DIONISIO IGAMA AND RUFINA REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTONIO SORIA AND VICENTE NEPOMUCENO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original petition for the writ
of mandamus to require the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance, to execute judgment in an action of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer now pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan upon appeal from a decision of the justice of
the peace of Manaoag. The cause is now before us upon an answer of the
respondents admitting the material allegations of the petition, and we
are required to determine whether under the admitted facts the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.

It appears that on February 1, 1919, Dionisio Igama and Rufina
Reyes instituted an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer in
the court of the justice of the peace of Manaoag, Pangasinan, against
Antonio Soria, to recover the possession of a lot of ground situated in
the poblacion of Manaoag and more particularly described in the
complaint. The ground of the complaint was alleged to be that, during
the temporary absence of the plaintiffs from Manaoag, the defendant had
entered by stealth upon the lot in question, of which the plaintiffs
were previously in possession, and had detained the same from the
plaintiffs, building thereon a house of light materials,
notwithstanding the opposition of the plaintiffs. Upon issue joined and
proof submitted, the justice of the peace entered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, requiring the defendant to surrender possession of the
lot in question to the plaintiffs and to pay to them the sum of P300,
plus the costs. In his decision the justice of the peace found that the
reasonable rental value of the lot in question was P20 per month; and
the sum of P300, which he awarded to the plaintiffs, represents the
rental value of the property from March, 1918, the date when the
defendant took possession thereof, until the termination of the cause
in the court of the justice of the peace.

From that judgment the defendant, Antonio Soria, appealed to the
Court of First Instance, giving the usual appeal bond in the amount of
P50, to answer for any costs which might be awarded against him in the
Court of First Instance, as required in section 76 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The appellant, however, did not give the bond prescribed in
section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2588
of the Philippine Legislature, with a view to the staying of the
execution of the judgment. Nor did he thereafter, on or before the
tenth of each month, pay, either into the Court of First Instance or to
the plaintiffs in person, the sum of P20, as the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises. Accordingly, while the cause
was as yet undetermined in the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs
moved the court to execute judgment and place the plaintiffs in
immediate possession. This motion was denied, and the plaintiffs
thereupon presented the present petition to the Supreme Court to compel
the judge of the Court of First Instance to proceed to the immediate
execution of judgment.

In overruling said motion, his Honor, the judge of the court below,
observed that the bond actually given was defective, if intended to
stay execution of the judgment, and he assumed that said bond had been
executed by a mistake, resulting from the use of the printed form of
the bond for costs commonly used in appeals from the court of the
justice of the peace. This irregularity his Honor deemed to be curable,
and he accordingly made an order authorizing the appellant to file a
proper bond for rents, damages, and costs within a period of fifteen
days.

Upon the other point, namely, the failure of the appellant to make
a deposit of P20 per month in the court, or to pay said sum to the
plaintiffs, as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
land, his Honor observed that the sum of P300 awarded to the plaintiffs
by the justice of the peace was really awarded in the character of
damages merely; and hence in his view the judgment of the justice of
the peace should not be interpreted as determining the value of the use
and occupation of the land, in the sense intended in the pertinent
portion of section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2588.

As presented in this court the case raises two questions which we
shall consider in turn. The first is whether it was competent for the
judge of first instance to make an order allowing the defendant in the
action of detainer to file a proper bond within the time stated in the
order. It is our opinion that, upon principle, as well as upon the
authority of Tirangbuaya vs. Judge of First Instance of Rizal
(14 Phil., 613), he had this power. The ordinary bond for costs, which
was in fact given, was sufficient to perfect the appeal and confer
jurisdiction over the cause upon the Court of First Instance. In this
connection it will be noted that in the very first sentence of section
88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is declared that in
the action of forcible entry and detainer either party may appeal from
the judgment of the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance
within five days and the suit shall be conducted therein in the same
manner as appeals from justices of the peace in other civil actions.
This implies that the ordinary cost bond required in other civil
actions under section 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall suffice
for the perfecting of the appeal. The special bond for rents, damages,
and costs, contemplated in section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 2588, is only required where a defendant who has
lost before the justice of the peace desires to stay the execution of
the judgment. Having thus obtained jurisdiction of the cause, upon
appeal, it was competent for the Court of First Instance, in the
exercise of the power which it possesses over the execution of
judgments, to accept a special bond for rents, damages, and costs at
any time before the judgment had been in fact executed, and it
necessarily also had the power to withhold the execution of the
judgment for the brief period of fifteen days to allow such bond to be
given. Whether that power was properly exercised is a question upon
which we express no opinion.

We may add furthermore, in this connection, that, supposing the
order allowing the defendant to give the stay bond has not been
complied with, the petitioners herein should again apply to the court
below to have the execution issue, basing their motion on the failure
of the defendant Soria—appellant in that court—to give the bond within
the time stated. In such situation it is not to be supposed that the
judge would hesitate for a moment to order the execution of the
judgment; forthwith. But of course the writ of mandamus will not be
issued by this court until the judge has refused to proceed, after
having his attention called to the failure of Soria to comply with the
terms of the order.

The second question is whether the judge of the Court of First
Instance was unconditionally bound to order execution to issue on
account of the admitted failure of the appellant in the detainer suit
to pay to the plaintiffs, or into court, the sum of P20, on or before
the tenth of each month, as the value of the use and occupation of the
premises.

We are clearly of the opinion that, upon the facts already stated,
the petitioner herein was entitled to the immediate execution of the
judgment of the justice of the peace, and the writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent judge to execute said judgment must accordingly
issue from this court.

The pertinent provision of section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2588, is as follows:

“During the pendency of the appeal in any case in
which a stay of execution of a judgment restoring possession has been
allowed, it shall be the duty of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
or into, the Court of First Instance, at the option of the defendant,
the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
found by the judgment of the justice of the peace to exist, or, in the
absence of a contract, to pay to the plaintiff or into court, as above
provided, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month at the rate determined by the judgment * * *.”

In the case before us the justice of the peace expressly found that
the reasonable rental value of the land was P20 per month. This is
equivalent to a finding that P20 per month is the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the land under the provision above quoted
from Act No. 2588; and the defendant was obligated to make monthly
payment of this amount, under said Act, exactly the same as if the
amount, had been determined by stipulation in a rental contract. We can
discover no sufficient ground for making any distinction at this point
between the obligation imposed on a mere intruder, such as the
defendant appears to be in this case, and that imposed on a lessee who
holds over in contravention of the terms of an express contract.
Whether a defendant in an action of this kind be the one or the other,
if he loses before the justice of the peace and desires to stay the
execution of the judgment pending the appeal, he must not only give the
bond required in section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2588, but must make the monthly payment contemplated
therein, provided the rental value is determined by contract or the
value of the use and occupation is determined in the decision of the
justice of the peace. The measure of damages for the unlawful detention
of property, whether by a mere intruder or a person holding in
contravention of a contract of lease, where the rental value is
undetermined, is the same, namely, the reasonable value bf the use and
occupation. (Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng, 2 Phil., 622, 626; Sparravohn vs. Fisher, 2 Phil., 676, 679.)

It being thus apparent upon the admissions of the answer that the
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, judgment absolute will be
entered that the writ of mandamus issue as prayed, with costs against
the respondent Antonio Soria, So Ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Avancena, and Viillamor, JJ., concur.