ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, PETITIONER, VS. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL.,RESPONDENTS.

On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co.,
Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the
customshouse which were imported without any dollar allocation or
remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,183
units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any Central
Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an
identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman
of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in
behalf of the company, likewise wrote said official urging that
authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not
content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting
Governor of the Central Bank, urging the same matter. Then Secretary
Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, “Senator Sabido
is taking this to you personally. Unless we have legal objection, I
would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment
of all charges. Please expedite action.”

Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central
Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the Monetary Board a
memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido Law Office
for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customhouse stating
therein that it sees no objection to the proposal. The Monetary Board,
however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting of October 12,
1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar
allocation of foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was
informed.

Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central
Bank, on October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade
Development Co., Inc. approached Collector of Customs lsidro Ang-Angco
in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the
concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the importation did
not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank advised the
counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the
No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case. In the
morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, of said Office, wrote a
letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating, among other
things, that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188
units of concentrates but that it could not take action on the request
as “the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import
Office within the contemplation of R. A. No. 1410.” The counsel already
referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs Ang-Angco
who upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release. Instead he
suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove the ambiguity
appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating
that the same was neither a permit nor a release. Secretary of Finance
Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs
Ang-Angco read to him the letter after which the Secretary verbally
expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the
action suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates
upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and
taxes.

When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the
release of the concentrates in question he immediately ordered their
seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the
warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against
Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having committed a
grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint
President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to
investigate Ang-Angco composed of former Solicitor General Ambrosio
Padilla, as Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A.
Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Mr. Aquiles J.
Lopez was aJso investigated by the same Committee, who was also charged
in a separate complaint with serious misconduct in office or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector
Ang-Angco was suspended from office in the latter part of December,
1956.

After the investigation, the committee submitted to President
Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension of 15 days, without
pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his
suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his
office by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on the administrative
case against him remained pending until the death of President
Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the
investigation during which period Ang-Angco had been discharging the
duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by
authority of the President, rendered a decision on the case on February
12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco “guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service”, and considering him resigned effective from
the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of
Customs.

Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco
wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the
fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from
office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have
his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as
well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals,
whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact
that such decision is in violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the
Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against
removal or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law.

In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by
authority of the President, denied the request for reconsideration. Not
satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum
to President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which he
predicated his request for reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo,
also by authority of the President, in a letter dated July 1, 1960,
denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that
the President by virtue of his power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of
the administrative case in question inasmuch as the provisions of law
that would seem to vest final authority in subordinate officers of the
executive branch of the government over administrative matters falling
under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power of
control nor diminish the same.

Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to
him to secure his reinstatement to the office from which he was removed
without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due process of
law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a
petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The
Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for
injunction.

The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary
Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his case by authority of the President
in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof,
violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and
employees in the classified service in that he acted in violation of
Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the
Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the
classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section
18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose
decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the service
without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act which
expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or
employee from the civil service shall be accomplished only after due
process, and of Section, 4, Article XII of our Constitution which
provides that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed except for cause as provided for by law.” Since petitioner is
an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a
presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance
under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the
service by the President in utter disregard of the provision of the
Civil Service Act of 1959.

Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory
entertained by petitioner. They admit that if the theory is to be
considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of
1959, the same may be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law as it
now stands provides that all officers and employees who belong to the
classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and as such all administrative cases
aginst them shall be indorsed to said official whose decision may be
appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no
further appeal can be taken. They also admit that petitioner belongs to
the classified civil service. But it is their theory that that
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law applicable to employees
in the classified service do not apply to the particular case of
petitioner since to hold otherwise would be to deprive the President of
his power of control over the officers and employees of the executive
branch of the government. In other words, respondents contend that,
whether the officer or employees concerned are presidential appointees
or belong to the classified service, if they are all officers and
employees in the executive department, they all come under the control
of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised
over them directly without distinction. Indeed, respondents contend
that, if, as held in the case of Negado vs. Castro, 55 Off.
Gaz. 10534, the President may modify or set aside a decision of the
Civil Service Board of Appeals al the instance of the office concerned,
or the respondent employee, or may even do so motu proprio,
there would be in the final analysis no logical difference between
removing petitioner by direct action of the President and separating
him from the service by ultimate action by the President should an
appeal be taken from the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals
to him, or if in his discretion he may motu proprio consider
it necessary to review the Board’s decision. It is contended that this
ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision wrought into the
law by Republic Act 2260 which eliminated the power of review given to
the President because the power of control given by the Constitution to
the President over officers and employees in the executive department
can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, for to
permit Congress to do so would be to diminish the authority conferred
on the President by the Constitution which is tantamount to amending
the Constitution itself (Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28,
1958). Indeed this is the argument invoked by respondent Castillo in
taking direct action against petitioner instead of following the
procedure outlined in the Civil Service Act of 1959 as may be seen from
the following portion of his decision:

