REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. GERTRUDES B. VERZOSA, Respondent.

Republic versus Verzosa

The Case

This is the case of Republic versus Verzosa, a petition for review brought by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, against Gertrudes B. Verzosa. The Republic assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the trial court directing the reconstitution of a lost transfer certificate of title. The case matters because it teaches the Bar candidate how a destroyed Torrens title is judicially reconstituted under Republic Act Number 26, what sources may be used, and how the best evidence rule and the rule on secondary evidence operate within that special proceeding.

Procedural History

Gertrudes B. Verzosa filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of a transfer certificate of title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. After notice, publication, posting, and hearing, the trial court rendered its decision directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute the title. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as errors the failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Republic Act Number 26 and the absence of clear and convincing evidence of ownership. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Republic then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court, which is the decision now before us.

Facts

Gertrudes B. Verzosa and her sister Edna Verzosa Garcia were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 140606. By virtue of a court order, Lot 7-B of the property was allotted to Gertrudes. The original copy of the title was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on June 11, 1988. The owner's duplicate copy was lost, as shown by an affidavit of loss executed by the co-owner, Edna Garcia.

On January 3, 2001, Gertrudes filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of the title. The trial court found the petition sufficient in form and substance, set it for hearing, and ordered publication in the Official Gazette and posting in the required places at least thirty days before the hearing. Copies of the order were served on the Register of Deeds, the Land Registration Authority, the Land Management Bureau, the Office of the Solicitor General, the City Prosecutor, the City Legal Officer, and the adjoining owners.

At the hearing, only the representative of the Office of the Solicitor General appeared. Gertrudes presented her evidence. The Land Registration Authority submitted a report confirming that the title existed in its records, that the plan and technical description of the lot were verified correct and approved, and that the same plan and technical description had been previously plotted under the same title. The trial court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

• Whether or not the Republic is estopped from assailing the sufficiency of the evidence because it failed to object timely before the trial court.
• Whether or not the petition for reconstitution may be granted on the basis of a mere photocopy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title.
• Whether or not the evidence presented was sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost certificate of title.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Republic Act Number 26 enumerates the sources for reconstitution of transfer certificates of title:

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of titles; (b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost destroyed certificate of title.

This provision fixes the hierarchy of sources and allows the court, under paragraph (f), to accept any other document it deems sufficient and proper.

Section 12 of the same law sets out the contents of the petition and the documents that must accompany it:

SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have interest in the property; (f) a detailed decription of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

This provision supplies the jurisdictional requirements whose compliance the Court examines in this case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Republic is not estopped. The state cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, especially absent any showing that it dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens. The failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to raise an effective objection does not bar the Republic from assailing the reconstitution.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition may be treated as one filed under Section 3(f) of Republic Act Number 26, since both lower courts so treated it and the Republic conceded the point. The owner's duplicate is given primacy because it is an exact reproduction of the original, but the owner's duplicate itself, and not a mere photocopy, must be presented to preclude questions of genuineness and bar reconstitution based on a fraudulent or forged duplicate. A photocopy is secondary evidence, inadmissible unless the exceptions in the Rules of Court are proved. Nonetheless, the Court found that the respondent submitted documents proving the existence, execution, and contents of the title, and proved its loss through the affidavit of loss, so that the records already constituted sufficient bases even without the photocopy.

On the third issue, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient. The report of the Land Registration Authority confirmed the previous existence of the title and the approval of the plan and technical description, which bore notations that they had been previously plotted under the same title. The disparity in land area was explained by a subdivision survey made before the fire. The Court stressed that while courts must exercise the greatest caution in reconstitution cases, this caveat should not deprive a person who has fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements of the law. When the court finds the evidence sufficient and proper, the petitioner the registered owner, and the certificate in force at the time of loss, the issuance of the order of reconstitution is mandatory.

Doctrine

First, the state cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Second, reconstitution under Republic Act Number 26 follows the hierarchy of sources in Section 3, and the owner's duplicate must be presented itself, not a mere photocopy, because a photocopy is secondary evidence admissible only upon proof of the exceptions under the Rules of Court. Third, a petition may be treated as filed under Section 3(f), and the court may accept any other document it finds sufficient and proper. Fourth, once the jurisdictional requirements are complied with and the evidence shows the petitioner is the registered owner and the title was in force when lost, the issuance of the order of reconstitution is mandatory, not discretionary.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the state cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, and reconstitution becomes mandatory once all the requirements of Republic Act Number 26 are satisfied. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of sources under Section 3, the treatment of a photocopy as secondary evidence, and the mandatory nature of the order of reconstitution.