SALVADOR ATIZADO AND SALVADOR MONREAL, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Atizado versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a criminal appeal by Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal against the People of the Philippines, asking the Supreme Court to overturn their conviction for murder in the killing of Rogelio Llona, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must carry into the examination room: it is a clean illustration of how conspiracy and treachery are established in a shooting, and it is a leading application of the retroactive benefits granted to a child in conflict with the law under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, which reduced one appellant's penalty and secured his immediate release.

Procedural History

The Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor charged Atizado, Monreal, and a certain Danilo Atizado with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Atizado and Monreal of murder, sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, and ordered them to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity and actual damages; it acquitted Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt. The petitioners brought a direct appeal, which the Supreme Court referred to the Court of Appeals in light of its ruling in People versus Mateo. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and modified the damages by adding moral damages. After the Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On the evening of April 18, 1994, during the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon, Simeona Mirandilla and her common-law husband Rogelio Llona were seated in the sala of the house of Manuel Desder, together with Jose Jesalva, a barangay kagawad. Mirandilla was putting her young child to sleep while Llona fanned the child. Suddenly she heard thundering steps, as of people running, followed by two successive gunshots.

Turning her head, Mirandilla saw Salvador Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona. She shouted for him to stop, then bent to aid the victim. She then heard three clicking sounds, and turning toward them saw Salvador Monreal stepping backward, adjusting the cylinder of his gun, with the weapon pointed toward her. The assailants fled. Mirandilla rushed to the barangay captain to report the shooting, and Llona was brought to a hospital where he was pronounced dead from two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.

The petitioners denied the charge and interposed alibi, claiming they were elsewhere in Barangay Tomalaytay at the time, and that they had been implicated only because they worked for their uncle, whom the defense painted as the alleged mastermind. The trial court and the appellate court both credited Mirandilla's positive identification of the petitioners and convicted them.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioners for murder based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla, despite the circumstances the petitioners urge against her credibility.
• Whether or not conspiracy and treachery attended the killing so as to qualify it as murder and make both petitioners liable as co-principals.
• Whether or not the minority of Monreal at the time of the crime should have been appreciated to reduce his penalty.
• Whether or not the awards of damages should be modified to conform to prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659, defines and punishes murder:

Article 248. Murder. -- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

This is the provision under which the petitioners were convicted, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make.

The Court used this definition to hold that the sudden, unexpected assault on the victim qualified the killing as murder.

Section 7 of Republic Act Number 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, governs the determination of age:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

This provision supplied the standard by which the Court found Monreal's minority legally established even without a birth certificate.

Section 68 of the same law grants the retroactive benefit to convicted children:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

This is the provision that authorized the reduction of Monreal's penalty and his immediate release.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court affirmed the conviction. The trial judge's evaluation of a witness's credibility is accorded the highest respect because of his unique opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor, and when affirmed by the Court of Appeals it binds the Court absent overlooked or misapprehended circumstances of weight. The petitioners pointed to none. Mirandilla's positive identification prevailed over their denials and alibi.

On the second issue, the Court held that conspiracy existed although no prior agreement was proved, because it was deduced from the mode and manner in which the crime was perpetrated. The petitioners acted in concert, their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose, and all conspirators are liable as co-principals. Treachery attended because the assault was mounted with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence, with no altercation preceding it and no provocation from the victim, a deliberate method that ensured unhampered execution of the crime.

On the third issue, the Court reduced Monreal's penalty. Although his birth certificate was not presented, his minority was sufficiently shown by his counter-affidavit, the police blotter, an affidavit, the trial court's minutes, and Mirandilla's description of him as a teenager. Under Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, an offender over 15 and under 18 years of age receives the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. The Court fixed his indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor as the minimum to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum, and ordered his immediate release, his detention of over 16 years having exceeded the modified sentence.

On the fourth issue, the Court reformed the damages, raising death indemnity and moral damages to 75,000 pesos each, adding 30,000 pesos in exemplary damages because of treachery, and upholding the 30,000 pesos in actual damages.

Doctrine

Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement; it may be inferred from the mode and manner in which the crime was committed, and every conspirator is liable as a co-principal. Treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the means, method, or form of execution is deliberately adopted to ensure the crime's execution without risk to the offender from any defense the victim might make. The minority of an accused over 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the crime entitles him to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, and age may be established by evidence other than a birth certificate, any doubt being resolved in the child's favor. A child convicted and serving sentence benefits retroactively from the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, and must be released if he has fully served the adjusted penalty.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of both petitioners but reduced Monreal's penalty to an indeterminate sentence, ordered his immediate release from the Bureau of Corrections, and increased the damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.

Remember This

Memorize this line: conspiracy may be inferred from the mode and manner of commission, and a child in conflict with the law enjoys the presumption of minority and the retroactive benefits of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy and treachery in a shooting, and the retroactive application of the minority privilege to reduce penalty and compel release.