PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARIEL PAOYO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Paoyo

The Case

This is People versus Paoyo, a criminal appeal in which the State seeks to hold Ariel Paoyo liable for the murder of Margarito Carelo, who was fatally shot on the night of March 28, 1992 outside his own gate in Canda Ilaya, Lopez, Quezon. Paoyo did not fire the fatal shot; his unidentified companion did. The case therefore matters because it is a study in conspiracy — how the acts of one gunman become the acts of a companion who never pulled the trigger — and in the credibility of eyewitness testimony weighed against alibi and flight.

Procedural History

Paoyo and an unidentified companion, referred to as John Doe, were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon at Calauag. In a decision dated May 30, 2003, the trial court found Paoyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as moral damages and 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity.

Paoyo filed a notice of appeal. Following the ruling in People versus Mateo, which requires intermediate review by the appellate court of criminal cases imposing death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by decision dated February 28, 2005, modifying it only by ordering Paoyo to pay an additional 56,000 pesos as actual damages. His motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case and decided it in April 2007.

Facts

On the evening of March 28, 1992, Paoyo and an unidentified companion went to the store of Paz Malubay Carelo at Canda Ilaya, Lopez, Quezon, which stood beside the victim's house. They bought cigarettes and matches, stayed for about one hour, and asked Paz about the location of Margarito Carelo's house. Paz then saw the two proceed to the victim's residence.

At the victim's house, Paoyo summoned Margarito. The victim's son, Jose Crizaldy Carelo, peeped out the window, and the victim, followed by his wife Eugenia, went out to open the gate. As he was opening the gate, the companion shot him between the neck and the shoulder. Paoyo and the gunman immediately fled. The victim was brought to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Twenty days later, on April 17, 1992, Eugenia gave a sworn statement before the Lopez police naming Paoyo and his companion, and stating that Crizaldy was at their house at the time. Crizaldy also gave a sworn statement that same day that he witnessed the incident. In his defense, Paoyo invoked alibi, claiming that as a Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit member he was on duty at a military camp in Barangay Silang, about five kilometers away, a claim corroborated by Staff Sergeant Romulo Cristobal.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution's evidence established the guilt of Paoyo beyond reasonable doubt despite his defense of alibi.
• Whether or not conspiracy was proven between Paoyo and his unidentified companion, such that the gunman's act became Paoyo's act.
• Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Eugenia Carelo, and the non-presentation of Ruperto Malubay, cast doubt on the prosecution's case.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, defines and penalizes murder:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

This is the crime charged, qualified by treachery, and it fixes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, invoked by the Court on the suppression of evidence, provides:

Evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

The Court held that this presumption does not apply where the omitted witness's testimony is merely corroborative.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the appeal bereft of merit. Prosecution eyewitness Eugenia named Paoyo and identified him in open court as the companion of the gunman. Being the victim's wife, her claim is more credible, it being unnatural for her to point to one other than the real culprit. Alibi, which placed Paoyo only about five kilometers away, could not prevail over positive identification.

On the second issue, the Court held that conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt. The series of events before, during, and after the killing showed unity of purpose, harmony of design, and concurrence of will. Paoyo and his companion asked for the victim's house, summoned him, and fled together after the shooting. There was no evidence that Paoyo tried to prevent the shooting, and he did not report the gunman's identity to the authorities. The Court quoted the trial court's observation:

Flight is evidence of a guilty conscience.

Since conspiracy was proven, the act of the gunman became the act of Paoyo, and both are liable as principals.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the attack on Eugenia's credibility. Her apparent inconsistency about Crizaldy's presence was explained by her limited education and her being a Bicolana answering questions propounded in English and translated to Tagalog. Her sworn statement and Crizaldy's own statement, both given twenty days after the killing, confirmed his presence. As to the non-presentation of Ruperto Malubay, the Court held that each party has the prerogative to determine which witnesses to present and to dispense with merely corroborative testimony, so the presumption of suppression did not arise.

Doctrine

First, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, showing unity of purpose and concurrence of will; once proven, the act of one conspirator is the act of all, and each is liable as a principal. Second, alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible eyewitness, especially where the accused was not shown to be so far away as to make it physically impossible for him to be at the scene. Third, the presumption that willfully suppressed evidence would be adverse if produced does not apply where the omitted testimony is merely corroborative, since each party may choose which witnesses to present.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting Paoyo of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with the awarded damages.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: once conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all, and the gunman's shot becomes the companion's crime. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy inferred from concerted action and flight, and the rule that alibi yields to positive identification.