PERCIVAL A. CENDAÑA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO A. AVILA, Respondent.

For review on certiorari is the Resolution^[1]
dated June 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89750,
which dismissed the petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction filed by herein petitioner.

The facts are undisputed.

On January 7, 2003, herein respondent, Cirilo A. Avila, joined the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) as Director II of its Law Enforcement
Service. While in office, Avila was conferred a Certificate of Career
Service Executive Eligibility by the Civil Service Commission.

On January 11, 2005, petitioner Percival A. Cendaña was appointed to
the same position by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Cendaña took
his oath of office and assumed the duties of Director II of the LTO’s
Law Enforcement Service. The LTO immediately issued an order directing
Avila to formally turn over his post to Cendaña. The LTO likewise
issued a memorandum to all LTO officials announcing the new appointment.

Aggrieved, Avila filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222 a petition^[2]
for quo warranto with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The RTC granted the injunctive relief applied
for, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issue directing respondent Percival A. Cendaña, and all persons acting
for and his own behalf, to immediately cease and desist from taking
over and assuming the functions and/or duties and responsibilities of
the Office of the Director II for Law Enforcement Service of the Land
Transportation Office or from otherwise exercising any and/or all acts
exclusively to petitioner and from further disturbing or interfering
with his functions as such until further orders from this Court and/or
unless restrained by higher judicial authority, upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00)
executed in favor of the said respondent to answer for all damages to
be sustained by the latter by reason of the injunction, should the
Court finally determine that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.

Let the writ and a copy of this Order be served on the defendant by
Sheriff IV Neri G. Loy of this Branch, at petitioner’s expense.

SO ORDERED.^[3]

Cendaña filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction. The appellate court dismissed the said
petition, to wit:

WHEREFORE, for being procedurally flawed, at the
very least, this petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
must be as it hereby is, DENIED DUE COURSE and consequently DISMISSED.

Needless to say, since the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is merely an
adjunct to the main suit, the same must be pro tanto DENIED.

SO ORDERED.^[4]

Undaunted, petitioner Cendaña then filed the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION BEFORE IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT (1) PETITIONER
DID NOT STATE THE “ACTUAL” ADDRESSES OF THE PARTIES; (2) PETITIONER DID
NOT MANIFEST HIS WILLINGNESS TO POST BOND IN HIS PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND (3)
PETITIONER DID NOT FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE FILING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION BEFORE IT IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE RULE THAT CASES SHOULD
BE DETERMINED ON THE MERITS, NOT ON TECHNICALITIES.^[5]

Petitioner contends there was no need to state his address in the
petition for certiorari because notice to his counsel, the Office of
the Solicitor General, is notice to him. Petitioner argues, his failure
to manifest willingness to post a bond in his prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction should not adversely affect the merits of his petition.
Petitioner stresses, immediate recourse to the Court of Appeals through
a petition for certiorari is justified because the questioned RTC Order
is a patent nullity. Petitioner insists that the appellate court erred
in dismissing the petition for certiorari on a technicality instead of
ruling on its merits.

Respondent, however, counters that the subject Resolution of the
appellate court, which dismissed the petition for certiorari, cannot be
the subject of a petition for review. Respondent maintains the petition
for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals and the instant petition
for review are both frivolous and intended merely for delay. Respondent
stresses that the addresses of the parties must be stated in initiatory
pleadings to determine venue and jurisdiction. Respondent points out
that petitioner failed to prove the alleged patent nullity of the RTC
Order to justify immediate recourse to a petition for certiorari.

After a thorough consideration of submissions by the parties, we are in agreement that the petition is without merit.

Under Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, a petition for certiorari shall contain the actual addresses
of all the petitioners and the respondents, thus:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents,
a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of
the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

x x x x

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with
proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The
certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by
his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the
court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized
representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition
shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents
attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there
is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the
same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees
to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at
the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

The requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual
addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents is mandatory.^[6]
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the said requirement is sufficient
ground for the dismissal of his petition. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
parties’ actual addresses were not indicated therein.

However, petitioner’s failure to manifest willingness to post a bond,
in his petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, is not
a fatal defect. This omission would, at the most, only result in the
denial of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order, not in the dismissal of his petition for
certiorari.^[7]
The Court of Appeals’ unqualified dismissal of the petition for
certiorari on the ground that petitioner failed to manifest willingness
to post a bond is clearly inappropriate.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for
certiorari on the ground that petitioner failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned RTC Order. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration to give the court a quo
a chance to correct itself is a jurisdictional and mandatory
requirement which must be strictly complied with. Although there are
exceptions^[8] to this general rule, the instant case presents no valid and compelling reason to deviate from the said rule.

Procedural rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.^[9] Hence, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure proper dispensation of justice.^[10]
The liberal interpretation and application of the rules apply only in
exceptional circumstances, none of which obtains in the present case.

Hence, the Court of Appeals could not be faulted for dismissing the
petition for certiorari for non-compliance with jurisdictional and
mandatory procedural requirements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89750, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by herein petitioner, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices
Edgardo F. Sundiam and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring.

^[2] Id. at 47-55.

^[3] Id. at 75-76.

^[4] Id. at 38-39.

^[5] Id. at 16.

^[6] Bukluran ng Manggagawa
sa Clothman Knitting Corp.-Solidarity of Unions in the Phils. for
Empowerment and Reforms v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158158, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 642, 653-654.

^[7] Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 144517, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 193, 205.

^[8] Abraham v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 143823, March 6, 2001, 353 SCRA 739, 744-745.

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

^[9] Norris v. Parentela, Jr., G.R. No. 143216, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 346, 354.

^[10] Id.