REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. RUBY LEE TSAI, RESPONDENT.

Republic versus Tsai

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Ruby Lee Tsai, decided by the Supreme Court in June 2009. The Republic challenged the approval of Tsai's application for the confirmation and registration of a parcel of land in Tagaytay City, and the case matters because it settles a recurring error in land registration: that a mere showing of thirty years of possession is enough. The Court holds that it is not, and that the applicant must trace possession back to the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier, and must also prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Procedural History

Tsai filed her application for confirmation and registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Republic was the only oppositor. The trial court granted the application, approving the registration of the land in Tsai's name. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Tsai failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that Tsai need not prove possession since that date because Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act Numbered 141 had been superseded by Republic Act Numbered 1942, which provided a simple thirty year prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration. The Republic then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45.

Facts

On the third of December 1996, Tsai filed an application for confirmation and registration of a parcel of land in Tagaytay City with an area of 888 square meters. She alleged that she purchased the property on the thirty-first of May 1993 from Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong, through the latter's daughter and attorney in fact, and that she and her predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property for more than thirty years.

To support her application, Tsai presented the deed of sale, a series of tax declarations in the name of her predecessor from 1948 to 1992, tax declarations in her own name for 1994, official receipts for real property taxes, and a certification of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City. The earliest of these documents, a tax declaration in the name of her predecessors in interest, was issued in 1948.

The Republic opposed the application on the ground that Tsai and her predecessors in interest failed to present sufficient evidence of possession since the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier, that the tax declarations and receipts do not constitute competent evidence of bona fide acquisition, and that the property forms part of the public domain. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both ruled for Tsai, prompting the Republic's petition to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court may grant the application for registration despite the lack of proof of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier.
• Whether or not the applicant must prove that the land applied for has been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree Numbered 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This is the provision under which Tsai's application falls, and it fixes the three requisites the Court applies.

Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act Numbered 141, the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree Numbered 1073, provides:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

This provision, as amended by Presidential Decree Numbered 1073, is in total conformity with Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree Numbered 1529, and it supplies the possession requirement the Court enforces.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the Republic. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act Numbered 141. Tracing the amendments, the Court explained that the original provision required possession since the twenty-sixth of July 1894, that Republic Act Numbered 1942 superseded it with a simple thirty year prescriptive period, and that Presidential Decree Numbered 1073, approved on the twenty-fifth of January 1977, amended it once more to require possession since the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for thirty years or more is not sufficient. The Court quoted its earlier summary in Republic versus Doldol:

As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Applying this to the evidence, the Court found that Tsai's earliest evidence, a tax declaration in the name of her predecessors in interest, could be traced only to 1948. She therefore failed to comply with the period of possession required by both Presidential Decree Numbered 1529 and Commonwealth Act Numbered 141, and her application should be denied.

On the second issue, the Court likewise ruled for the Republic. Tsai failed to prove that the subject property had been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The Court quoted Republic versus T.A.N. Properties, Inc.:

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Doctrine

An application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree Numbered 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act Numbered 141, as amended by Presidential Decree Numbered 1073, requires three requisites: first, that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; second, that the applicant, personally or through predecessors in interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and third, that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of thirty years of possession is not sufficient, because Republic Act Numbered 1942, which had established that simple prescriptive period, was itself amended by Presidential Decree Numbered 1073. The applicant must also prove that the land has been classified and released as alienable and disposable by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, through the original classification approved by the Secretary and certified by the legal custodian of the records.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the Republic's petition, set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and denied Tsai's application for confirmation and registration of the land.

Remember This

Memorize this line: since Presidential Decree Numbered 1073, thirty years of possession is not enough, for the applicant must trace possession back to the twelfth of June 1945 or earlier. Examiners use this case to test the amendment history of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the twin burden of proving both the statutory period of possession and the alienable and disposable character of the land.