VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, PETITIONER, VS. REY C. ALCAZAR, RESPONDENT.

Alcazar versus Alcazar

The Case

This is the case of Alcazar versus Alcazar, decided by the Supreme Court in October 2009. Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar asked that her marriage to Rey C. Alcazar be annulled, and later that it be declared void. The case matters because it shows, in one clean stroke, the difference between the wrong remedy and the right one, and why even the right remedy fails when the evidence is thin. It is a favorite of examiners on psychological incapacity, on the burden of proof in nullity cases, and on the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel.

Procedural History

Veronica filed a complaint for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85. She grounded it on the fifth paragraph of Article 45 of the Family Code, that is, physical incapacity to consummate the marriage. The public prosecutor was directed to investigate for collusion, and reported that no collusion existed. After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It found no showing that the respondent's defects existed at the inception of the marriage or that they were incurable.

Veronica moved for reconsideration, which was denied. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in a decision dated 24 May 2006. The appellate court held that she failed to prove psychological incapacity, and that at most the abandonment could be a ground for legal separation. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated 28 August 2008. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, raising the sole issue of whether the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Facts

Veronica and Rey were married on 11 October 2000 by Reverend Augusto G. Pabustan at the latter's residence. After the wedding they stayed five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of the respondent's parents. They then returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica at her home in Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer.

While abroad, Rey never communicated with Veronica by phone or by letter. She tried to call him five times, and he never answered. About a year and a half later, a co-teacher told her that Rey was coming home, and she was surprised that he had not told her himself. When he arrived in March 2002, he did not go to her in Tondo. He went straight to his parents' house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and lived there. Veronica traveled to San Jose and learned this, but Rey never contacted her.

Veronica concluded that Rey was physically incapable of consummating the marriage, and filed her complaint. At trial she testified, her mother corroborated her, and a clinical psychologist, Nedy L. Tayag, presented a report. Tayag had never examined Rey, who did not appear despite her invitation, and she relied on information supplied by Veronica. She diagnosed Rey with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which she described as grave, severe, long lasting, and incurable, rooted in his childhood, and existing long before the marriage. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were not persuaded.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent was psychologically incapacitated, as defined by law and jurisprudence, to perform the essential marital obligations.
• Whether or not the complaint, though pleaded as one for annulment under the fifth paragraph of Article 45, may be treated as one for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Applicable Provisions

The fifth paragraph of Article 45 of the Family Code, the ground actually pleaded, provides:

Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: x x x x (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

This is the ground the petitioner invoked, and the Court holds that it refers to lack of power to copulate, which the evidence here does not establish.

Article 36 of the Family Code, the ground the Court treats as the real one, provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

This is the provision against which the petitioner's evidence must be measured, and it is the provision under which her case ultimately fails.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent was not psychologically incapacitated. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Court applied the guidelines it had laid down in Republic versus Court of Appeals, including that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff, that any doubt is resolved in favor of the marriage, and that the root cause must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts.

Measured against these guidelines, the evidence fell short. The testimonies of Veronica and her mother showed only that Rey left soon after the wedding, went to his parents on his return, and never contacted her. These do not give much insight into his psychological state. Tayag's report left much to be desired. She never examined Rey, and she relied on information from Veronica, who was hardly impartial. The report was bereft of the basis for its conclusion. It did not describe the pattern of behavior showing the disorder, and it did not explain how the disorder made Rey unable to perform his obligations as a husband. The Court stressed that the burden is not just to prove a psychological disorder, but that the disorder renders the person truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Psychological incapacity must be more than a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect.

The Court saw instead a simple case of a couple apart too long, becoming strangers, with the husband falling out of love. To be tired and to give up are not necessarily signs of psychological illness, and falling out of love cannot be so labeled. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. On the claim of abandonment and infidelity, the Court held that sexual infidelity, by itself, does not constitute psychological incapacity. The petitioner had to show that the unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which she did not. The Court closed with the presumption in favor of the validity of marriage, semper praesumitur pro matrimonio, meaning the presumption always stands for marriage.

On the second issue, the Court noted that the complaint was really one for declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that the petitioner blamed her former counsel's mistake. But the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in procedural technique, and the exception for gross and inexcusable mistake was not shown. Even treating the complaint as one under Article 36, it would still be dismissed for lack of merit.

Doctrine

A candidate should retain these rules. First, psychological incapacity under Article 36 is a mental, not physical, incapacity, and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Second, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. Third, it is not enough to prove a psychological disorder. The plaintiff must prove that the disorder renders the spouse truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, and that it is more than a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect. Fourth, falling out of love, abandonment, and sexual infidelity, by themselves, are not psychological incapacity. Fifth, the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel in procedural technique, save where the mistake is so gross and palpable as to violate the client's substantive rights.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court dismissing the complaint were affirmed, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. Examiners use this case to test the three characteristics of psychological incapacity, the burden of proof and the presumption of validity, and the rule that infidelity and abandonment alone do not suffice.