“In connection with the second ground advanced in
support of your petition, it is contended that in deciding the case
directly, instead of transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil
Service for original decision, this Office deprived the respondent of
his right to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. This
contention overlooks the principle that the President may modify or set
aside a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance
of either the office concerned or the respondent employee, or may even
do so motu proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 Off. Gaz.,
No. 51, p. 10534, Dec. 21, 1959). There would therefore be no
difference in effect between direct action by the President and
ultimate action by him should an appeal be taken from the decision of
the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of
Appeals. The result is that the President’s direct action would be the
final decision that would be reached in case an appeal takes its due
course.”

Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the
President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner
even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions
now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner sustains the
negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his
office without due process of law while respondents sustain the
affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the
Constitution over all officers and employees belonging to the executive
department.

To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of
the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service
who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative
cases of all officers and employees in the classified service for in
said section the following is provided: “Except as otherwise provided
by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters
relating to the employees.” The only limitation to this power is that
the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal
within a period of 90 days after the same has been submitted for
decision, whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18,
Republic Act 2260). It should be noted that the law as it now stands
does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the
power to review the decision motu proprio, unlike the
provision of the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was
expressly repealed by the Civil Service of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which
provides that the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be
reversed or modified motu proprio by the President. It is,
therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service
Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been
deprived of the procedure laid down therein in connection with the
investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has
been deprived of due process as guranteed by said law.

It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and
suspension of the officers and employees of the classified service are
subject to the saving clause “except as otherwise provided by law”
(Section 16 (i), Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service?

The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which we quote:

“(b) To remove officials from office conformably to
law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials.
For disloyalty to the ( United States) Republic of the Philippines, the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at any time remove
a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government
of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.”

The phrase “conformably to law” is significant. It shows that the
President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or
employee of the government but that his power must still be subject to
the law that may be passed by the legislative body particularly with
regard to the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of the
persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as
abovestated, we have such law which governs the action to be taken
against officers and employees in the classified civil service. This
law is binding upon the President.

Another provision that may be mentioned is Section 79 (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:

“Power to appoint and remove.—The
Department Head, upon the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or
office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees
whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, and may remove or
punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.”

The phrase “in accordance with the Civil Service Law” is also
significant. So we may say that even granting that, for administrative
purposes, the President of the Philippines is considered as the
Department Head of the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is
still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know
that with regard to officers and employees who belong to the classified
service the finality of the action is given either to the Commissioner
of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by
the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive
department which is now invoked by respondents as justification to
override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. This power
of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific
manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes, supra,
had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter” ^[1],
to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the
power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.
Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over
the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of
the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or
action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word “control” as used
in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79
(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under
his department by virtue of which he may “repeal or modify decisions of
the chiefs of said bureaus or offices”, and under Section 74 of the
same Code, the President’s control over the executive department only
refers to matters of general policy. The term “policy” means a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual ^[2],
and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes
within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.

But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that
it would entirely nullify and set at naught the beneficent purpose of
the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction which is
to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the
classified service in derogation of the provision of our Constitution
which provides that “No officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law” (Section
4, Article XII, Constitution). Here, we have two provisions of our
Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by
the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the
protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our
government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to
reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner that
may be given to both full force and effect and the only logical,
practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do it
in this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson vs. Romero:

“* * * To hold that civil service officials hold
their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or
forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and
eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The
country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils
System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections
could if so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees
differing in political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his
political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him
help, political or otherwise.” (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 754)

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the
President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they
are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service
for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson vs. Romero, supra),
but not with regard to those officers and employees who belong to the
classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which
says that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department” (Article VII, Section 10 (3), Constitution). With regard to
these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments,
Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal
precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the
Civil Service Act of 1959.

“We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests
the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it may
limit and restrict power of removal as it seems best for the public
interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the
appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the
removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers
so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional
prerogative of appointment to officers independently of legislation of
Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in
making appointments but in all that is incident thereto.” ( U. S. vs. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483)

In resumé we may conclude that the step taken by respondent
Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in
taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary
to law and should be set aside.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be
immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the
Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with law.
No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 41 Off. Gaz., 2884.

^[2] Lockhead Aircraft Corp. vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 171 P. 2d 21, 24, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 166 A. L. R. 701.