SANTOS L. NACAYTUNA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Nacaytuna versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the story of a municipal mayor who removed his own wife from public office by pretending to accept a resignation she never tendered. Santos Nacaytuna, then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, was charged by the People of the Philippines with violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for causing undue injury to Dr. Marydole Nacaytuna through evident bad faith. The case matters to every bar candidate because it fixes the elements of the offense of causing undue injury under the graft law, and because it teaches that resignation from public office is never complete without a genuine intention to relinquish, an act of relinquishment, and an acceptance by the proper authority. It also shows how the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty bends and breaks against affirmative evidence of bad faith.

Procedural History

Upon the recommendation of the Ombudsman, an information was filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019. In a decision dated October 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum, and imposed perpetual disqualification to hold public office. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a resolution dated January 4, 2006. He then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assigning as errors the finding that his wife never tendered her resignation, the claimed failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

Facts

On November 17, 1999, Mayor Santos Nacaytuna appointed his wife, Marydole Nacaytuna, as Municipal Health Officer of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. In the course of her employment, Marydole drafted a letter of resignation dated April 7, 2000, which the petitioner claimed to have received on the same date. In May 2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately from her husband.

Sometime in April 2002, Marydole was informed by a certain Marly Prieto that the mayor had accepted her resignation effective at the end of April 2002. She protested, insisting that she never tendered the letter, and she brought the matter before the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission declared the acceptance of her resignation illegal and ordered her reinstatement with full backwages. Meanwhile, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of the graft charge.

Before the Sandiganbayan, Marydole testified that she drafted the letter in April 2000 but never tendered it, that she continued working even after it was supposedly approved because she had no intention of resigning, and that the petitioner probably took the letter from belongings she had left in the conjugal home. The petitioner testified that his private secretary received the letter on April 7, 2000, that he kept it in his office until he accepted the resignation on April 23, 2002, that he delayed because he was still assessing her performance, and that he consulted the Civil Service Commission before approving it.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Whether or not Dr. Marydole Nacaytuna actually tendered her resignation, such that its acceptance was lawful.
• Whether or not the petitioner acted with evident bad faith and caused undue injury to Marydole, notwithstanding her subsequent reinstatement with backwages.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This is the very provision under which the petitioner was charged and convicted, and its language supplies the four elements the Court required the prosecution to prove.

Section 8 of the same law fixes the penalty, providing for imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, with perpetual disqualification from public office. This provision governs the penalty actually imposed on the petitioner.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan in full. On the first issue, the Court held that all the elements of the offense were established beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner was a public officer; his acceptance of the resignation was done in the performance of his official duty; he acted with evident bad faith when he made it appear that a resignation letter was submitted when it never was; and his actuations caused undue injury to Marydole because they resulted in her removal from office and the withholding of her salaries.

On the second issue, the Court defined resignation and laid down its requisites:

Resignation is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.

The Court held that to constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term, an act of relinquishment, and an acceptance by the proper authority. Here, the intention and the act of relinquishment were clearly absent. Marydole admitted writing the letter, but the evidence showed she never tendered it and refrained from pursuing any intention to resign. She continued working after the letter was drafted and even after its supposed acceptance, despite her salaries being withheld, and she protested by letter upon learning of the acceptance.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the claim of good faith and the defense of reinstatement. The petitioner's account of how he received the letter was riddled with inconsistencies: before the Civil Service Commission he claimed the letter reached him outside the normal course of transmitting written communications because protocol is not strictly observed between husband and wife, yet before the Sandiganbayan he claimed his private secretary received it. The two year gap between the alleged tender and the acceptance negated good faith, and his claim of consulting the Civil Service Commission was self-serving and unsupported. As the Sandiganbayan observed, he could simply have asked his wife whether she was resigning, and his failure to do so, coupled with his belated acceptance of an untendered resignation apparently motivated by their marital problems, were clear indications of evident bad faith. The Court also held that the subsequent reinstatement and backwages did not erase the undue injury already caused by her removal from office and the withholding of her salaries.

Doctrine

First, a violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act requires proof of four elements: that the accused is a public officer discharging official or administrative functions; that the prohibited act was committed during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position; that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and that his action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any party an unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference.

Second, resignation from public office is complete and operative only upon the concurrence of three requisites: an intention to relinquish a part of the term, an act of relinquishment, and an acceptance by the proper authority. A letter drafted but never tendered produces no resignation at all, and its acceptance is an act of evident bad faith.

Third, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot stand against affirmative evidence of bad faith, and the subsequent reinstatement of the injured party with backwages does not negate the undue injury already inflicted.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Sandiganbayan decision finding Santos Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum with perpetual disqualification to hold public office, was affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize the three requisites of a complete and operative resignation: intention to relinquish, act of relinquishment, and acceptance by the proper authority. Examiners use this case to test the elements of Section 3(e) of the graft law, the meaning of evident bad faith, and the rule that an untendered resignation cannot be validly accepted.