PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY IBAÑEZ Y FRANCISCO, APPELLANT.

People versus Ibañez

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco, a father charged with three counts of qualified rape committed against his own daughter, AAA, a minor. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold on to. First, it settles that the exact date of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the information with ultimate precision, because the date is not an essential element of the crime. Second, it applies Republic Act Number 9346, which abolished the death penalty, reducing a sentence of death to reclusion perpetua and fixing the proper damages for each count.

Procedural History

Three informations for rape were filed against the appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21. When arraigned, he entered pleas of not guilty, and trial on the merits followed. The trial court, in its decision dated July 17, 2002, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape in two of the three cases and acquitted him in the third. He was sentenced to death by lethal injection and ordered to pay indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and costs. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case was elevated on automatic review. Following the ruling in People versus Mateo, the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated May 31, 2006, affirmed the conviction with modification, sentencing him to death for each conviction and increasing the damages. It then refrained from entering judgment and certified the entire record to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to the amended Rules of Criminal Procedure. The case thus reached the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Facts

AAA is the daughter of the appellant. In June 1997, while her mother was in Isabela, AAA was sleeping inside her parents' room with her youngest sibling. The appellant carried the sibling out and placed the child on the floor. He then undressed AAA, kissed her lips and breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina, staying on top of her for about ten minutes. She kept still because she was afraid of him, having always feared him because he was a drug dependent. She told no one of the incident.

From January to December 1998, the appellant raped AAA eight times in their home. She did not tell her mother because she was afraid of him. The third charged rape happened sometime in the morning of April 1999, while her mother was at work. The appellant called AAA into her parents' room. When she refused, he came out, took her by the arms, dragged her inside, undressed her, kissed her body, and raped her. After this, she told a cousin, who brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation, where her complaint-affidavit was executed. The medical examination showed an old, healed laceration of the hymen and a hymenal orifice that admitted a tube 2.5 centimeters in diameter.

For his part, the appellant denied the charges. He claimed as alibi that he was often away from home because of gambling and drugs, usually returning only after four days, and that he came home in the morning only after his wife had left for work, by which time AAA would already be in school. He admitted staying in a rehabilitation center, continuing to take drugs after release, and beating and threatening his wife when she did not give him money for drugs. He also admitted leaving the house in January 1999, staying in Pasig, and returning only to steal his wife's car, and later selling the family's things to buy shabu.

Issues

• Whether or not the informations in the two rape cases were insufficient to support a judgment of conviction because the prosecution failed to state the precise dates of the commission of the rapes.
• Whether or not the failure to allege the exact dates deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Whether or not the appellant waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of error as to the time of the alleged rape.
• Whether or not the penalty and the awards of damages were correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

This provision requires only the approximate date of the offense, which the informations supplied.

Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.

This provision confirms that the precise date is required only when it is a material ingredient of the offense, which it is not in rape.

Section 2 of Republic Act Number 9346 provides:

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

This provision required the reduction of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appellant's contention was devoid of merit. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive of it. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman, and the precise time has no substantial bearing on its commission. Hence it need not be alleged with ultimate precision.

On the second issue, the Court held that the appellant was not deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The allegation that he committed the rape "sometime in June 1997" and "sometime in April 1999" was sufficient to inform him that he was being charged with qualified rape committed against his daughter, and it adequately afforded him an opportunity to prepare his defense.

On the third issue, the Court held that it was too late for the appellant to question the sufficiency of the informations. He could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before arraignment, or a motion to quash on the ground of erroneous dates, before entering his plea. He did neither. Instead, he was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. By so doing, he waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.

The Court also rejected the appellant's claim that AAA filed the cases to have him imprisoned for failing to fulfill his paternal obligations. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to constitute the commission of the crime. This doctrine applies with more vigor when the culprit is a close relative, and her father at that. No woman, least of all a minor, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule unless she had truly been a victim of rape.

On the fourth issue, the Court agreed that the trial court erred in imposing only one penalty of death for two convictions. Each conviction should be separately penalized. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act Number 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty in each case is reclusion perpetua. The Court also upheld the modification of damages, awarding 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity and 75,000 pesos as moral damages for each conviction, and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages in light of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

Doctrine

An information is sufficient if it states the approximate date of the commission of the offense, as Section 6, Rule 110 requires. The precise date need not be alleged except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, as Section 11, Rule 110 provides. In rape, the date is not a material ingredient; the gravamen is carnal knowledge, and the material fact is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not violated by the use of approximate dates. Any objection to the time alleged in the information must be raised before arraignment, by motion for a bill of particulars or motion to quash; otherwise, it is waived. Finally, under Section 2 of Republic Act Number 9346, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua where the law violated uses the nomenclature of the Revised Penal Code.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant for qualified rape, reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility for parole, and fixed the damages at 75,000 pesos civil indemnity, 75,000 pesos moral damages, and 25,000 pesos exemplary damages for each count of rape.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and an information alleging only the approximate date is sufficient. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of informations under Rule 110 and the effect of Republic Act Number 9346 in reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua.