ADELA SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE D. VILLEGAS AND RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Direct appeal by both the plaintiff and the defendants”
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig, Rizal, in its Civil Case No. 3726.

The
facts, about which the parties are not in controversy, are as follows:
That the plaintiff and the defendants are the only legal heirs of the
late Irene Santos of Malabon, Rizal, who died intestate on 11 November
1954. The defendant, Jose D. Villegas, is the surviving spouse, while
the plaintiff, Adela Santos Gutierrez, and the other defendant,
Rizalina Santos Rivera, are the nieces, of the said decedent. A few
days after the death of Irene Santos, a petition for the administration
of her estate was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, and docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 2100.
The probate court granted the petition on 5 January 1955, and
thereafter Jose D. Villegas qualified as the administrator of the
estate. On 12 January 1955, Adela Santos Gutierrez signed a four-page
document (Exhibit “A”), written in Tagalog, entitled “Kasulatan Ng
Bilihan At Salinan”, purporting to be a sale of her share and
participation in the estate in favor of Rizalina Santos Rivera, in
consideration of P50,000.00, payable in installments: the first in sum
of P10,000.00 upon signing, and the balance of P40,000.00 in one (1)
year, and with the plaintiff assuming to pay her share in the estate
and inheritance taxes. This deed was notarized by Severo Jovellanos on
13 January 1955. On this day also, the plaintiff signed a
“Manifestation” (Exhibit “B”) purporting to inform the probate court
that the plaintiff had sold all her rights, interests, and
participation in the estate to Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that she,
the plaintiff, is no longer entitled to the service of any pleading,
motion, order, or decision filed or promulgated in the probate court.

On 27 July 1955, the plaintiff filed the present case to
annul the aforesaid deed of sale on grounds of fraud and
mistake. The defendants answered denying the charges,
and counterclaimed for P200,000.00 moral and exemplary
damages and P50,000.00attorney’s fees, because of the
allegedly malicious charges and filing of the suit.

The
plaintiff, alone and in her own behalf, testified that on 7 December
1954 she asked Jose D. Villegas for a loan of P2,000.00 by way of
advance payment on her share in the estate of her deceased aunt, but
Villegas answered her that as his lawyer advised him that he had no
authority to give such an advance he would ask Rizalina Santos Rivera
if she could lend him the money, which, in turn, he would give to the
plaintiff; that at about Christmas time, Villegas counter-offered to
give the plaintiff a loan of P10,000.00, to be evidenced in writing,
instead of the P2,000.00 originally asked, to which proposition the
plaintiff agreed because she was planning a business venture; that in
the afternoon of 12 January 1955, the defendants invited the plaintiff
to go with them to Manila without informing her of the purpose of the
trip; to her surprise, they went to the law office of attorney Modesto
Flores; that while they were waiting for the lawyer, who had not yet
arrived, they were told to sit in the reception room, and the plaintiff
and Rizalina were given copies of a document which the former was not
able to read on account of her poor eyesight and her failure to bring
her eyeglasses with her; that when attorney Flores arrived, the
plaintiff asked both the said lawyer and Villegas what the document was
all about, but neither of them answered her; that when she was asked to
sign the document on the space indicated to her, she simply obeyed;
that she had no residence certificate at the time and she was asked to
secure one; that she did secure one the following day, 13 January 1955,
in Malabon, Rizal, and brought it to the said law office; that while
there she was again asked to sign another document, a manifestation,
which she did sign, after which attorney Flores translated to her in
Tagalog this second document, which turned out to be a manifestation
for the court, and what she signed the day before was a sale of her
share in the inheritance; that she up-braided Villegas but she did not
inform Flores of the deception; that Villegas pacified her by telling
her that they would talk it over in the house; that on their-way home,
Villegas admitted that he and Rizalina wanted the document to be a sale
instead of a loan; that on 14 January 1955, Villegas gave the plaintiff
the sum of P4,800.00, with the explanation that the plaintiff’s
son-in-law’s debt of P2,000.00 would be deducted from the amount of
P10,000.00, while the balance would be paid by check that same evening;
that the same evening the plaintiff called on attorney Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, who advised her to deposit in court the amount that she
received, which she did.

The plaintiff claims, furthermore, that in signing the
deed of sale, her consent was vitiated by gross mistake
because the defendants misled and deceived her as to the
actual and real value of the estate of Irene Santos because
the inventory, which was filed in Special Proceeding 2100
of the probate court, failed to include certain properties,
or which, if at all listed, were either undervalued or stated
to be conjugal when, in fact, they are paraphernal properties of the deceased. Plaintiff also asked that certain
withdrawals made by Rizalina Santos Rivera from the bank
overdraft account of the deceased should be brought to
collation.

