THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CHAN FOOK, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant Chan Fook was prosecuted for the
crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority, and
sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to two months and
one day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 1,301 pesetas and the costs of the action, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

From the record it appears that the accused, a Chinese subject, was a passenger of the United States Military Transport South Bend,
which arrived in Manila on April 6, 1920. Having been allowed by the
immigration authorities to land, he left the boat on the same day,
April 6. At about 3 or 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the following day,
he went to pier No. 1 to get his baggage. After the search of the
baggage in which postcards of an indecent character were found, a
customs agent, Eugenio M. Cruz, attempted to search the body of the
accused, to which the latter apparently objected. A dispute took place
between the two, which terminated in the secret agent seizing the
Chinaman by the arm with intent to search his body, after showing him
his police badge. The accused resisted and struck the secret agent on
the stomach. The latter in turn struck him on the neck. Here the
customs inspector, Anastacio Jacinto, intervened, and explained to the
accused that Cruz was a customs secret service agent and had the right
to search him in order to find whether he had on his person any
contraband. Then the appellant made no further resistance and allowed
himself to be searched. Under such circumstances, has the accused
committed the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public
authority as alleged in the information? To decide this question, it is
first necessary to determine whether the agent, Cruz, was authorized to
search the person of the accused.

The prosecution alleges that under section 1338 of the
Administrative Code all persons coming into the Philippine Islands from
Foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by the
customs authorities under such regulations as may be prescribed
relative thereto. The defense, however, contends that once the accused
has arrived at the point of his destination by being allowed to leave
the boat and to land he was beyond the jurisdiction of the customs
authorities, and, therefore, not liable to search without judicial
warrant. Section 1338 of the Administrative Code provides:

“SEC. 1338. Search of persons arriving from foreign countries.—All
persons coming into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries shall
be liable to detention and search by the customs authorities under such
regulations as may be prescribed relative thereto.

“Female inspectors may be employed for the examination and search of persons of their own sex.”

Having in mind the aim of the law in authorizing the search of
persons coming from foreign countries, which is to avoid the
clandestine introduction into the Philippine Islands of goods subject
to the payment of customs duties, or the importation of articles
prohibited by law, or the entrance of persons who have no right to
reside in these Islands, we are of the opinion that after the customs
authorities have permitted the accused to land in Manila, the terminus
of his voyage, he ceased to be a passenger within the meaning of said
section 1338 of the Administrative Code.

The fact that the accused returned to pier No. 1 to get the baggage
that he had left there the day before does not subject him to the
operation of said section. He could have gone back there several weeks
or months after his arrival, and in such case, if the contention of the
prosecution is sustained, all foreigners arriving in the Philippines
would be in the highly anomalous situation of being liable to detention
and search for an indefinite time, which is a violation of the right to
be secured against ureasonable searches guaranteed by section 3 of the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as Jones Law, which provides:

“That the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,”

“”
It is urged that the object of searching the person of the accused was
to find whether he had with him any contraband. It was too late to look
for any contraband. He had already been searched when he left the boat.
The accused had reached his destination, spending the night in the
house where he had taken lodging. It is not, therefore, reasonable to
believe that when he returned to pier No. 1 the next day, he had about
his body any contraband. Thus the search made by the agent Cruz appears
to be unreasonable.

Commenting on the meaning and scope of resistance and disobedience,
as elements of the crimes against public authority and its agents,
Groizard, among other things, says:

“A person in authority, his agent or a public
officer who exceeds his power can not be said to be in the exercise of
the functions of his office. The law that defines and establishes his
powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided for.

“The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents
is fixed. If they go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights
of the citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, specially
when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with
the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to repel
the aggression.

“The invasion of the prerrogatives or rights
of another and the excess in the functions of an office, are the
sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far as
it is necessary for the defense of the persons or their rights in the
manner provided for in article 8 of the Penal Code.” (3 Groizard, pp.
456, et seq.)

In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying his hands on
the agent Cruz is, in our opinion, an adequate defense to repel the
aggression of the latter, who had seized him by the arm for the purpose
of searching him. In accordance with the repeated decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, the gravity of a disobedience to an order of a
person in public authority is measured and graded by the circumstances
surrounding the act, the motives prompting it, and the real importance
of the transgression, rather than by the source of the order disobeyed.
And, taking into consideration the circumstances of the present case,
wherein the agent Cruz had exceeded his functions, and wherein the
accused acted in defense of the most highly esteemed of individual
rights—the constitutional right to be secured against unreasonable
searches—we are of the opinion that there is no ground for finding the
accused guilty of the crime defined in article 252 of the Penal Code.

The supreme court of Spain, in a decision rendered December 26,
1876, held that the act of obstinately disregarding an order of an
agent of the authority does not constitute the crime of grave
resistance and disobedience to an agent of the public authority where
it appears that upon being directed for the third time, the accused
obeyed, though uttering unpleasant words, for although the accused did
not leave the premises on the first and second requests, he, however,
obeyed on the third, and did not render it necessary for the public
officer to make use of the means authorized by law to make himself
respected. That the accused had no intention to resist and disobey the
agents of the authority, in the legal sense of the word, is shown by
the fact that by the mere explanation of the customs inspector,
Anastasio Jacinto, he finally allowed himself to be searched. Jacinto’s
words were sufficient to make the Chinaman submit himself peacefully to
the requirement of the agent Cruz.

That foreigners in the Philippines are entitled to the benefits of
the individual rights sedured by the Philippine Bill is undeniable. In
the case of Kepner vs. U. S. (195 U. S., 100), the Supreme Court said:

“When Congress came to pass the-Act of July 1,
1902, it enacted, almost in the language of the President’s
instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In view of the
expressed declarations of the President, followed by the action of
Congress, both adopting, with little alteration, the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument that in
this form it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those
principles of our government which the President declared to be
established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom,
at the same time expressing regret that the inhabitants of the Islands
had not therefore enjoyed their benefit.”

And according to the principles underlying the Constitution, as
extended to the Philippine Islands by the President’s instructions to
the Commission and by the Philippine Bill, foreigners are entitled to
the protection of their life, liberty, and property. In the case of
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins (118 U. S., 356, 369), Justice Matthews says:

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is
not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process-of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.’ These provisions are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality;
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws.”

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed,
and the accused must be, and is hereby, acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.