PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO CALONGUI Y LOPEZ, APPELLANT.

People versus Calongui

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Alejandro Calongui y Lopez for two counts of rape committed against his thirteen-year-old first cousin, Marinel Calongui, in the family home where he had been taken in to help with the farm. The case matters for the bar candidate because it gathers in one decision the Court's settled rules on the credibility of a child rape victim, the strict requirements of the sweethearts defense, the mandatory character of civil indemnity and moral damages in rape, and the narrow, limited purpose for which aggravating circumstances may be appreciated in awarding exemplary damages.

Procedural History

Two separate informations for rape were filed against the appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 33, one for the incident of January 1, 1998 and another for the incident of September 26, 1998. The appellant pleaded not guilty, and the cases were tried jointly. The trial court rendered judgment on December 23, 2002, convicting him of two counts of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a), of Republic Act No. 8353, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordering him to pay fifty thousand pesos as civil liability, fifty thousand pesos as moral damages, and thirty thousand pesos as exemplary damages for each count, plus costs.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Court's ruling in People versus Mateo, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, which rendered its decision on October 26, 2005, affirming the trial court's judgment with the modification that the imprisonment sentence in each case was fixed at reclusion perpetua, deleting the range of twenty years and one day to forty years. The case then came before the Supreme Court on appeal, raising the sole issue of whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

Marinel was five years old when her family took in the appellant, her first cousin, then twenty-one years old, to live with them and help in the upkeep of the family farm. On January 1, 1998, at about two o'clock in the morning, Marinel, then thirteen years old and sleeping in the same room as the appellant and her three siblings, awoke to find that he had removed her shorts and panties. He threatened to kill her and her siblings if she resisted. She tried to repel him by moving her body and kicking his thighs, but he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. The next morning she learned that her twelve-year-old brother Noel had witnessed the incident but had pretended to be asleep out of fear. She told Noel not to tell anyone, and she herself did not report the matter to her parents because of the appellant's threats.

On September 26, 1998, at about three o'clock in the morning, the appellant raped her again, and Noel again witnessed it. She was undressed from the waist down and was threatened that she and her siblings would be killed if she resisted. Shortly after the second incident, the appellant stayed at the barracks where he worked as a laborer. Emboldened by his absence, Marinel told her mother of her ordeals on November 15, 1998, and her mother accompanied her to the police authorities. A medical examination on November 18, 1998 showed old hymenal lacerations and a non-virgin state consistent with her account of sexual intercourse on two occasions.

For his part, the appellant denied having sexual congress with Marinel on January 1, 1998. As to the September 26, 1998 incident, he claimed that it was a consensual act because he and Marinel were sweethearts at that time. The trial court rejected these defenses and convicted him on both counts.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of January 1, 1998, despite his bare denial.
• Whether or not the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of September 26, 1998, despite his claim that he and the victim were sweethearts and that the act was consensual.
• Whether or not the trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

Applicable Provisions

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed — 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; x x x x

This is the provision under which the appellant was charged and convicted on both counts, the prosecution having established carnal knowledge through force, threats, and intimidation.

Article 266-B of the same Code provides:

Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

This fixes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of simple rape, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed.

Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender x x x x.

This is the provision the Court used to hold that the first-cousin relationship between the appellant and the victim is not an aggravating circumstance, since a first cousin is not within the degrees enumerated.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appellant's bare and unsubstantiated denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. Marinel's clear, candid, and straightforward testimony firmly established that the appellant raped her on January 1, 1998.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the sweethearts defense. It held that this defense must be proven by compelling evidence, specifically, that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations. The appellant's claim remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated; no mementos, love letters, notes, or pictures were presented, and Marinel denied the alleged love relationship on both direct and cross-examination. The Court added that even if the relationship were true, it does not by itself establish consent, for, as the Court put it, love is not a license for lust. The Court also held that Marinel's failure to offer tenacious resistance did not make her submission voluntary, since at thirteen years of age she could not be expected to resist as a mature woman would, and her inability to recall the exact duration of the intercourse was a minor lapse to be expected of a person recounting a traumatic experience.

On the third issue, the Court held that civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries. The awards of fifty thousand pesos as civil liability and fifty thousand pesos as moral damages were therefore correct. The award of exemplary damages, however, had to be deleted. The Court explained that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages, and that although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information, the retroactive application of those rules cannot adversely affect rights that vested before their effectivity. Even so, a review of the records showed no aggravating circumstance at all: dwelling could not be appreciated because the victim and the appellant lived in the same house; nighttime could not be appreciated because there was no proof that the appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness; relationship was not aggravating because a first cousin is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15; abuse of confidence was not established as having facilitated the rape; and the use of a deadly weapon could not be appreciated because the victim's belated assertion about a knife raised doubts as to its existence.

Doctrine

A bare denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot prevail over the clear and candid testimony of a credible witness. The sweethearts defense must be proven by compelling evidence that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the sexual relations; even when proven, the relationship does not by itself establish consent, for love is not a license for lust. The failure of a young victim to offer tenacious resistance does not make her submission voluntary. Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a), and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages are awarded without need of further proof. Exemplary damages require an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, and under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure such circumstances must be alleged in the information; but where the crime and the informations predate those rules, aggravating circumstances not alleged but proved at trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining liability for exemplary damages. Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 does not include first cousins.

Disposition

The appeal was denied; the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed with the modification that the award of exemplary damages was deleted, while the convictions for two counts of rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages were sustained.

Remember This

Memorize the line that love is not a license for lust, and the rule that civil indemnity and moral damages in rape need no further proof while exemplary damages require an aggravating circumstance. Examiners use this case to test the sweethearts defense, the credibility of a child victim, and the requirements for awarding exemplary damages.