The foregoing facts are disputed by the defendants.
Their evidence varies from that of the plaintiff’s in the
following particulars: That the plaintiff did not ask for
a loan but offered to sell her share in the inheritance to
Villegas for the purpose of investing the proceeds in business, but Villegas, after consulting, and being advised
by his lawyer that he could not buy property under his
administration suggested to the plaintiff to ask Rizalina
instead; that when the plaintiff mentioned her proposition
to Rizalina, the latter was at first reluctant to agree to
the price of P50,000.00, but later on they agreed on said
price, with the stipulation that it be paid up in two installments, the first, in the sum of P10,000.00, upon signing

of the contract, and the balance, within one year, therefrom, provided the plaintiff paid her share in the estate
and inheritance taxes; that the latter read and signed the
deed, Exhibit “A”, with her eyeglasses on; that she was
an avid reader of Tagalog literature; that the plaintiff’s
daughter, Jovita, was with her during the signing of the
deed of sale on 12 January 1955, and also during the
notarization of the same and the signing again of the “Manifestation” on 13 January 1955; that said pleading was
first translated and explained to the plaintiff before she
signed it; that a year thereafter, or more particularly on
5 January 1956, Rizalina Santos Rivera, through her lawyer, forwarded to the plaintiff a cashier’s check drawn
on the Prudential Bank and Trust Company payable to the
plaintiff in the sum of P40,000.00 in full payment of the
purchase price, which was, however, refused acceptance by
the plaintiff.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of both parties,
dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
Whereupon, plaintiffs and defendants regularly appealed
to this Court directly, the amounts involved being in excess of P200,000.00.

The plaintiffs assignments of error recite:

“1. The lower court erred in rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s claim that
on account of the fraud practiced upon her by the
defendants-appellants, she consented to the execution of Exhibits “A”
and “B” under the mistaken notion that those documents related to the
loan agreement she and the defendants-appellants had previously agreed
upon.

2. The lower court erred in refusing to find the price of P50,000.00
as a grossly inadequate consideration for the alleged sale and
assignment of plaintiff-appellant’s share in the estate of the late
Irene Santos.

3. The lower court erred in relying upon the appraisal made
by Bureau of Internal Revenue Examiner Bernarda Tamese for
the purpose of determining the true and fair market value of
the estate of Irene Santos and the share of the plaintiff-appellant
in such estate.

4. The lower court erred in disregarding plaintiff-appellant’s
contention that under Article 1082 (of the Civil Code of the
Philipines, Exhibit “A” should be deemed as a partition and as such it
is rescindible on account of lesion since the amount to be received by
the plaintiff-appellant under that instrument is less by more than
one-fourth (1/4) of the true value of the share of which she is
entitled.

5. The lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s complaint.”

The plaintiff depicts herself as an unschooled simpleton
that attained only the third grade, while picturing the
defendants as intelligent and clever persons; that she has
poor eye-sight, low degree of intelligence, and that there
was no impelling need for her to sell the property. These
circumstances, the plaintiff reasons out, coupled with the
inadequacy of consideration, are badges of fraud that contributed to her being an easy victim of her opponents’
deceit. Moreover, continues the plaintiff, in view of the
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties
the presumption of fraud arises.

The facts, as shown by the record, do not support the
plaintiff’s conclusions. The alleged indicia of fraud upon
which she rests her case are backed only by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is contradicted by that of
defendants and their witnesses. Plaintiff’s lack of formal
education was no handicap to her ability to read and
write the Tagalog dialect, in which Exhibit “A” was
couched, and, as the lower court stated, “she is a woman
of average intelligence capable of understanding the consequences of a signature affixed to a document”. Her
alleged poor eye-sight has not been shown with convincing
evidence, but, on the contrary, during the trial, she readily
identified a letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
even without eyeglasses. Plaintiff has herself testified
that she needed money to engage in business in Mindoro.
The defendants, on the other hand, proved in convincing
detail the circumstances surrounding the execution of the

questioned deed through their own testimony, that of the
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. The lawyer, who dictated the draft of the deed, first in English,
and then finalized it in Tagalog, fully acquitted himself
on the witness stand of the possible stigma of being a
party to the alleged fraud.

The alleged existence of a relationship of trust and confidence which was supposedly taken advantage of by the
defendants is belied by the plaintiff’s own assertion
that her defendant uncle-in-law and her deceased aunt
had treated her as the underdog since childhood, and her
sister, Rizalina, as the favorite; yet the plaintiff allegedly
came to live with the defendants only to provide company
for her uncle-in-law during his bereavement on the death
of her aunt. With the unfavorable treatment that the
plaintiff claims to have received at the hands of the defendants Villegas since childhood, it cannot be expected
that the plaintiff would be unwary of whatever he would
ask her to do, let alone her signing a four-page document.
Under the present situation, the careful preparation of
the document cannot be taken against the defendants as
an indication of fraud, in the absence of other evidence
manifesting a scheme to commit it and which would link
the lawyer who caused its preparation.

