THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF–APPELLEE, VS. COMMANDER JOSE ALCANTARA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal by Lucio Mañosca
and Mariano Ramos from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, in its Criminal Case No. 160-G, the dispositive portion of which decreed as follows:

“PREMISED on the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
finds Lucia Mañosca and Mariano Ramos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, the first as principal and the second as accomplice, of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom, defined by Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and punished by the last paragraph thereof as amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 18 and 1084.  But the offense having
been committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1084, the correct
penalty for the accused should be that provided in the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, which is reclusion perpetua to death. 
There being two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating to offset
the same, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum which is death.  But taking into consideration that the
accused Lucio Mañosca is
now in his declining years, 64 years of age, not in the best of health, the
Court is of the sense that justice would be better subserved
if he is only imprisoned for the rest of his natu­ral life.  In view thereof, the Court hereby sentences Lucio Mañosca to suffer RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay one-tenth of the costs.

“Mariano Ramos being an accomplice only, the correct penalty
for his guilt is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua
and that is reclusion temporal.  Applying
now the in­determinate sentence law, Mariano Ramos is hereby sentenced to a
minimum of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor to a
maximum of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, to pay one-tenth of the
costs, with credit to one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

“SO ORDERED.”

The facts which are not in dispute are:  that in the afternoon of 21 April 1954, a
Chinese merchant, Wee King, was kidnapped by several armed men dressed in Army
uniforms, from his house in Catanauan, Quezon, taken to the mountain fastnesses of Bondoc Peninsula, he was held there in custody for thirty
days and then ransomed by his wife for P30,000.00.  At that time, the accused appellant Lucio Mañosca was the vice-mayor
of the municipality of Catanauan, while the other
appellant, Mariano Ramos, was the teniente concejal of barrio Camandizon
(then part of barrio Tagbakan Silangan)
of the same town; that at that time, also, Jose Alcantara
or Lt. Alcantara or Commander Alcantara,
known as Hukbalahap, commanded the Tadtad Unit, in charge of kidnapping; and that Mañosca had previously negotiated for the release of one Yumul, kidnapped for ransom by Alcantara
and his gang.

On 11 June 1956,
the two appellants, together with Alcantara and other
unidentified persons, were charged with Wee King’s kidnapping.  After trial, the lower court sentenced the
accused-appellants as herein before quoted.

They appealed to this Court and assigned the following errors:

“The trial court erred in admitting the alleged confessions,
Exhibits A and B, notwithstanding the fact that they were not freely made by
the accused Mariano Ramos and Lucio Mañosca.

“The trial court erred in giving credence to the
uncorroborated testimony of Mariano Ricaro and Mateo Molines, two self-confessed members of the gang, which
committed the kidnapping.

“The trial court erred in ruling that the accused Lucio Mañosca conspired with the
kidnappers of Wee King.”

The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:

On 15 April 1954,
Commander Alcantara held a conference with Commander Eling Magtapat, head of the Lapu-lapu Unit of the HMB at the latter’s headquarters at sitio Bukal, barrio of Ilayang Cawayan.  The former inquired from the latter whom they
could trust in the town of Catanauan
and the latter mentioned the name of appellant Lucio Mañosca.  Forthwith, Alcantara dispatched two of his men, one of whom is
prosecution witness Mariano Ricaro, to fetch Mañosca at barrio Commandizon.  The emissaries reached the place and stated
their mission.  Mañosca
told them that they could not go right away as he wanted to wait for appellant
Mariano Ramos.  When Ramos arrived, the
group proceeded to the Huk camp.

In a conference with the two Huk
commanders the following morning, Mañosca was asked
by Alcantara if he was ready to help, to which he
replied, “Primong Eling
(Magtapat) knows how I help.” Alcantara then asked who was the wealthiest person in town,
to which Mañosca answered that he knew no other
person than copra merchant Wee King.  Alcantara decided to kidnap Wee King and told Mañosca that he would be given a share of P10,000.00 if the
ransom would be P30,000.00 or a P5,000.00-share if the ransom would be
P20,000.00.  Mañosca
agreed.  (T.s.n.,
pp. 21-28) Ramos took no part in the planning but Alcantara
told him to act as a lookout during the kidnapping.

On 21 April 1954,
Wee King was kidnapped.  Appellants Mañosca and Ramos acted as look-outs while the kidnapping
was taking place.  (Exhs.
“A” & “B”).

