PERFECTA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ALIPIO DEL ROSARIO AND LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. JOSEFA DE LA PAZ, INTERVENOR AND APPELLEE.

On July 8, 1957,
plaintiff-appellant filed an action with the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City against Alipio del Rosario and the Land Tenure Administration praying,
among other things, that she be declared owner of 14 of Lot No. 20, Blk. 90-B
of the Marikina Estate, and, to that end, for the court to order the Land
Tenure Administration to issue in her favor the corresponding title. After both
defendants have answered, defendant Alipio del Rosario
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had
not exhausted all available administrative remedies. Before the motion could be
heard and ruled on, however, Josefa de la Paz was allowed to intervene upon a
claim that she was a third party purchaser for value of the lot in dispute. She
too moved to dismiss the action filed. After due hearing and reception of some
documentary evidence, the court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint,
sustaining movants’ assertion that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies then available. Failing in a motion for reconsideration
of the above order of dismissal, the case was elevated to this Court on appeal.

Plaintiff-appellant assigns a
single error to the order of dismissal, to wit:

THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE ON THE ISSUE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.”

The lower court’s order of
dismissal was based on the following undisputed facts:

It is to be noted that since February
17, 1953,
Perfecta Cruz, plaintiff-appellant herein, and her daughter Leonora Eautista,
filed a claim for the lot in dispute with the Landed Estates Division of the
Bureau of Lands against Alipio del Rosario and Josefa
Paz vda. de Bautista. On March 17,
1955, the
Director of Lands rendered a decision to the effect that the transfer of rights
over the land in dispute in favor of Alipio del
Rosario was ineffectual. The same decision, however, recognized the right of
Luisita Bautista, daughter of the herein intervenor, to one-half of the
disputed property. But, because plaintiff-appellant was not completely
satisfied with the decision, she appealed the same to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Before the Secretary of Agriculture
could act on the appeal, however, the Land Tenure Administration was created
and appeal was forwarded to that office which then took cognizance of the
appeal. After due investigation, the Land Tenure Administration rendered a
decision adjudicating 1/2 of the property in dispute
to Leonora Bautista and the other half to Alipio del Rosario. No award was
granted Josefa Paz Vda. de Bautista as she was
declared un-entitled by law to acquire the portion granted to Alipio del
Rosario.

Dissatisfied with the above
decision of the Land Tenure Administration, plaintiff-appellant twice moved to
have the decision reconsidered. When both motions were denied, she filed the
claim with the court.

Upon the facts above narrated, We held the order of dismissal appealed from legally correct
and proper.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that,
‘there is no law requiring a party to an action before the Land Tenure
Administration to bring his case to a higher authority before he can go to
Court, neither does the Land Tenures Administration, Order No. 1, require the
appeal of a decision of the Chairman to the President as a condition precedent
to bringing to the courts of justice an action for annulment of the
decision.”

We cannot agree with the above
proposition. Section2 of the Land Tenure Administration Administrative Order
No. 1 (duly published in the Official Gazette, Vol.1 52, No. 1, pp. 81-82,
1956) providing for the rules and regulations concerning appeals from the
decisions or orders of the Land Tenure Administration expressly declares that
“a decision or order of the Land Tenure Administration *** may be appealed
to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from date the interested
party received notice thereof. * * * ” Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same
Administrative Order, it is expressly provided that the “decision or order
of the Land Tenure Administration * * * concerning any adverse claim or
conflict between two or more application shall become final after thirty (30)
days from the date a copy thereof is received by the interested party unless
appeal therefrom in the manner prescribed in Section 2 hereof is taken to the
Office of the President, ***.” Very clearly, therefore, appellant’s claim is
unmeritorious as it is untenable. For administrative rules, regulations and
orders have the efficacy and force of law so long as they do not contravene any
statute or the Constitution. Even as this is basic and needs no citation, We refer plaintiff-appellant to Article 7 of our Civil Code,
And, for the record, it should be stated that appellant does not dispute the
validity of the above-mentioned Administrative Order.

When an adequate remedy may be had
within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant
fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the
judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts
is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the
party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy
is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative
agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. This has been a consistent
ruling in a chain of cases decided by Us. (See Jao
Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil. 448; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456; Miguel vs.
Reyes, 93 Phil., 542; Arnedo vs. Aldanese, 63 Phil. 768, Tuan Kay vs. Import
Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143; Veloso vs. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5760, April 20, 1953; Lubugan, et al.
vs. Castrillo and Malinay, G.R. No. L-10521, May 29, 1957.)

In view of all the foregoing, this appeal is dismissed for lack
of merit. Costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.