REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, AND JEROME R. CANLAS, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATOR JINGGOY E. …

Romero versus Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition with an application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, filed by Reghis Romero II and his fellow directors of R-II Builders, Inc. against the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development, chaired by Senator Jinggoy Estrada. The petitioners sought to stop the Committee from compelling them to appear and testify at its inquiry into the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration funds in the Smokey Mountain project, and to strike down the invitations and subpoenas as unconstitutional. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest statement that a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation may proceed even while related judicial proceedings are pending, and that such an inquiry dies with the Congress that began it.

Procedural History

The petitioners went straight to the Supreme Court, filing an original petition for prohibition under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee. They asked for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to bar the Committee from continuing its inquiry. The Court did not grant the restraining order. The respondents filed their comment, the petitioners filed their reply, and the Court resolved the case in a full en banc decision.

Facts

On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received an invitation from the Senate Committee. The invitation cited two Senate resolutions directing an investigation, in aid of legislation, into the alleged illegal investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration funds in the Smokey Mountain project and the resulting loss to the Administration. The inquiry was said to be intended to aid the Senate in reviewing and possibly amending Republic Act Number 8042, the Migrant Workers Act.

On August 18, 2006, Romero II asked to be excused from appearing. The Committee denied his request on August 28, 2006, and on the same day sent invitations to the six other petitioners, who were members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc. The next day, Senator Estrada caused the service of a subpoena on Romero II, and later separate subpoenas were issued to the other petitioners.

On August 30, 2006, the petitioners filed this petition. Failing to secure a restraining order, Romero II appeared at the September 4, 2006 hearing and answered questions. He later filed a manifestation and an urgent motion for a restraining order, claiming that the Committee intended to harass them. Meanwhile, the Court in a separate case, Chavez against the National Housing Authority, had rendered a decision, and the Chavez motion for reconsideration was later denied with finality.

Issues

• Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is sub judice because of the pendency of the Chavez petition.
• Whether or not the investigation, being intended to ascertain the petitioners' criminal liability for plunder, is not in aid of legislation.
• Whether or not the inquiry compelled the petitioners to appear and testify in violation of their right against self-incrimination.
• Whether or not the petition has been rendered moot and academic by supervening events.

Applicable Provisions

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

This is the very provision under which the Committee issued the invitations and subpoenas, and its text frames the entire dispute over the scope and limits of the legislative power of inquiry.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the subject matter of the inquiry is no longer sub judice. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. But by an en banc resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court had denied with finality the motion for reconsideration in Chavez, so the matter was no longer before a court for consideration. The issue had been rendered moot and academic. Even assuming Chavez were still pending, the Court said, that circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation, because a legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings have different purposes. Courts settle actual controversies between adverse litigants, while inquiries in aid of legislation gather information so that the legislature may legislate wisely and effectively. The Court quoted with approval:

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.

On the second issue, the Court held that when the Committee issued the invitations and subpoenas, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, clearly provided in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

On the third issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination may be invoked only when the incriminating question is being asked, since a witness has no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked. The possibility that the right may be violated or abused is no ground for denying the Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The Court stressed:

The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the petition had been rendered moot and academic. The Senate resolutions were passed in 2006 and the invitations and subpoenas were sent in August 2006, during a past Congress. On the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it, the invitations and subpoenas are functos oficio, and the related legislative inquiry is terminated. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first time.

Since the present Senate had not opted to take up anew the inquiry, there was no more investigation to be continued, and no more investigation whose constitutionality could be challenged.

Doctrine

A legislative inquiry in aid of legislation may proceed even while related judicial proceedings are pending, because the two have different purposes: courts adjudicate actual controversies, while legislative inquiries gather information to legislate wisely and effectively. The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint does not automatically bar a legislative investigation. The right against self-incrimination may be invoked only when the incriminating question is actually asked, and the possibility of abuse is no ground to deny the power of inquiry. Finally, all pending matters and proceedings of the Senate of a particular Congress terminate upon the expiration of that Congress, and may be taken up by the succeeding Congress only as if presented for the first time.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and no pronouncement was made as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation is not barred by the pendency of a related judicial proceeding, and it terminates upon the expiration of the Congress that began it. Examiners use this case to test the scope of the congressional power of inquiry under Section 21, Article VI, and the sub judice and mootness doctrines.