G.R. No. 17358. May 30, 1961
MOHAMAD-ALI DIMAPORO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL ESTIPONA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
provincial governor of Lanao del Norte in the elections held on November 10,
1959. After the canvass of the votes, the provincial board of canvassers found
that Dimaporo obtained 27,537 votes while Lluch 27,259 votes and so it
proclaimed the former as the duly elected governor of said province.
On December 10, 1959, Lluch filed a protest with the court of first instance
praying to annul the election in 92 precincts spread out in different
municipalities on the grounds, among others, that the elections were not free
nor orderly, but were characterized by frauds; terrorism, coercion, corrupt
practices and other irregularities committed by protestee and/or his leaders.
Considering that protestant did not mention the names of those who allegedly
committed said acts, protestee filed a motion for bill of particulars praying
that said names be specified in order that he may be able to properly prepare
his answer and the government to prosecute the persons responsible therefor.
On December 19, 1959, protestee filed a counter protest alleging the
commission of similar irregularities by protestant and/or his leaders in the
precincts and municipalities there in indicated, to which protestant filed his
answer denying the averment of irregularities mentioned therein. On December 21,
1959, protestant filed an opposition to the bill of particulars alleging that
the specification desired by protestee is not necessary for they are merely
evidentiary matters which protestant will establish during the trial. And while
the court denied at first said motion it however reconsidered it later requiring
protestant to make the specification prayed for and, in compliance therewith,
protestant submitted a written manifestation mentioning therein the names of
those who allegedly committed the acts averred in the protest.
On April 12, 1960, protestee filed his answer alleging that if frauds were
committed in the protested precincts the same were committed by protestant and
not by him.
On June 15, 1960, protestant filed an urgent motion to stop the recanvassing
in the 36 precincts covered by his protest on the ground that, after
recanvassing 29 out of the protested 92 precincts he found it unnecessary to do
so considering that he won in said precincts, to which protestee objected
contending that since the alleged derogatory acts were committed by protestant
and his henchmen, the same can no longer be withdrawn because if the alleged
acts are proven the result of the election should be annulled.
On June 25, 1960, the court denied the motion of withdrawal reasoning that,
since both parties alleged that irregularities were committed in the precincts
to be withdrawn, and the protest is vested with public interest, the matter is
no longer under the control of protestant since the public is entitled to know
what actually happened in said precincts. Thereupon, protestant filed a motion
for reconsideration, to which protestee filed an opposition, and while the same
was pending consideration the trial judge, Hon. Manuel Estipona, received an
administrative order from the Secretary of Justice authorizing him to hold court
in the province of Albay for three months beginning August 8, 1960, to be
substituted by Judge Tito V. Tizon who in turn was authorized to hold court in
the province for the same period of time, for which reason protestee requested
Judge Estipona not to act on the motion for reconsideration of protestant until
such time as the question of his transfer shall have been decided. Apparently,
Judge Estipona chose to decline the transfer, and so on August 9, 1960 he
entered an order granting the motion for reconsideration authorizing protestant
to withdraw his protest insofar as the 36 precincts are concerned. Protestee
moved to reconsider this order, which was denied.
In the meantime, protestant moved that the keys to all the ballot boxes of
the precincts which have not yet been recanvassed be turned over to the clerk of
court in order that they may be available every time they are needed, and that
in the canvassing of their contents only two out of the three
commissioners be authorized to act to facilitate their work and avoid
unnecessary delay, which request met an opposition on the part of protestee who
claimed that such arrangement may only lead to the commission of frauds or may
place the clerk of court in a precarious situation, a thing which may not happen
if the keys were left as they were in the possession of the provincial
commander, the provincial treasurer, and the provincial fiscal as provided by
law. Protestee requested at the same time that he be not required to recanvass
the precincts covered by his counter-protest until after the 36 precincts
covered by the protest shall have been opened and recanvassed as originally
requested, but, ignoring this request, the court ordered the board of canvassers
to immediately proceed with the canvass of the remaining precincts even if one
of the commissioners is absent in order that the trial may not be unnecessarily
delayed. And considering this order to be oppressive and arbitrary and one
issued in excess of its jurisdiction, protestee interposed the present petition
for certiorari.