In the band’s mountain hide-out, Alcantara
ordered Wee King to write to his wife. 
Wee King had been informed by the commander’s men that Mañosca could facilitate his release.

Some persons also suggested to Mrs. Wee King that appellant Mañosca could be of help since he had been a guerilla and
was familiar with the mountains (T.s.n., pp.
76-77).  Mrs. Wee King accepted the
suggestion and approached Mañosca for help.  Thereafter, with Mañosca
as negotiator, the original demand of the kidnappers for the release of their
victim was gradually reduced from P200,000.00 to P30,000.00.

On 22 May 1954,
Mrs. Wee King, accompanied by appellant Mañosca,
Mayor Orfanel and some other persons, delivered
P30,000.00 to Alcantara at his hide-out and Wee King
was released.

Alcantara then divided the ransom
money, and later sent part thereof to Mañosca.

The foregoing findings of the trial Court are supported by the
testimony of two witnesses, Mariano Ricaro and Mateo Molines, both former Huk (HMB) surrenderers, and by the confessions of the two appellants
(Exhs. A and B) given at the Constabulary
headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, on June 13 and 20, 1956, respectively, and ratified before Fiscal Pedro Revilla, of said city on June 21 of the same year.  Ricaro had been the
bodyguard of Huk commander Magtapat,
and had been dispatched to summon Mañosca, to a
conference with Magtapat and Huk
commander Alcantara when the kidnapping was agreed
upon, and had brought thither Mañosca and appellant
Ramos, for whom Mañosca had waited before conferring
with the commanders.  Ricaro
had been present at said conference, and after the ransom was paid, the witness
was sent to deliver Mañosca’s share.  Molines in his turn
had been a Huk since 1951, but surrendered in 1953 and thereafter lived for
sometime in Mañosca’s house; had accompanied Mañosca and Ramos to the conference with the rebel
commanders; had witnessed the kidnapping of Wee King, and the subsequent
division of Mañosca’s P10,000.00 between Mañosca, Ramos and Mayor Orfanel
of Catanauan, and had been given P300.00, apparently
as a gratuity for his trouble.

The testimony of both witnesses and their credibility are
vigorously assailed by the defense, mainly on the ground that they had, by
their acts, shown to have been particeps criminis, yet had not been included in the Fiscal’s information; and that they had been utilized as
state witnesses without first being accused and previously discharged by the
Court.  As the trial judge remarked in
his decision, however, the participation of these witnesses in the kidnapping
had been more passive than active, being merely bystanders and onlookers, who
failed to reveal to the authorities what they knew about the felony.  While their testimony must be received with
caution, the defense has not shown that they are wholly unreliable and underserving of the credence accorded them by the trial
Court, who saw them testify and was thus in a better position to gauge whether
they were telling the truth on the witness stand.^[1]
It is urged that not having been previously accused and discharged, these
witnesses had no option but to testify as the prosecution desired; but mere
suspicions are not enough to deprive them of credibility, without adequate
showing that they had been asked and had agreed to prevaricate.  At any rate, the confessions of the accused
appellants themselves confirmed the testimony of both Ricaro
and Molines on the essential points.

Both accused appellants contended that their extrajudicial
confessions were obtained through torture and maltreatment.  But there is nothing in record to corroborate
the claim.  They were ordered physically
examined twice by physicians, upon representations and petition of the defense
counsel, but no trace of maltreatment was found on their bodies as certified by
the examining doctors, (Exhibits G, X and Y). 
While the last examination was only made on July 2, (the first was done
on June 28) it is well to note that the wife of appellant Ramos had been
allowed to visit him around the middle of June, and no proof exists that he
complained then about having been maltreated or tortured.  As to Mañosca, his
confession was only executed on June 20, according to him, as a result of the
violence practiced upon him, only twelve days before his physical examination.

To substantiate his claim of maltreatment, Mañosca
asserted that he thought of varying his signature to his confession (Exh. B) from his usual signature (Exhibits 14 to 16).  It is noteworthy, however, that when asked to
sign the confession again in the presence of City Attorney Revilla,
Mañosca, for no apparent reason, still used his
allegedly deformed signature, instead of reverting to his former way of
signing, thereby casting doubt on his version. 
Moreover, if the deformation had been done on the spur of the moment, as
affirmed by this appellant, it is highly improbable that he could have
maintained it without variation when he signed all the pages (4 each) of the
original and copy of the confession.  The
signatures, moreover, show no sign of weakness or tremor.  Nor did either appellant apprise Revilla that they were tortured when they swore to the same
before said official.