All the foregoing circumstances pointed to by the plaintiff as badges of fraud do not stand unexplained, while,
on the other hand, there are certain questions which have
not been satisfactorily explained by the plaintiff. What
motive had Villegas, a man 80i years of age, for committing the alleged fraud against the plaintiff? Why did not
the plaintiff present her daughter, Jovita, to at least corroborate her testimony? She was present during the
signing of Exhibits “A” and “C”. How could the plaintiff have simply obeyed and signed the deed, Exhibit “A”,
without having noted the words “LIMAMPUNG LIBONG
PISO” written in bold capital letters in the four-page deed
of sale? How could she claim ignorance of the contents

and import of the deed which she signed on 12 January
1955 when she even secured a residence certificate and
returned to the same law office with it on the following
day, 13 January 1955? Why did she accept the first installment payment on 14 January 1955 when, according to
her, she had already learned of the fraud when Atty. Flores
explained to her the “manifestation”, Exhibit “B”, on 13
January 1955? Why is it that during the trial she readily
identified Exhibit “C” (a letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue) without wearing eyeglasses but could not
identify Exhibit “A” without wearing them, when a comparison of the type of print between these exhibits shows
no appreciable difference at all? The lack of a satisfactory explanation to these questions impels affirmance of
the lower court’s finding that no fraud or mistake vitiated
the consent of the plaintiff in affixing her signature to
the deed.

One striking feature of plaintiff’s story is that the success of defendants’ alleged machinations wholly rested
on the most fortuitous circumstance of plaintiff’s not
bringing her eyeglasses when she signed the deed conveying her interest to her sister. It is undeniable that
had she been able to read the deed, according to her version of what transpired, plaintiff would have flatly refused
to sign; yet it is not shown that the defendants took any
steps to prevent her from bringing her eyeglasses. If
fraud there was, it must be admitted that there was no
preparation to insure its success, and such carelessness
renders the whole charge of deceit absurd and incredible.

The claim of grossly inadequate consideration for the
sale is predicted by the plaintiff upon a double theme:
(a) that the inventory of the estate of Irene Santos did
not include certain properties in Rizal (a one-sixth undivided interest in an estate in Montalban, Rizal, of
1010.9999 has.), and (b) an alleged gross undervaluation
of the estate properties. As to the first, the court below

rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s evidence consisting in a
simple copy of a purported decision of the pre-war Court
of Appeals, in case CA-G. R. No. 654, “San Pedro, et al.
vs. Director of Forestry” (Exhibit G-2). We are not
prepared to declare the rejection of this exhibit to be
erroneous, since it bears no signatures or certification by
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals that purportedly rendered it, nor any signatures attesting its authenticity. The
destruction of the pre-war records of that Court should
undoubtedly impose caution before accepting at face value
this sort of copies, not supported by reliable evidence of
genuineness and authenticity. As to the averred undervaluation, we note that the trial court preferred to adopt
the appraisal of the examiner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Bernardo Tamese, made in assessing the inheritance taxes due on the estate of Irene Santos, and
approved by the superior officers of the Bureau, over that
of witness Santiago presented by the appellant. In this
respect, the trial court made the following cogent observations in its decision:

“It
is a fact that Irene Samtos owned real properties situated in the City
of Manila, and in the provinces of Laguna, Rizal, Bulacan, and
Pampanga, some of which are paraphernal (Exhibits
“N” to “N-3”) and the rest are conjugal. These real properties were
appraised by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for purposes of fixing the
amount of estate and inheritance taxes to be paid, and their fair
market value was determined by the examiner, Bernardo Tamese, after an
ocular inspection of the properties and investigation of the deeds of
title and tax declarations covering the same. The findings of Mr.
Tamese as noted down by him in his worksheet, Exhibit “7” and which is
reproduced in page 15 hereof, were submitted to his superior officers
(Exhibit “B”) and the same were approved by the Superintendent and
Senior Examiners and confirmed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
the latter acting through Deputy Commissioner Misael P. Vera (Exhs.
“27” to “28-A”), and this Court sees no ground for disturbing the
findings of these public officials in the absence of proof of any
irregularity in their actuations. It is to be observed that in his
report Mr. Tamese valued the property in Famy, Laguna, at P2,502.00
although in the inventory of defendant Villegas each parcel was valued
only at P1.00. It is also to be noted that in said Report the
paraphernal properties of Irene Santos were included, appraised and
considered in determining the total value of the estate of the old
woman. These facts belie the claim of plaintiff that there was
undervaluation of the properties of the deceased. Moreover the official
appraisal made by the Government deserves more credit than the
testimony of the witness Bernardo Santiago who pretended to be in a
position to pay P3,000.00 for every hectare of fishpond of Irene Santos
and yet was found to have no properties to his name in the provinces of
Bulacan and Pampanga, (Exhibits “22”‘ and “22-A”) and was worth only
P15,000.00 after his death (Exhibits “23” to “23-B”). The deeds of
sale, Exhibits
“L” to “L-4″ which were also submitted by the plaintiff to prove the
market value of the properties in Bulacan and Pampanga are worthless as
evidence in that matter, in the absence of proof that the properties
covered by said documents are of the same kind and class and are
similarly situated as those of the deceased.”

