G.R. No. 17015. April 29, 1961
GEORGE H. EVANS, ETC., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND NATALIA ARGUELLES VDA. DE NAVAL, RESPONDENTS.
BARRERA, J.:
Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated February 4, 1960, as well as its
resolution en banc of April 12, 1960.
From the records, it appears that on December 2, 1952, a claim for death
benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) was
filed by respondent Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval (for herself as widow of the
deceased Fabian Naval, and for and in behalf of her 2 minor children with said
deceased, namely, Elmer and Evelyn Naval) against the Dahican Lumber Company.
When the claim was transmitted to the company, it elicited an answer to the
effect that it (company) was denying liability for the death of Fabian Naval, on
the ground that he (Naval) was laid off from the service on July 31, 1952 and,
since he died on August 10, 1952, his “death occurred when there was no longer
any employer-employee relation between him and the company.”[1]
On November 5, 1953, Dahican Lumber Company informed respondent Commission
that it was under receivership, and pointed to herein petitioner George H. Evans
as the receiver duly appointed by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 20987. Thereafter (or on April 22, May 5, and August 5, 1955),
respondent Commission, acting: through Referee Patricio Dionisio, advised
petitioner to take cognizance of the claim for compensation filed against the
company by respondent Vda. de Naval.
On August 24, 1955, petitioner’s counsel replied to the referee in a letter
of this tenor:
“1. Your letter of 5 August 1965 was referred to us by Mr. George H. Evans
(herein petitioner), receiver of Dahican Lumber Company.“2. It is respectfully suggested that hearing of this claim be had by your
Office to determine the merit or lack of merit of this claim. If, after said
hearing your Office finds this claim meritorious, and an award is decreed, such
award will then be submitted to the Court for consideration with a view to it
being consolidated with the claims of other persons and entities against the
Dahican Lumber Company in the receivership proceedings.“3. Please let us know of such action as you may decide to take in the
premises.”
Acting upon this suggestion, the referee set the case for hearing on
September 21, 1955, notice thereof having been sent to respondent Vda. de Naval
and to petitioner’s counsel. The scheduled hearing was, however, postponed,
first to September 26, 1955, and then to October 7, 1955. On November 4, 1955,
the referee issued an order (copy of which was received by petitioner on
November 16, 1955) stating:
“ORDER
“The parties in this case are hereby ordered to appear before the Public
Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte when summoned by said official, to submit
their respective evidence.“Notify (1) Mrs. Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval c/o Joaquin Gosilater, Daet,
Camarines Norte; (2) The Receiver Mr. George Evans [herein petitioner], 233
David St., Manila; and (3) Baradi and Gallardo Law Offiee, 804-806 Wilson Bldg.,
Manila.“SO ORDERED.”
Without notifying petitioner to appear before him, the Public Defender at
Daet, on January 28 and 30, 1956, conducted a hearing of the case, pursuant to
the abovequoted order of the referee. On April 25, 1956, the referee rendered a
decision against Dahican Lumber Company, in favor of respondent Vda. de Naval,
the dispositive part of which reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and considering further the fact
that the allegations of the claimant widow (herein respondent Vda. de Naval)
were corroborated by the foreman of the deceased and by a log-contractor of the
Company (Dahican Lumber Company), there is no alternative but to consider this
compensation case as, compensable.. It is hereby ordered, therefore, that the
Company should be held responsible to the claimant widow and her children, by
paying them the amount of 50 per centum of the deceased’s regular weekly
wages. Computing it for the whole period of 208 weeks, as provided by law, the
dependents are entitled to P2,184.00, as compensation payable in lump sum, less
the 8 per centum provided by Section 22 of Act 3428, as amended, or
P2,009.28. The Company is also ordered to pay to the widow the amount of P200.00
as burial expenses and to pay to this Commission the amount of P21.00, as
provided by Section 55 of the Compensation Law, as amended.“Let the parties concerned be served with a copy of this Decision for their
information and guidance.“SO ORDERED.”
From November 16, 1955, the date when petitioner received a copy of the
aforequoted order (dated November 4, 1955) of the referee requiring the parties
‘to appear before the Public defender at Daet, Camarines Norte, when summoned by
said official, to submit their respective evidence”, until June 12, 1959 (a
period of 3 years, 6 months, and 28 days), petitioner received no notice, order,
or other communication from respondent Commission regarding the case. It was
only on said date (June 12, 1959) that petitioner received the following letter
dated June 4i» 1959, from respondent Commission:
“Our records do not reveal that the decision dated April 26, 1956 of the
defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission in the above-entitled case requiring
you to pay the claimant the amount of P2,209.28 has ever been complied with.“In this connection, it is requested that said amount together With the sum
of P21.00 fee as required by Section 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, be remitted to this Office within ten (10) days from your receipt
hereof, otherwise we shall much to our regret, issue a writ of execution to
enforce the aforesaid decision.“However, if direct payments have been made to the claimant, kindly submit to
this Commission within the above-mentioned period corresponding proof thereof
together with said fee.”
Upon receipt of said letter, petitioner’s counsel, on June 13, 1959, wrote to
respondent Commission the following letter:
“1. The Receiver, George H. Evans (herein petitioner), has referred to us
your letter of 4 June 1959, wherein you referred to‘* * * the decision dated April 26, 1956, of the defunct Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in the above-entitled ease requiring you to pay the
claimant the amount of P2,209.28 has ever been complied with.’and this is to advise (that) we never received way notice of said alleged
decision.“2. The last notice we received in this case was dated 4 November 1955
and read as follows:‘ORDER
‘The parties in this case are hereby ordered to appear before the Public
Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte when summoned by said official, to submit
their respective evidence.‘Notify (1) Mrs. Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval, c/o Joaquin Gosilater,
Daet, Camarines Norte; (2) The Receiver Mr. George Evans, 233 David St., Manila;
and (3) Baradi and Gallardo Law Office, 804-806 Wilson Bldg., Manila.‘SO ORDERED.
