbed possession. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be directed against the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and failure to implead the tribunal that issued the challenged orders is a sufficient ground for dismissal. Grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the orders of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Feliciano's petition for quo warranto and denying his motion for reconsideration were upheld; Villasin remained General Manager.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a person instituting quo warranto on his own behalf must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, or the action may be dismissed at any stage. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of an individual quo warranto action and the procedural requirement that a Rule 65 petition be directed against the tribunal that issued the challenged orders.