FRANCISCO Q. DUQUE, HUGO S. ESTRADA, MARIA C. MAGSANO AND RESTITUTO C. BASA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. AMADO S. SANTIAGO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, EMETERI…

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed on 16 May 1960 to annul
arid set aside an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dated 3
February 1960 (Annex C) in criminal case No. U-335 and for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the respondent judge from proceeding with the arraignment
of the petitioners and the trial of said criminal case pending final judgment on
this petition.

On 18 July 1959 tbe respondent Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an
information charging the petitioners with libel upon complaint by the respondent
Provincial Governor Conrado F. Estrella (No. U-335 and praying for damages in
the sum of P200,000 (Annex A).

On 31 July 1960 the petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion (Annex B) praying,
for reasons therein stated, for transfer of the case from the Urdaneta branch to
the Dagupan branch of the court, for the quashing of the information, on the
ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute the offense of libel
since the published parts of the article claimed to be libelous are but a fair
and true report of the acceptance speech delivered by then candidate Francisco
Q. Duque, one of the herein petitioners, and an appraisal and a just comment or
a candid criticism of past official acts of the respondent Conrado F. Estrella
in connection with his announced intention to run for reelection as governor of
Pangasinan and for that reason the above-mentioned published parts of the
article are or constitute a privileged communication under article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code; and praying further, in the alternative, for a bill of
particulars specifying the time, place and occasion of the alleged public
utterances and conversation between the petitioners Francisco Q. Duque and
Restituto Basa, and at the same time denying the truth of the charges and the
part allegedly taken therein by the petitioner Francisco Q. Duque; and setting
up a counterclaim for damages against the respondents Emeteno M. Castañeda and
Conrado F. Estrella for the malicious filing of the information against the
petitioners. On 20 August 1959 the respondents filed an answer to the
petitioners’ omnibus motion and claim for damages (Annex 2).

After hearing held on 27 August 1959 and the parties had filed their
respective memoranda, the court presided over by the respondent judge entered an
order dated 3 February 1960 denying the petitioners’ motion to quash for the
reason that the published parts of the article are not privileged and even if
they were so, still they would not be a legal ground for the quashal of the
information, because, in the opinion of the respondent judge who presided over
the court, the privileged character of the allegedly libelous publication should
be set up as a defense. The prayer in the motion for a bill of particulars was
also denied for lack of merit, but the petition of both the public and private
prosecution for the striking out of that part of the omnibus motion regarding
the claim for damages based on malicious prosecution was granted. The court
further held that the information does, not suffer from the infirmity of
duplicity of offenses, charged, a point not raised in the motion but most likely
in the course of the argument.

Whereupon, the respondent judge directed the clerk of court to set the
arraignment of the defendants, the herein petitioners, at the earliest available
date in the calendar of court (Annex C).

On 2 March 1960 the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to quash, reiterating the reasons and argument advanced in
the omnibus motion and claiming that the information charges both libel and
slander (oral defamation) contrary to section 12, Rule 106, Rules of Court, for
it charges that the accused Duque and Basa, before the publication of the libel
complained of, uttered the substance of the libelous article publicly and
privately. An objection to the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed
by the respondents and after consideration of the arguments advanced by both
parties, on 30 April 1960 the motion for reconsideration was denied, the court
getting the arraignment of the accused for 16 May I960 at 8:00 a.m.

On 10 June 1960, upon the petitioners’ filing of a bond in the sum of P200, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this court restraining the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan from proceeding
with the arraignment of the herein petitioners and the trial of the criminal
case for libel (U-335) until further orders.

The petitioners contend that the information should be quashed, because it
does not charge an offense, or if it does, the allegedly libelous publication is
a fair comment on a matter that concerns public interest which is privileged and
comes under the protection provided for in article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, invoking the rule laid down in the case of People vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.
731. They assert that protection afforded by law to privileged communications
cannot be torn up by evidence and for that reason a criminal action for libel on
such communication would not and does not lie.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petitioners’ contention
is untenable, because they claim that even if the publication were a privileged
communication, the privileged character of the publication is not a legal ground
for the quashal of the information, for it is a matter of defense. They argue
that assuming that the publication is privileged, it does not mean that it is
not actionable for the privileged character simply does away with the
presumption of malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.^[1]

Whether comment made by the petitioner (Duque) is fair or not on matters of
public interest, or he was prompted by personal ill-will or spite and caused its
publication not merely in response to duty but just to injure the reputation of
respondent Governor Estrella, or justifiable grounds for such comment on the
person, office and reputation of respondent Governor Estrella exist or do not
exist, are matters which may only be determined after the trial of the
petitioners.

Although a publication which imputes political corruption; or the use of
political influence or privileges for pecuniary gain is libelous per se
(53 C.J.S., Sec. 28, p. 69), still as already adverted to above, since the
privileged character or nature destroys the presumption of malice, the onus of
proving malice is on the plaintiff, and whether malice of defendant exists the
same can only be proved after trial of the case on the merits.^[2]

The next point to determine is whether the information charges more than one
offense. The information charges the petitioners with the crime of libel
committed on or About 28 June 1959. The petitioners maintain that the
information charges both libel and slander, because after setting out the
published parts of the article claimed to be libelous the information further
alleges and charges—

That to make effective their scheme and premeditated plan to dishonor,
discredit and besmirch the good name and reputation of the herein complainant,
accused Francisco Q. Duque and Restitute C. Basa, before the circulation of the
libel contained in the aforementioned issue of the Pangasinan Courier, and to
prepare the ground for the same, uttered and mentioned the substance of the said
libelous article quoted above in public and also in private conversations; * *
*.

Such allegations are made to strengthen the charge of malice which is
necessary to support a conviction of the crime of libel.

Be that as it may, the orders complained of entered by the respondent judge
in the exercise of its power and jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be, and does
not amount to, a grave abuse of discretion to entitle the petitioners to the
writ prayed for by them. The denial of a motion to quash on the ground that the
publication of the parts of an article claimed to be libelous is privileged and
that the information charges two offenses is interlocutory and cannot be
appealed. Whether the publication is privileged or not and the information
suffers from the infirmity of duplicity, the trial court will have to pass upon
them and if passed upon adversely to the petitioners the same may be raised and
reviewed on appeal.

The writ prayed for is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction is
dissolved. No costs shall be taxed.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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[1] Article 354, Revised Penal Code; Lu Chu Sing vs.
Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669.

[2] U.S. vs. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253; also 33 Am.
Jur., pp. 124, 126.