THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. LAMBERTO RAFON, APPELLANT.

People versus Rafon

The Case

This is People versus Rafon, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Lamberto Rafon for raping his own minor daughter, AAA, on two occasions — once in 1994, when she was eleven years old, and again in 1998, when she was fifteen. The case matters for the bar because it gathers in one decision the rules on the sufficiency of an information that states only the year of the offense, the distinction between statutory rape before the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 and rape by force or intimidation after it, the weight given to a child's testimony against her own father, the role of moral ascendancy in incestuous rape, and the effect of the law abolishing the death penalty on a sentence already imposed.

Procedural History

Two separate informations were filed against the appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61, docketed as two criminal cases. He pleaded not guilty on arraignment, and after trial the court rendered judgment on 8 July 2002 finding him guilty of two counts of rape and imposing the penalty of death for each, with civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, but in a resolution of 21 September 2004 the Court transferred it to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review, conformably with its ruling in People versus Mateo. On 5 May 2005 the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, modifying only the amounts of moral and exemplary damages. The case then returned to the Supreme Court for final disposition.

Facts

AAA was born on 3 November 1983, one of five children of the appellant and his wife BBB. Sometime in 1994, while AAA was in grade five and her mother was working overseas, the appellant, who was drunk, forced her to lie down on the papag and to remove her clothes, warned her not to make any noise or he would kill her and her siblings, and had sexual intercourse with her. She tried to cross her legs but was overpowered, and she could only cry silently. She told no one, for fear that her father would carry out his threats.

The appellant raped her several more times thereafter, the last incident occurring sometime in 1998 when she was in second year high school, in much the same manner. She revealed the truth first to her boyfriend, and later, when her mother came home in January 1999, she told her mother, and the two of them went to the police to report the matter. Dr. Cheres Daquilanea examined AAA on 4 January 1999 and found healed hymenal lacerations at the three o'clock, six o'clock, and nine o'clock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse.

For his defense, the appellant denied the charges, claimed cordial relations with his daughter, and suggested that his brother-in-law, who allegedly bore him a grudge over money, initiated the case. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that his wife had been working as a beautician in Saudi Arabia since 1995 and came home only every two years — contradicting his own testimony that she never left the house from 1994 to 1998.

Issues

• Whether or not the informations, which stated only the year of the commission of the offenses, deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Whether or not the testimony of AAA was credible, despite her alleged inconsistencies and her delay in reporting the rapes.
• Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape.
• Whether or not the penalty of death may still be imposed on the appellant.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

This provision defeats the appellant's belated attack on the informations, because he raised no objection before arraignment and went to trial.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it is unnecessary to state in the information the precise date of the offense, except when the date is an essential element of the offense, and the date of commission is not an element of rape, whose gravamen is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances provided by law. A statement of the year of commission suffices. Moreover, the appellant's failure to object before arraignment amounted to a waiver under Section 9, Rule 117, and he actively participated in the trial, so there was no denial of due process.

On the second issue, the Court upheld the credibility of AAA. The trial court is in the best position to resolve credibility, having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor, and its findings are entitled to great weight. The alleged inconsistencies — on who removed her clothes and on where her siblings were — were minor and inconsequential, and a testimony must be considered in its entirety, not in truncated portions. It was the appellant, the Court noted, who was inconsistent about his wife's whereabouts. His bare denial could not prevail over AAA's clear and categorical narration, and it was hardly believable that she would falsely accuse her own father only to serve a grudge harbored by her uncle.

On the third issue, the Court distinguished the two counts. The 1994 rape, committed when AAA was eleven, was statutory rape under the law then in force, so proof of force was unnecessary; the 1998 rape, committed when she was fifteen, required proof of carnal knowledge through force, threat, or intimidation, which the prosecution established. In both cases the rape was qualified because the victim was under eighteen and the offender was her parent. On the role of moral ascendancy, the Court quoted its ruling in People versus Melivo:

The rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time.

The Court clarified that moral ascendancy alone does not establish intimidation, but it is a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances, such as the appellant's threats to kill AAA and her siblings.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that although the lower court correctly imposed death, Republic Act Number 9346, signed into law on 24 June 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, so the appellant shall suffer only reclusion perpetua for each count.

Doctrine

• The date of commission need not be alleged in the information unless it is an essential element of the offense; the year suffices, and any objection to the information is waived if not raised before arraignment under Section 9, Rule 117.
• Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect, and minor inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony do not impair her credibility.
• In incestuous rape, the father's moral ascendancy and influence, coupled with threats, build a climate of psychological terror sufficient to establish intimidation.
• Qualified rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, and the penalty is death — but Republic Act Number 9346 now bars its imposition, reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction with modification: the appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape, sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay, for each count, 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 75,000 pesos as moral damages, and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages, with costs against him.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the date of commission is not an element of rape, and a father's moral ascendancy, coupled with threats, supplies the intimidation the law requires. Examiners use this case for the sufficiency of informations stating only the year, the credibility of a child-victim's testimony, and the retroactive effect of Republic Act Number 9346 on a death sentence.