‘Manila, November 4, 1955.
‘PATRICIO DIONISIO Trial Referee‘ “3. No notice of trial or hearing was ever received and we repeat, no
notice of the decision was ever served.“4. Please review the record and furnish us proof that (a) notice of
trial or hearing was duly served and (b) notice of decision of 26 April 1956 was
duly served. Without such proof, any trial or hearing and any decision,
is null and void.” (Italics supplied.)
On October 27, 1959, respondent Commission sent to petitioner’s counsel, a
letter of this tenor:
“In connection with your letter, informing us of the fact that you have not
received a copy of the Decision dated April 25, 1956, rendered by the defunct
Workmen’s Compensation Commission on the above-entitled case, we are furnishing
you herewith a true copy of the same.”
On November 4, 1959, petitioner filed with respondent Commission a petition
for review of said decision of the referee (dated April 26, 1956), on the ground
that it “is null and void and, therefore, contrary to law.” On February 4, 1960,
respondent Commission affirmed said decision of the referee, in a decision which
in part reads:
“In this case, we find that the employer has failed to establish his right to
controvert the claim within the period required by law. It has also failed to
answer any defenses which could be lawfully considered in his favor to defeat
the claim. The mere allegation that at the time of death of the employee, he was
no longer under its employ is totally inadequate. The proven fact is that the
worker’s illness was contracted in the course of his employment and by reason of
his work long before the severance of the employer-employee relationship duo to
circumstances not imputable to the fault of the employee. And, since the cause
of action accrued at the time when the employer-employee relationship was still
subsisting, the claim must, as it should, prosper. In this case, tfte facts show
direct causal relation between the worker’s illness and his employment, and the
referee’s decision is supported by both the evidence and the applicable law.“WHEREFORE, the decision under review should be, .as it is hereby, affirmed
and the respondent ordered to pay, in addition to what has been adjudged against
it by the referee, the sum of P5.00 for this review.“SO ORDERED.”
On March 8, 1960, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, on the grounds that (1) it is contrary to law; (2) Dahican Lumber
Company is in receivership proceedings, and cannot be reached by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission except through the court having jurisdiction over said
receivership; and “ail proceedings to date have been without due and proper
notice to the court having jurisdiction and, therefore, are null and void. “Said
motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Commission in its resolution
en banc of April 12, 1960. Hence, this appeal.
The appeal is meritorious. As already stated, since November 16, 1955, when
petitioner received from the referee of respondent Commission, notice of order
directing him “to appear before the Public Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte,
when summoned by said official“, to submit evidence in connection with
respondent’s Vda. de Naval’s claim for compensation against the Dahican Lumber
Company, of which he (petitioner) is the receiver, no notice or communication
whatsoever has been received from the said Public Defender at Daet or the
referee of the Cormmssion regarding the hearing of the case on January 28 and
30, 1956 and the rendering of a decision thereon on April 25, 1956, awarding the
sum of P2,209.28 as compensation to respondent Vda. de Naval. Neither copy nor
notice of said decision of the referee was ever served on petitioner or his
counsel. It was only on June 12, 1959 when petitioner received respondent
Commission’s letter dated June 4, 1959, requiring him to comply with the
aforesaid decision of the referee of April 26, 1956 that petitioner, learned for
the first time that the claim has been heard and decided. In the circumstances,
petitioner was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, all
proceedings had by respondent Commission in connection with the case, are null
and void and without any legal effect.
As to respondent Commission’s claim that petitioner’s failure to establish
his right to controvert the claim within the period required under Section 45 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, namely, to submit a report of Naval’s death
within 14 days from date thereof, or within 10 days after acquiring knowledge of
the same, resulted in the admission of liability for said claim, we note that
Naval was laid off from the service of Dahiean Lumber Company on July 31, 1952.
He died on August 10, 1952. Hence, the company was not in a position to know of
the death of Naval. Besides, it occurred 10 days after the employer—employee
relationship between him and the company had been severed. In the circumstances,
Dahican Lumber Company was not in law bound to submit the required report of
Naval’s death within the aforesaid period. On the other hand, the records shtow
that when respondent Vda. de Naval’s claim for compensation was transmitted to
the company, the latter reasonably answered that it was not liable for the death
of Fabian Naval, for the reason that he (Naval) was laid off from the service of
the company on July 31, 1952 and, since he died on August 10, 1952, said death
occurred when “there was no longer any employer-employee relationship” between
him and the company. This, to our mind, constituted sufficient controversion of
the claim in question by the company. Petitioner was thereafter, accordingly,
entitled to be duly notified of all proceedings taken in connection with said
claim.
Petitioner’s claim that he could not be sued before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission as receiver of Dahican Lumber Company, without first
obtaining permission from the court (Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 20967) having jurisdiction of the receivership proceedings is without
merit since it was petitioner himself who, through his counsel, suggested (in
his letter of August 24, 1955 quoted earlier in this opinion) that the claim be
heard by the Commission for determination of its merits. Furthermore, under
Section 7, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, “subject to the control of the court
in which the action is pending, a receiver shall have the power to bring and
defend, as such, actions in his own name.” (See Cahilo vs. De Guzman, et
al., 106 Phil., 520; Somes vs. Government of P. I., 62 Phil., 432.)
Wherefore, the decision and resolution of respondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission appealed from are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to
respondent Commission for further proceedings after due notice to the parties.
No costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] See Decision of WCC Commissioner Jose
Sanchez (Schedule “C”).