We find no reversible error in these conclusions of the
court a quo, which had ample opportunity to estimate the
credibility of the contrasting witnesses and evidence.
Hence, the claim of gross inadequacy of the price must be
rejected as unproved.

To sustain the claim of deliberate undervaluation would
necessarily imply that the Internal Revenue examiner Tamese and his superiors deliberately betrayed their official
duty, and there is no evidence to justify such conclusion.

Neither do we find merit in the charge that plaintiff’s
sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, had siphoned off money and
properties from her aunt’s overdraft account. The checks
(Exhibits 3 to 3-F) and deposit slips (Exhibits 4 to 4-F)
evidence that the amounts drawn were duly returned.

The trial court found the fair value of the conjugal estate to be P147,194.00, from which the expenses and claims
amounting to P138,931.00 should be deducted, having a
net conjugal estate of P8,263.00, of which one-half
(P4,131.50) pertained to the deceased. Adding to that
half the net paraphernal estate, valued at P212,513.00,
gives a partible estate of P216,644.50 to be devided (in
the absence of ascendants and descendants) half to the

surviving spouse and half to the two nieces, as nearest
collateral relatives (Civil Code, Art. 1001). The onefourth share of plaintiff-appellant, as niece of the deceased,
amounts to P54,161.00, for which the P50,000.00 payable
under Exhibit “A” is certainly not an inadequate price,
considering that appellant was to obtain it free from the
troubles, delays, and vicissitudes attendant to the judicial
liquidation and settlement of the estate.

While fraud may be proved entirely by circumstantial
evidence, it is not to be lightly inferred. Our review of
the evidence discloses that the evidence for appellant does
not suffice to overcome the presumption of good faith and
regularity in human affairs.

The next question is whether the contract of sale and
assignment, Exhibit “A”, being valid and binding, is,
nonetheless, rescissible on the ground of lesion.

The theory of the plaintiff is that the contract should
be deemed a partition, on the strength of Article 1082
of the Civil Code, which provides:

“Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.”;

and she contends that inasmuch as the net hereditary
estate of the deceased is, according to the plaintiff, over
one million pesos, to which she is entitled to an aliquot
one-fourth (1/4) as an heir, and, having received only
P50,000.00 under the contract, suffering, therefore, a lesion of more than one-fourth (1/4), she is entitled to a
rescission thereof, under Article 1098. This article reads:

“Art. 1098. A partition judicial or extra judicial, may also be
rescinded on account of lesion, when any one of the co-heirs received
things whose value is less, by at least one-fourth, than the share
to which he is entitled, considering the value of the things at the
time they were adjudicated.”

The evidenced values of the properties in the estate of
Irene Santos, and of plaintiff’s share therein, render unnecessary any extended discussion of her alternative claim
that the contract, Exhibit “A”, should be regarded as a
partition, rescindible on account of lesion of one-fourth. Granting, arguendo, that the assignment of her hereditary
share in favor of her sister, Rizalina, should be deemed
a partition under Article 1082 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (notwithstanding the fact that it did not totally terminate the indivision among the co-heirs of Irene
Santos, since the undivided share of the widower Villegas
remained unchanged), still the lesion, if any, suffered by
plaintiff from her sate of P,000.00 of an undivided hereditary interest worth P54,000.00
is certainly less than the
one-fourth (1/4) required by Article 1098 of the Code.

Turning now to the defendant’s appeal, we are not disposed to vary the lower court’s refusal to award them
damages and attorney’s fees. Such awards are primarily
in the discretion of the trial court, and it has found no
facts upon which such award can be made. Not only were
the allegations of fraud in plaintiff’s complaint privileged
in character, but her failure to seek an amicable settlement before filing suit, as required of relatives by Article
222 of the Civil Code, has not been pleaded either by
answer or motion to dismiss. As to moral damages, the
record shows no proof of mental suffering on the part of
defendants upon which the award can be based. In addition, the absence of actual damages, moral, temperate,
or compensatory, blocks the grant of exemplary damages
(Civil Code, Article 2234).

We find no reason for disturbing the decision appealed
from, and, therefore, the same is hereby affirmed. No
costs in this instance.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.