SAMAR MINING CO., INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPBYO V. TAN AND RUFINO ABUYEN, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Samar Mining versus Arnado

The Case

This is an appeal by Samar Mining Company from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing its action for certiorari and prohibition on the ground of wrong venue. Samar Mining sought to annul proceedings conducted by a labor attorney of the Department of Labor Regional Office in Cebu City, which had ruled against it in a workmen's compensation claim. The case matters because it settles a question every bar candidate must be able to answer cold: is the rule on where a petition for certiorari and prohibition may be filed a rule of jurisdiction or a rule of venue, and which court is the proper forum when the challenged acts are those of a regional office and its officers?

Procedural History

Rufino Abuyen filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The claim was docketed and set for hearing in Catbalogan, Samar, by Pompeyo Tan, a labor attorney. Samar Mining protested the notice and the authority of Tan to hold the hearing, but the hearing proceeded without Samar Mining, and Tan rendered a decision awarding compensation. Samar Mining moved for reconsideration and reopening before the Regional Office, and that motion was denied. Samar Mining then filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Francisco Arnado, Pompeyo Tan, and Rufino Abuyen. The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing and approval of a bond, but later dismissed the case on motion of the respondents upon the ground of wrong venue. Samar Mining appealed that dismissal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Rufino Abuyen had been employed as a capataz of Samar Mining in General MacArthur, Samar, from August 1949 to March 1956. He was examined by the company physician before employment and annually thereafter, and was found physically fit from 1950 to 1954. On December 31, 1955, he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, was confined and treated in the company hospital, and was laid off on March 5, 1956, still suffering from the disease. On June 18, 1956, he filed a notice of injury or sickness and claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission, alleging that the disease was contracted while in the service of Samar Mining.

On April 23, 1958, Samar Mining received from Pompeyo Tan, a labor attorney, a notice dated March 21, 1958, setting the claim for hearing on May 31, 1958, in Catbalogan, Samar. Samar Mining wrote a letter dated May 13, 1958, assailing the validity of the notice and the authority of Tan to hold the hearing, on the ground that the authority was vested by Reorganization Plan 20-A and Executive Order Number 218 of the President in Department of Labor Regional Office Number VI, located in Cebu City, of which Francisco Arnado and Pompeyo Tan were Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney, respectively. The hearing took place without Samar Mining, and Tan rendered a decision dated October 14, 1958, finding that Abuyen must have contracted the illness in 1955 while in the service of Samar Mining, that his midnight work must have led to the aggravation of the disease, and sentencing Samar Mining to pay the corresponding compensation plus costs.

Samar Mining moved for reconsideration and reopening before the Regional Office, based on the alleged lack of authority of Tan to hear the case. Tan denied the motion in an order dated September 11, 1959, received by Samar Mining on March 15, 1960. On March 24, 1960, Samar Mining filed the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that Tan and Arnado had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing and approval of a bond, but later dismissed the case on the ground of wrong venue.

Issues

• Whether or not the provision of Rule 67, section 4, on where the petition may be filed is a rule of venue or a rule of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila is the proper venue for an action for certiorari and prohibition against officers of a regional office located in Cebu City.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the case on the ground of wrong venue was proper.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 67, section 4, of the Rules of Court provides:

The petition may be filed in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First Instance having jurisdiction thereof. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals, if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

This is the provision whose interpretation is the very hinge of the case, and the Court holds that it speaks of venue, not jurisdiction.

Rule 65, section 1, of the Rules of Court provides:

The provisions of the preceding rules shall apply in special actions for declaratory relief, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, eminent domain, foreclosure of mortgage, partition of real estate, and forcible entry and detainer, which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rules relating to such special civil actions.

Samar Mining invoked this provision to argue that the general rule on venue applies to special civil actions.

Rule 5, section 1, of the Rules of Court provides:

Civil action in Courts of First Instance may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides at the election of the plaintiff.

Samar Mining relied on this general rule to claim that, being established in Manila, it could bring the action in the Manila court.

Section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides that courts of first instance:

shall have power to issue writs of injunctions, certiorari, prohibition in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.

This fixes the territorial reach of each court of first instance and is the statutory limit the Court refuses to override.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Rule 67, section 4, is a provision on venue, not jurisdiction. Its title is "Where petition filed," and it obviously contemplates venue, although it makes venue coterminous with, or dependent upon, jurisdiction. The jurisdiction alluded to is jurisdiction over the corporation, board, officer or person whose acts are in question, not jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Court of First Instance of Manila was not the proper venue. The Court reasoned that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is limited to matters of pleading, practice, and procedure and to admission to the practice of law, whereas the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs exclusively to Congress. Samar Mining's theory would, in effect, vest the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction, certiorari and prohibition affecting corporations, boards, officers or persons outside the City of Manila, which is denied to it by the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court also noted that the action is directed against given proceedings undertaken by order and under the authority of Regional Office Number VI, located in Cebu City, and that Arnado and Tan are mere incidents of those proceedings and agents of that office.

On the third issue, the Court held that the dismissal on the ground of wrong venue was proper. It observed that Samar Mining's own argument, questioning the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to affect those outside Cebu, merely succeeded in proving that the Manila court was right in holding that venue had been improperly laid.

Doctrine

The rule on where a petition for certiorari and prohibition may be filed is a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction. The petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the corporation, board, officer or person whose acts or omissions are challenged, and that jurisdiction is territorial, limited to the province or district of the court. The general rule on venue in Rule 5, section 1, does not supplant this specific rule, because the Supreme Court's rule-making power cannot enlarge the jurisdiction that Congress has apportioned among the courts. A bar candidate should be able to state that the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot issue writs affecting officers and proceedings outside the City of Manila, and that the proper venue is the court of the place where the regional office and its officers are located.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, with costs against Samar Mining Company.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that Rule 67, section 4, is a rule of venue, not jurisdiction, and venue is coterminous with the territorial jurisdiction of the court over the officer or person whose acts are challenged. Examiners like to use this case to test whether a student can distinguish venue from jurisdiction in special civil actions and explain why the rule-making power cannot expand the jurisdiction apportioned by Congress.