VALENTINA ROSARIO, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ESTANISLAO FIESTAN, AND MATILDE ROSARIO, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND MACARIO ABERO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. JUANA ALONZO, QUIN…

This is an action for partition of two parcels of land situated in
the barrio of Taguipuro, municipality of Bantay, province of Ilocos Sur,
accounting of the products thereof, and damages brought by the
plaintiffs against the defendants.

The plaintiffs claimed that the two parcels of land described in the
complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of their late father
Hilario Rosario and Juana Alonzo, his second wife.

The defendants, on the other hand, alleged that they had acquired by
purchase the first parcel of land with the proceeds of the sale of
cattle they had inherited from their deceased father Eleno Manzano, had
been in possession of the same as owners for more than twenty years and
paying the realty tax thereon; that Juana Alonzo and Roberto Rosario
had acquired by occupation and homestead the second parcel of land and
had been in possession thereof as owners for more than twenty years and
paying realty tax thereon; that Hilario Rosario, the second husband of
Juana Alonzo, prior to his demise was blind for thirty years and could
not have earned money to purchase any parcel of land; and that the
action by the plaintiffs, if any, was reckless, groundless and barred
by the statute of limitations; and upon those grounds they prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, damages in the sum of P300 and costs.

On 27 October 1954 the parties submitted a partial agreed statement
of facts and reserved the right to present evidence. The hearing of the
case was set for the 18th day of March 1955. On that date the
defendants and their attorney failed to appear. After introducing
Exhibits A, B, C and D the attorney for the plaintiffs rested his case.
On 11 April 1955 the court rendered judgment against the defendants, as
prayed for by the plaintiffs except the amount of damages. The
defendants moved for reconsideration of the judgment thus rendered but
on 4 June 1955 the motion was denied. On 6 August, the defendants filed
another motion praying for the setting aside of the judgment and leave
to present evidence. On the same ground as the denial of the first
motion that no affidavit of merit had been attached to or had
accompanied the motion, the latter was denied. The defendants appealed.
On 12 April 1957 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal (CA—G. R.
No. 16192-R). On petition for certiorari docketed as G. R. No. L-12309,
on 30 April 1959 this Court set aside the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of 12 April 1957 and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for judgment on the merits. On 13 May 1960 the latter certified the
case to this Court on the ground that the two errors assigned by the
appellants in their brief raise legal questions only.

The errors assigned by the appellants in their brief are the following:

The lower court erred, with abuse of discretion, in refusing to give
due consideration to lift order of default and set aside judgment
rendered in pursuance thereof.

The lower court, in refusing to relieve appellants’ counsel from the
effects and consequences of his failure to appear and defend
appellants’ case, committed a grave injustice to the prejudice of the
substantial rights of the herein defendants-appellants, thereby barring
them from defending their case and presenting evidence thereof
sufficient to overcome the proof adduced by plaintiffs-appellees during
the trial of the case.

Having answered the complaint filed by the appellees, the appellants
were not and could not be in default. The appellants complain that in
refusing to relieve their counsel from the effects and consequences of
his failure to appear and defend their case, the lower court committed
a grave injustice to their prejudice, for they contend that such
failure was due to his forgetfulness and oversight.

Although the two motions for reconsideration were sworn to by the
attorney for the appellants, still such motions were not “accompanied
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be,
which he may prove if his petition be granted,” as provided for and
required in section 3 of Rule 38, Rules of Court.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Bengzon, C.J. , Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.