ARSENIO L. CANLAS AND ADENA GONZALES-CANLAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC AND JAIME TAYAG, RESPONDENTS.

Canlas versus De Aquino

The Case

This is an original action for a writ of certiorari brought by Arsenio Canlas and Adena Gonzales-Canlas, husband and wife and both doctors of medicine, against Judge Bernabe de Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac and against Jaime Tayag. The spouses ask the Supreme Court to annul Judge de Aquino's order dissolving a writ of preliminary injunction that had restrained Tayag from constructing a ricemill across the street from the Canlas Clinic. The case matters because it fixes the standard a judge must meet before dissolving an injunction on the ground that the defendant would suffer great damage: the motion must be verified, it must allege concrete facts rather than abstract conclusions, and the judge may not act on private information or on a promise to correct the harm later. It is a staple in remedial law on preliminary injunction and in the law on nuisance.

Procedural History

The spouses filed a complaint for injunction against Tayag in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case Number 3512. On October 22, 1959, the court then presided over by Judge Zoilo Hilario issued an order authorizing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Tayag from constructing the ricemill, upon the filing of a bond of 1,000 pesos. On November 4, 1959, Tayag filed an unverified motion to dissolve the writ. Over the opposition of the spouses, the court then presided over by Judge Bernabe de Aquino issued an order dated February 4, 1960 granting the motion and dissolving the writ upon Tayag's filing of a bond of 2,000 pesos, which was approved on February 8, 1960. The spouses' motion for reconsideration was denied. They then came to the Supreme Court by an original action for certiorari to annul the order of February 4, 1960.

Facts

On December 11, 1957, the spouses, both physicians, obtained a permit to construct a house in the barrio of San Jose, municipality of Concepcion, province of Tarlac, for the purpose of establishing a private hospital of fifteen beds, two of which would be for charity cases. When half of the house was finished, in January 1958, they opened a medical clinic of five emergency beds, one for charity. On December 1, 1958, they applied to the Director of Hospitals for authority to operate and maintain the hospital. The Provincial Board of Tarlac recommended approval by resolution on January 14, 1959, and the application was approved on August 24, 1959.

Meanwhile, on October 30, 1958, Tayag obtained a permit to construct a ricemill in front of the Canlas Clinic, just across the street. Chapter Seven of Municipal Ordinance Number 44 of Concepcion, Tarlac required a sanitary permit, issued by the local health officer, for the operation of any establishment which may exhale foul odor or cause physical discomfort to such a degree as to constitute a nuisance. Purporting to act under that ordinance, the municipal health officer cancelled Tayag's permit by letter, on the ground that the operation of a ricemill in that place was contrary to the ordinance.

Because Tayag was about to proceed with construction despite the letter, the spouses filed their complaint for injunction on or about October 19, 1959. They alleged that the smoke, vapor, palay husk, dust and dirt and the constant noise from the ricemill would destroy the quiet, cleanliness, tranquility and fresh air needed in a hospital area, and that the Bureau of Hospitals had made clear that the hospital permit would be revoked and the clinic closed if the ricemill were built and operated. They had already spent not less than 40,000 pesos on the house and equipment. The injunction was issued, then dissolved by the challenged order. In his answer, Tayag claimed that the health officer had no authority to revoke his building permit, that Chapter Seven of the ordinance had been amended on January 11, 1960 by Ordinance Number 7 so as to dispense with the sanitary permit, and that his building permit had been reissued on January 13, 1960.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction upon an unverified motion that alleged only abstract conclusions.
• Whether or not the dissolution of the injunction could be justified on the ground that the plaintiff can be fully compensated for the damage, where the operation of a hospital affects the health and welfare of the community.
• Whether or not the judge's reliance on private information, and his plan to inspect the ricemill after construction and enjoin its operation only if it proved to be a nuisance, constituted grave abuse of discretion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides:

The injunction may be refused, or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, upon the insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the complaint itself or upon affidavits on the part of the defendant, which may be opposed by the plaintiff also by affidavits. It may also be refused, or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, if it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, but the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that the defendant will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained of. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too great, it must be modified. On any of these grounds, the defendant may object to the injunction applied for, or may move that the same be dissolved or modified if already granted ex parte.

This is the provision the Court construes, and it bears on the case because the dissolution of an injunction on the ground of great damage requires that the conditions of the section actually appear, not merely be recited.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the spouses are entitled to the writ. Tayag's motion to dissolve was unverified. Worse, instead of alleging facts establishing the presence of the conditions prescribed in Section 6 of Rule 60, he merely reproduced the language of the section, relying on abstract conclusions without any concrete or specific premise to bear them out. Although the spouses impugned the accuracy of those conclusions in their opposition, the respondent judge accepted them at face value, without any evidence or even an affidavit in support.

On the second issue, the Court held that the damage could not be compensated in full. The operation of a hospital is a matter that concerns not only its owners or operators but, if not more particularly, the health and welfare of the community, and the damage sustained by the community, whether from obstruction of the proper operation of the hospital or from its closing, cannot possibly be compensated in full.

On the third issue, the Court held that the judge's reasoning entailed such a serious error of judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. He had acted on account of very reliable information he had received privately, to the effect that a ricemill can now be operated without noise or smoke, and he justified himself by saying that after construction he intended to inspect the ricemill and, if it proved to be a nuisance, to enjoin its operation immediately. The Court also noted that the main action was filed precisely to prevent construction, so that once the ricemill was built the action would become futile. The intention to prohibit the operation later could not offset the harm already done to the hospital, its patients and the public. And by permitting Tayag to construct the building and install the machinery, the judge exposed him to much greater damage than could have resulted had the injunction been maintained until final judgment.

Doctrine

A preliminary injunction may be dissolved on the ground that its continuance would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be fully compensated, only if the conditions of Section 6 of Rule 60 actually appear. The motion must be verified and must allege concrete facts, not mere conclusions copied from the text of the rule. The judge may not accept the defendant's conclusions on their face without evidence or affidavits, especially where the plaintiff contests them. Nor may the judge act on private information, or dissolve the injunction on a promise to inspect the establishment after it is built and to enjoin its operation only if it later proves to be a nuisance. Where the activity enjoined affects the health and welfare of the community, as the operation of a hospital does, the resulting damage is not capable of full compensation, and the injunction should be maintained. A dissolution that ignores these limits is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the order of February 4, 1960 dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, and taxed the costs against respondent Jaime Tayag.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an injunction is not dissolved on a recital of the words of the rule, but only on verified, concrete facts showing that the defendant will suffer great damage while the plaintiff can be fully compensated. Examiners use this case in remedial law on the grounds for dissolving a preliminary injunction and in torts on nuisance, particularly where public health and welfare make the damage inestimable.