G.R. No. 173819. November 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MA. ISABEL LAUREL BARANDIARAN, RESPONDENT.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Tanauan City, Batangas an
Application for Registration[1] over a parcel of land which she specifically described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 12753-C=Lot 13115 of the
subdivision plan, Csd-04-020537-D, being a portion of Lot 12753,
Cad-168, Tanauan Cadastre, L.R.C. Rec. No. ____) [sic],
situated in the Barrio of Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of
Batangas. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2 by Lot 12753-B of this
subdivision plan; on the SE., along line 2-3 by Lot 12753-E, both of
the subdivision plan; on the SW., along line 3-4-5 by Lot 12269; along
line 5-6 by Lot 12268; along line 6-7 by Lot 12266, all of Cad-168;
Tanauan Cadastre; and on the NW., along line 7-1 by Lot 12753-A, of the
subdivision plan x x x containing an area of TWENTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO (23,962) SQUARE METERS, more or less.[2] (Emphasis in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic, herein petitioner),
represented by the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General,
opposed the application on the ground that Lot No. 12753-C (the
questioned lot) is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and that neither respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession or
occupation thereof since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.[3]
After respondent proved compliance with jurisdictional requirements,
the trial court issued on August 5, 2004 an Order of General Default,[4] no one, other than the Republic, having appeared or filed an answer within the time allowed for the purpose.
During the hearing, respondent testified[5]
as follows: A certain Isadora Gonzales (Gonzales) was the owner of Lot
No. 12753 (the lot) of which the questioned lot forms part. When
respondent and her siblings became interested in buying the lot, they
inquired from people in the vicinity and from the Assessor’s Office in
Tanauan and came to learn that the lot was registered in Gonzales’ name
in 1930. After negotiating with the heirs of Gonzales, the latter
executed on October 3, 2002 a Deed of Sale[6] in favor of respondent and her siblings for a consideration of P100,000.
Respondent went on to declare: On June 9, 2003, she and her siblings
partitioned the lot and the questioned lot was allotted to her.[7]
She thereupon took possession of the questioned lot for which she hired
an overseer, and had it surveyed under her name. She also had the
questioned lot declared under her name for taxation purposes, and paid
taxes thereon.
Carmen Garcia Azuelo (Azuelo), one of the heirs of Gonzales,
corroborated respondent’s testimony that she and her siblings bought
the lot from her (Azuelo) and her co-heirs.[8] She added that Gonzales was, since time immemorial, in possession of the lot which was registered in Gonzales’ name.[9]
By Decision of August 18, 2004, the trial court, finding respondent to
have a clear registrable title over the questioned lot, disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, and upon confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot No. 127[5]3-C,
Cad-168 of the subdivision plan Csd-04-020537-D with a total area of
Twenty three thousand nine hundred sixty two (23,962) square meters,
situated at Barangay Maria Paz (formerly Boot), Tanauan, Batangas, on
the name of Ma. Isabel Laurel Barandiaran with postal address at 2nd
Floor, Rufina Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati City.Once this decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.[10]
The Republic appealed,[11]
contending that respondent had not proven that the questioned lot is
within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[12] By Decision[13] dated July 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, observing as follows:
x x x [O]ther than the bare assertion of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that applicant-appellee Barandiaran possesses
no registrable right over the subject property, it failed to adduce
concrete and convincing evidence to support its stand. Neither were
there private oppositors who came to register their opposition in the
instant application for registration, which inclined us more to grant
the instant application.[14]Hence, the present Petition[15] faulting the appellate court:
. . . IN RULING THAT [THE QUESTIONED LOT] IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND, HENCE, AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC
APPROPRIATION.[16]
The petition is meritorious.
The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of state ownership of
lands of the public domain lies on the person applying for
registration. The evidence to overcome the presumption must be
“well-nigh incontrovertible.”[17]
To discharge the burden, respondent presented a Certification issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Such certificate does
not state, however, that the lot of which the questioned lot forms part
is alienable and disposable. The certification merely states that the
lot “is not covered by any kind of public land application or patent.”[18]
As for the notation on the subdivision plan of the lot stating that “the survey is inside alienable and disposable area,”[19] the same does not constitute proof that the lot is alienable and disposable. So Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation[20] instructs:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the
certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the
nature and character of the property surveyed.[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent cites[22] the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Guido Sinsuat v. Director of Lands, et al. and Raymundo v. Bureau of Forestry and Diaz which she quoted in her petition, albeit inaccurately. The rulings in said cases are correctly quoted below:
x x x x
“[W]here it appears that the evidence of ownership and possession are
so significant and convincing, the government is not necessarily
relieved of its duty from presenting proofs to show that the parcel of
land sought to be registered is part of the public domain to enable
[the courts] to evaluate the evidence of both sides.”[23]x x x [W]hen the records shows that a certain property, the
registration of title to which is applied for has been possessed and
cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long
number of years without the government taking any action to dislodge
the occupants from their holdings, and when the land has passed from
one hand to another by inheritance or by purchase, the government is
duty bound to prove that the land which it avers to be of public domain
is really of such nature.” [24]
Respondent argues thus:
In the case at bar, it was proven through documentary and
testimonial evidences that the applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest has been in open, peaceful, continuous and
adverse possession of the subject land, in the concept of an owner as
early as 1945, as shown by the Declaration of Real Property No.
030-00252 in the name of Isadora Gonzales.[25] (Citations omitted)
Respondent has not, however, established by well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the questioned lot in
the concept of an owner since 1945. While she claims having confirmed
with the Assessor’s Office in Tanauan that the lot was “registered” in
Gonzales’ name in 1930, for what purpose was the registration made she
did not elaborate, as she did not even present any document to
substantiate the same.
Respecting the Declaration of Real Property in Gonzales’ name, the same
does not prove ownership of the questioned lot. It is settled that tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are “not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership; they only become evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property.”[26]
No such proof of actual possession of the property was presented.
Besides, the Declaration of Real Property shows that it was effective
in 1997, indicating that the declaration is of recent vintage.[27]
It cannot thus prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial or since
1945.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 21, 2006 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and respondent’s Application for Registration of Lot No.
12753-C is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., in the result.
[1] MTCC records, pp. 1-3.
[2] Id. at 2. Vide pp. 4, 5, 10, 12.
[3] Id. at 27.
[4] Id. at 69.
[5] TSN, August 5, 2004, pp. 9-22.
[6] MTCC records, pp. 12-14.
[7] Id. at 10-11.
[8] TSN, August 5, 2004, pp. 91-96.
[9] Id. at 96.
[10] MTCC records, p. 72.
[11] Id. at 92-93.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 19-24.
[13] Penned by Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Jose Reyes, Jr. and Enrico A. Lanzanas; id. at
47-54.
[14] Id. at 53-54.
[15] Rollo, pp. 9-23.
[16] Id. at 15.
[17] Vide Turquesa v. Valera, 379 Phil. 622, 631 (2000); 274 Phil. 284, 291 (1991).
[18] MTCC records, p. 66.
[19] Id. at 5.
[20] G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91.
[21] Id. at 102.
[22] Vide rollo, p. 65.
[23] 56 O.G. No. 42, 6487, 6489-6490, October 17, 1960.
[24] 58 O.G. No. 37, 6019, 6021, citation omitted.
[25] Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[26] De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57092, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 307, 317. Citations omitted.
[27] MTCC records, p. 68.