NELSON T. LLUZ AND CATALINO C. ALDEOSA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CAESAR O. VICENCIO, RESPONDENTS.

Lluz versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Nelson T. Lluz and Catalino C. Aldeosa against the Commission on Elections and private respondent Caesar O. Vicencio. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul two resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc, which had ruled that no probable cause exists to charge Vicencio with an election offense for stating in his certificate of candidacy that his profession or occupation was certified public accountant. The case matters because it fixes the boundary of criminal liability under the Omnibus Election Code: it tells us that a false entry in a certificate of candidacy is punishable as an election offense only when the misrepresentation is material, and that profession or occupation is never material because it is not a qualification for elective office.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed a complaint with the Law Department of the Commission on Elections, charging Vicencio with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Law Department recommended dismissal, holding that the misrepresentation was not material to eligibility. On motion of the petitioners, the Commission on Elections En Banc reversed the Law Department and ordered that an information be filed against Vicencio. On reconsideration, the Commission En Banc reversed itself once more, ruling that materiality is a crucial test and that no probable cause exists. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, raising a single question of law.

Facts

Caesar O. Vicencio was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig, Samar in the synchronized barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections held in July 2002. In his certificate of candidacy he stated his profession or occupation as certified public accountant. He won the election.

After his proclamation, the petitioners charged him before the Law Department of the Commission on Elections with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. They attached a certification from the Regulations Office of the Professional Regulation Commission stating that Vicencio's name does not appear in the book of the Board of Accountancy, which contains the names of those duly authorized to practice accountancy in the Philippines. In his answer, Vicencio insisted that he was a certified public accountant and claimed that he passed the board examinations in 1993 with a rating of seventy-six percent. He argued that the alleged misrepresentation was not material to his eligibility.

The Law Department subpoenaed the records officer of the Professional Regulation Commission, who produced a certification showing that Vicencio had taken the October 1993 examinations and obtained a failing mark of forty point seven one percent. Despite this, the Law Department recommended dismissal, citing the Court's rulings in the disqualification cases of Romualdez-Marcos versus Commission on Elections and Salcedo versus Commission on Elections. The Commission En Banc at first reversed and ordered prosecution, holding that election offenses are wrongs prohibited by law, so that criminal intent is not required. On reconsideration, however, the Commission En Banc held that materiality remains a crucial test and that occupation is not a material matter, and it denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not a violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code is a wrong prohibited by law such that materiality of the misrepresentation need not be shown.
• Whether or not the ruling in Salcedo versus Commission on Elections applies, that is, whether a fact misrepresented in a certificate of candidacy must be material to constitute a violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74.
• Whether or not, assuming materiality is required, the misrepresentation of profession or occupation is material because it increased the candidate's chances of winning.

Applicable Provisions

Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 262. Other election offenses. Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240.

The introductory clause limiting the listing to the provisions or pertinent portions of the enumerated sections is the textual hook for the Court's holding that the penal coverage of Section 262 is limited.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Section 74 lists profession or occupation among the required entries, but it contains no penal clause of its own, so the Court had to determine which of its provisions Section 262 actually punishes.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This provision supplies the standard of materiality that the Court read into the election offense, since it speaks of a false material representation as required under Section 74.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

This is the decisive provision: it shows that profession or occupation is not among the qualifications for elective local office, and therefore cannot be a material matter in a certificate of candidacy.

Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 264. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding officials have been found guilty.

The severity of this uniform penalty is the reason the Court refused to stretch the offense to cover non-material falsehoods.

Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provision of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Because a violation of Section 74 is a species of perjury, materiality is likewise an essential element even on a perjury theory.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the penal coverage of Section 262 is limited. The listing of sections is introduced by the clause "Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses." That phraseology signals that only pertinent portions of Section 74 are penalized. The Court added that a statute imposing criminal liability must be construed narrowly, so that only offenses clearly included, beyond reasonable doubt, fall within its operation. The fact that an offense is a wrong prohibited by law does not exempt it from the general principles of criminal law.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that materiality is an essential element. A violation of Section 74 is a species of perjury, and perjury requires that the untruthful statement be made upon a material matter. A misrepresentation is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility. A non-material misrepresentation cannot ground a petition under Section 78, and for the same reason cannot ground a criminal prosecution under Section 262.

On the third issue, the Court ruled that profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office. No elective office, not even the Presidency, requires a particular profession or occupation, and Section 39 of the Local Government Code prescribes only citizenship, voter registration, residence, and the ability to read and write. Hence the misrepresentation was not material, and the claim that it increased the candidate's chances of winning does not make it so. The Court also warned that the contrary view would allow every detail in a certificate of candidacy, even one with no bearing on eligibility, to become the basis of a criminal prosecution carrying imprisonment, disqualification, and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Doctrine

A misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is punishable as an election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code only if it is material. A misrepresentation is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility. Profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, so a false statement of profession or occupation is not a material misrepresentation and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution for an election offense. The rule that election offenses are wrongs prohibited by law does not dispense with materiality, because a violation of Section 74 is a species of perjury, and perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the false statement be made upon a material matter.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc holding that no probable cause exists to charge Caesar O. Vicencio with an election offense were affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, so misrepresenting it in a certificate of candidacy is not a material misrepresentation and is not an election offense. Examiners use this case to test the materiality requirement in certificate of candidacy cases and to distinguish a criminal prosecution under Section 262 from a petition to deny due course under Section 78.