VICENTE PAGADO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE ALDANESE, INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Ang Tec was denied admission to the Philippine Islands by the
customs authorities. Application for habeas corpus was then filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, with the result that the
decision of the Insular Collector of Customs was reversed and it was
ordered that the petitioner Ang Tec be permitted to disembark and to
remain in the country. From this decision of the Court of First
Instance, the Insular Collector of Customs has appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Both parties are agreed that the applicable provision of law is
section 5 of the Act of Congress of May 5, 1892 (27 Stat. at L., 25)
which provides:

“That after the passage of this Act on an
application to any judge or court of the United States in the first
instance for a writ of habeas corpus, by a Chinese person seeking to
land in the United States, to whom that privilege has been denied, no
bail shall be allowed, and such application shall be heard and
determined promptly without unnecessary delay.”

The Attorney-General cites the case of Tan Puy vs.
Collector of Customs ([1917] 36 Phil., 586), as substantiating his
interpretation of the law. In the decision of this case typical of
others of the same nature, it was held that “A Chinese1 alien who is
seeking admission into the territory of the Philippine Islands under
the Chinese Exclusion Laws, is not entitled to bail during the pendency
of his appeal after it has been decided that he is not entitled to
enter.” It is noteworthy, however, that in this and other cases, the
aliens were refused admission by the customs authorities and on filing
proceedings in habeas corpus before the courts of first instance, they
were again defeated in the attempt to obtain entry. Under the instant
facts, on the contrary, the petitioner has been successful in »the
Court of First Instance.

The Act of Congress of 1892 prohibits the allowance of bail on an
application to any judge in first instance for a writ of habeas corpus
by a Chinese person seeking to land in the Islands to whom that
privilege has been denied. The Act does not prohibit admission to bail
pending an appeal in the second instance by a Chinese person to whom
the privilege of landing has been granted. The power to admit to bail
thus rests, in implication, on the express prohibition of the Chinese
Exclusion Act. Although the practice of the Federal courts as to the
allowance of bail has been marked by some variance, and the matter has
been the subject of confusion, we think the true rule is, that if the
writ be sustained and the petitioner discharged, the court in its
discretion may provide for bail to insure appearance if the ruling be
reversed. (2 C. J., 1100; U. S. vs. Sisson [1914], 220 Fed., 538.)

The reason assigned for the prohibition by this court in its decision in Tan Puy vs. Collector of Customs, supra,
that “It would mean a great burden upon the officials of the Government
charged with the administration of the Chinese Exclusion Laws to permit
large numbers of Chinese persons seeking admission to the Philippine
Islands to enter the Islands and scatter broadcast,” does not exist in
this case. There will be relatively few immigrants who will obtain a
reversal of decisions of collectors of customs by Courts of First
Instance. The situation is more nearly analogous to the rule laid down
by this court with reference to admission to bail under Act No. 702,
namely, that a Chinese person who has appealed to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of the, Court of First Instance ordering his
deportation may be admitted to bail pending his appeal (U. S. vs.
Go-Siaco [1909], 12 Phil., 490.) It was said in the case last cited
that “There is no reason to think that his being at large will be any
menace to the people in the locality where he resides, nor is there any
reason to believe that his attendance at court to abide the judgment
which may be entered against him can not be secured by the giving of
bail as in ordinary cases.” The decision of the court of First
Instance, being in favor of the petitioner, the presumption of an
ultimate successful termination arises. To keep such a person in
confinement during the time needed for judicial proceedings to unwind
would be a gross injustice.

The motion, is granted. The order of the court is, that; Ang Tec,
the wife of the petitioner Vicente Pagado, be. discharged from the
custody of the Insular Collector of Customs on filing a bond in such
sum as shall be suggested by the Attorney-General and approved by the
court, conditioned that she will surrender herself again to the customs
authorities when the appeal shall have been heard and determined by
this court, if the decision upon such appeal be adverse to her right to
land. So ordered.