The main theme of petitioner is that the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion in granting the motion of respondent that he be authorized to
withdraw 36 out of the 92 precincts covered by his protest on the ground that
after the recanvass of the first 29 precincts he found that his protest with
regard to said 36 precincts was unnecessary. Petitioner contends that to allow
such withdrawal at that stage would be tantamount to amending the protest which
can no longer be done because the period fixed for doing so had already expired.
And this contention is apparently predicated upon the fact that at the time the
motion for withdrawal was filed the recanvass of the votes has already started
and the period for filing the pleadings has expired.
There is no merit in this contention. While it is true that the period for
filing the pleadings has already expired and the recanvass of the ballots
covered by the protest has already started when the motion for withdrawal was
filed and protestee had traversed the allegations of the motion insofar as the
36 precincts are concerned, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in
allowing the withdrawal considering that the move of protestant in asking for
such withdrawal is not to amend his protest but merely to inform the court that
he was desisting from it with regard to said 36 precincts. We have no quarrel
with the theory that an election protest is impressed with public interest in
the sense that the public is interested in knowing what has actually happened in
the elections, but that issue is not involved herein. This is a matter that
wholly depends upon protestant. Even if the withdrawal of the protest is not
effected, if the protestant desists from acting thereon or from presenting
evidence to substantiate it, that will be the end of the case. The most that can
happen is that the protest should be dismissed for lack of action or proof, and
to such eventuality protestee cannot object nor complain, because the precincts
concerned are not involved in his counter-protest. In other words, he cannot
allege prejudice if the withdrawal is allowed. This is the exclusive prerogative
of protestant.
The next question at issue refers to the order of the trial court requiring
the keys to the ballot boxes to be turned over to the clerk of court as well as
that which authorizes two out of the three commissioners to be present in the
recanvass in order that the same may be facilitated and no further delay is
suffered. Petitioner contends that such authority is improvident for the reason
that to turn over the keys to the clerk of court would be to place him in a
precarious situation for he may be under duress on the part of protestant or
amenable to undue influence thereby facilitating the commission of frauds.
There is also no merit in this contention. While it is true that under the
law immediately after the boxes are locked upon the completion of the counting
the three keys pertaining to the white boxes shall be placed in three separate
envelopes which shall be sealed and signed by all the inspectors and the
envelopes containing the keys shall be delivered one to the provincial commander,
another to the provincial treasurer, and the third to the provincial fiscal, who
shall keep them during a period of three months, and thereafter they shall be
delivered to the provincial treasurer for safekeeping (Section 70, Revised
Election Code), this requirement is subject to the discretion of the court.
Thus, it is therein provided that the keys shall remain in the possession of
said officials “if before said date the court did not order otherwise.” This
means that the legislature has foreseen that circumstances may supervene during
the substantiation of an election protest which may warrant the delivery of the
keys to other officials in order that the purpose of the protest may not be
defeated. And, undoubtedly, such a situation is here present since it is to be
presumed that the trial court has acted with the only end of promoting the
interest of justice. There are times when the three officials charged with the
keys are not in a position to attend to the recanvassing due to pressure of
their official duties thereby giving to the protestee a convenient excuse to ask
for postponement or to delay the proceeding. This apparently has happened here,
and conscious of its duty to expedite the disposal of the case considering its
urgent nature, the trial court saw no other course than to issue the order in
question. Far from being an abuse of discretion, we see in this action one that
is plausible and deserving of support. The fear of petitioner that an untoward
happening may result if the order is implemented is merely hypothetical. The
clerk of court is a responsible official who is entitled to the confidence of
the court and unless something is shown that may reflect against his character
there is no justification for presuming that he will be a derelict in the
performance of his official duties.
The same thing may be said with regard to the authority given by the court
that two out of the three commissioners may undertake the
canvassing of the votes, for experience has shown that not all three could be
present at the same time. And, undoubtedly, the trial court was forced to take
such action also with the end of preventing unnecessary delay. At any rate, this
is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and from the
record we find nothing that may justify that it has abused its discretion.
Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs against petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon,
and Natividad, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
I dissent. Where frauds or terrorism
or both are alleged to have been committed, public policy demands that the
charges be inquired into, so that if such frauds were really committed, steps
should be taken in order to mete condign punishment on its perpetrators; and if
judicial inquiry should show that no frauds really took place, the basis is laid
for defamation and damage suits against those who recklessly charged such false
violations of the election law. To treat the issue as the sole concern of either
party is to encourage irresponsibility in electoral contests.