GEORGIA T. ESTEL, PETITIONER, VS. RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. AND RECAREDO R. DIEGO, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Estel versus Diego

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Georgia T. Estel against Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., arising from a complaint for forcible entry, damages, and injunction over a parcel of land in Gingoog City. Estel attacks the rulings of the lower courts on the ground that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint states no cause of action. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules a bar candidate must know on jurisdiction over forcible entry, on estoppel by participation, and on substantial compliance with verification and the certificate against forum shopping.

Procedural History

The Diegos filed their complaint for forcible entry, damages, and injunction with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Gingoog City, which issued a temporary restraining order against Estel. After trial, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the Diegos, ordering Estel to vacate the premises, to pay monthly rentals, actual damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, and to pay the costs of suit. Estel appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, which affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Estel then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which likewise affirmed. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, she came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On April 16, 1991, the Diegos entered into a contract of sale over a 306 square meter parcel of land, denominated as Lot 19, with Estel. After receiving 17,000 pesos as downpayment, Estel voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the property to the Diegos, who had been in actual, adverse, and uninterrupted possession since then.

Around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, Estel, together with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot, entered its premises, and cut and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that time.

In her answer, Estel denied that the Diegos were ever in possession. She claimed that full possession and absolute ownership had always been hers and her daughter's, that the sale had been abrogated, and that what was actually delivered to the Diegos was the adjacent Lot 16, not the disputed Lot 19.

Issues

• Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court in Cities acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint despite the failure to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land.
• Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged the facts constitutive of forcible entry.
• Whether or not the complaint states no cause of action because of a defective verification and certificate against forum shopping.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

This provision governs Estel's claim that the verification was defective and that the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Estel did not raise the question of jurisdiction or venue in her answer before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, did not raise it on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. She is therefore estopped from raising it for the first time in the Court of Appeals or before the Supreme Court. The Court stressed that one cannot belatedly reject a lower court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, and frowned upon the practice of accepting a judgment when favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. In any event, since the complaint is clearly one for forcible entry, jurisdiction lies with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and any omission of the land's location was a matter of venue, not jurisdiction, cured by the evidence showing the lot was in Gingoog City.

On the second issue, the Court held that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession, and must allege deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth. The Diegos sufficiently alleged both. The Court ruled that unlawfully entering the property and excluding the prior possessor necessarily implies the use of force, and that to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.

On the third issue, the Court held that the verification substantially complied with Section 4 of Rule 7, since the Diegos declared that the allegations were true and correct based on their personal knowledge, and the addition of the words "to the best" did not violate the requirement. As to the certificate against forum shopping, the only missing statement was the undertaking to report any similar pending action, and the Court found substantial compliance, since the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.

Doctrine

First, estoppel by participation: a party who participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court is estopped from raising that challenge belatedly.

Second, jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the failure to allege the location of the property is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction.

Third, in forcible entry, the complaint must allege prior physical possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth; force is implied by unlawful entry and exclusion of the prior possessor.

Fourth, verification and the certificate against forum shopping admit of substantial compliance, as the Court applied under Section 4 of Rule 7.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed; the Diegos won.

Remember This

Memorize the line that estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. Examiners use this case for jurisdiction over forcible entry, the two mandatory allegations, and substantial compliance with verification and the certificate against forum shopping.