The army investigators not only denied the torture and
maltreatment claimed by Ramos and Mañosca, but
revealed to the Court that Ramos had at first manifested to Colonel (now
general) Manuel T. Yan that if the former’s family were taken to Quezon
City and thereby assure their safety, he (Ramos) would be willing to
voluntarily tell his participation in the Wee King kidnapping.  The request was complied with, and after the
family of Ramos was brought, and his wife had visited him, Ramos confessed and
disclosed everything, the conferences he attended with the Huk
commanders before the kidnapping and how the crime was executed.  The statements of Ramos were tape recorded
besides being transcribed in writing (T.s.n., pp.
651-652).  Lt. Burgos later replayed this
confession to Mañosca, who after hearing it broke
down and also confessed (T.s.n., pp. 627, 633).  Mañosca’s
statements were first transcribed and later tape recorded, a fact admitted by
this appellant on cross examination, albeit he asserted that what he spoke into
the recorders he was made to read from his transcribed confession; but the claim
can not be true, since the Court that heard the tape recording noticed some
variation between the tape recorded version and the written confession (T.s.n., p. 686), besides its being denied by the inves­tigators.

Voluntariness of the confessions is likewise deducible from
the contradictions between them and the testimony of prosecution witnesses Ricaro and Molines; and some of
the statements of the confessants were plainly evasive or mitigating.  Thus, while the prosecution witnesses denied
that Huk commander Magtapat
participated in the actual kidnapping of Wee King, Ramos in his confession
positively identified Magtapat as having been among
the kidnappers.  Ramos stated that during
the kidnapping Mañosca was present holding a rifle;
but in his confession Mañosca claimed he was
unarmed.  And while Molines
and Ricaro declared that Mañosca
had been given P10,000.00 by the Huk commanders, the
said appellant claimed he received only P300.00.

Finally a revealing detail is that disclosed by the victim, Wee
King, in the course of his testimony, that while held a prisoner of the
kidnappers in the mountains, his guards told him that Mañosca
would be contacted for his release (T.s.n., p.
12).  This is significant, because as
pointed out in the appealed decision, the Huk guards
then had no reason to assume that the victim’s wife would seek Mañosca’s intervention to obtain her husband’s release,
unless this appellant had previously conspired with the kidnappers.

In his defense, appellant Mañosca
claims to have gone in company with Eugenio Patubo and Eladio de Roses to sitio Mahagakhak, which is about
11 kilometers from the poblacion (T.s.n.,
p. 546) to extract buntal fiber on 10 April 1954 and
returned to Catanauan on the 23rd.  For the entire venture, they earned P9.00
each.  Appellant Ramos in turn claims to
have been repairing his house in the poblacion when
Wee King was kidnapped, had heard the commotion of the people and, out of fear,
repaired to the house of Telesforo Cabangon where he was temporarily living.

These alibis are far from convincing.  In the case of Mañosca,
it is rather odd for him to
have taken so much trouble for so long and for such small compensation,
considering that he had a coconut plantation of his own, is an overseer of 500
hectares of coconut and buri and a cattle ranch,
aside from being engaged in other gainful activities. 
With respect to Ramos, he was so near Wee King’s place that during the
kidnapping it was easy for him
to have been there.  The defense of alibi
is so weak a defense that this Court had ruled that in order to be believed,
there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (Peo. vs. Limpo, et al., L-13058,
28 January 1961).

At the time the trial Court rendered its decision on 11 March 1957, Lucio
Mañosca was 64 years old.  He should now be 74.  Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty when the guilty person is more
than seventy years of age.  A review of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether reclusion
perpetua or death should be imposed would be
therefore, academic.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed.  No costs.

However, in view of appellant Lucio Mañosca’s prolonged detention, having been detained from
the inception of this case, and of his advanced age, the Court recommends that
he be extended executive clemency.  Let a copy of this decision be forwarded
to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
through the Department of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Peo. vs. Secapuri,
L-17518, Feb. 28, 1966; Peo. vs. Tilaon, L-12406, June 30, 1961; Peo.
vs. Lumayag, L-19142, March 31, 1965.