RAMCAR INCORPORATED, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO GARCIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

In May 1959, Domingo Garcia obtained the services of Ramcar Inc. for the
repair of his two cars. The total cost of the repair, in labor and material,
amounted to P1,610.82, which, according to their agreement, was payable within
the first 10 days of the month. As Domingo Garcia failed to pay his obligation,
despite demands, Ramcar Inc. on October 9, 1959, filed an action in the
Municipal Court of Manila for the recovery of said amount. Judgment was entered
in favor of Ramcar Inc., against Garcia who appealed to the CFI of Manila (being
Civ. Case No. 41853). The lower court set the hearing of the case on January 28,
1960. On January 27, 1960, appellant’s motion to postpone, as his counsel had to
appear in a hearing in Pampanga—Crim. Case No. 3297, was denied. The lower court
forthwith received plaintiff’s evidence; in the absence of the defendant and
entered judgment, condemning defendant to pay the amount of P1,610.82 at 12%
interest per annum from October 9, 1959, until fully paid, plus 25% of the said
sum as attorney’s fees and the costs in both instances. Defendant’s motion for
new trial was denied. He directly appealed to this Court, alleging that (1) the
lower court erred, in ordering him to pay, on the basis of the evidence
presented by appellee, in view of article 1715, in relation to article 1169 of
the new Civil Code; and (2) the decision of the trial court is contrary to
law.

The position of the appellant may be stated as follows:

The contract between the parties is one for lease of work or service to
execute a piece of work (Art. 1644 N.C.C.). Appellant in paragraph 3 of his
answer avers—

“Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 4 of the complaint, the truth
being that if he is at all indebted to the plaintiff, his obligation has not
become due and demandable for the reason that plaintiff has not complied with
defendant’s request to correct defects in the repair services done by
it.”

Under the contract, it was appellee’s obligation to do the work or repair
without defects that would destroy or lessen the valued or fitness of the cars
of their ordinary or stipulated use, pursuant to the provisions of Article 1715
N.C.C. which provides—

“ART. 1715. The contractor shall execute the work in such a manner that it
has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects which destroy or lessen its
value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use. Should the work be not of
such quality, the employer may require that the contractor remove the defect or
execute another work. If the contractor fails or refuses to comply with this
obligation, the employer may have the defect removed or another work executed,
at the contractor’s cost.”

As the principal issue raised by the pleadings was whether the repairs made
by the appellee were not defective, the appellee has the burden of proof
(onus probandi) of establishing that the repairs were not defective.

In other words, defendant-appellant contends that plaintiff-appellee runs the
risk of losing its case, if it fails to prove that the repairs were without
defect, considering the provision of said article 1715; that plaintiff merely
proved the allegations in its complaint, in the absence of the defendant,
notwithstanding the allegation in his answer that the repairs were defective and
as appellee had failed to prove that it performed the repairs without any
defect, appellant’s obligation to pay such repairs is not yet due and
demandable. Defendant-appellant in support of this theory, cites Art. 1169 N. C.
C., which provides that in reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay
if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with
what is incumbent upon him.

The plaintiff in a civil case, is called upon only to prove the material
allegations in his complaint constituting his cause of action. In the case at
bar, plaintiff’s cause of action relates to the prestation of repair services to
the appellant for which the latter in turn obligated himself to pay for the
value thereof. Appellee proved his allegations, it is not enough that a
defendant interposes an affirmative or special defense, in order to relieve him
of his liability to the plaintiff; he must establish by preponderant evidence
such affirmative defense (Kesler Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez, 44 Phil., 19;
Alvarez vs. Vargas, 35 Phil., 1). Although appellant herein, filed his answer,
alleging that the repairs made by the appellee were defective, he presented no
evidence in support of the same, because he failed to appear at the trial. The
legal issue is not whether the repairs made were defective but rather the
determination of who has the burden of proving that the repairs were defective.
The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated, if no evidence were
given on either side (sec. 70, Rule 123). The plaintiff herein having proven its
case, the defendant would run the risk of being defeated, if he did not prove
his allegation. It is true that defendant-appellant’s averment to the effect
that the repair services were defective, is a negative one, but defendant has
asserted the affirmative of this issue, hence, he should be made to prove it. It
stands to reason that the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue, upon the principle that the suitor who
relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that
fact.

Article 1715 in conjunction with Art. 1169 of the N.C.C., may be available
only under certain established facts; that is, the proof of the defects in the
work, which in the instant case, appellant has failed to do. The trial court
found that plaintiff did in fact render repair services to the defendant, and in
the absence of proof to the contrary, such repair services are deemed
satisfactory. The law presumes that appellee acted in accordance with his
commitments, and that the repairs were regularly done (Sec. 69, pars. p & q
Rule 123). And since, in the case at bar, defendant-appellant presented no
evidence, he is not justified in invoking the aforecited provisions. Verily, the
findings of the lower court, as to facts are now considered final and
conclusive.

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the evidence and the law
on the matter, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against the
defendant-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J,
B. L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.