HAP HONG HARDWARE CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PHILIPPINE MILLING COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Bonifacio Ysip, presiding, sentencing the defendant Philippine Milling Company
to pay the plaintiff Hap Hong Hardware Co., Inc. the sum of P2,084.90 plus legal
interest, and the sum of P400.00 as attorney’s fees.

The action was brought to recover the value of hardware materials ordered by
the defendant from the plaintiff which it promised to pay upon delivery. The
materials were delivered, but only P200.00 was paid at the time of the delivery,
thus leaving a balance of P2,084.90. After a denial of a motion for a bill of
particulars and of a motion to dismiss, the defendant filed an answer, admitting
the purchase by it of the materials and the payment thereon of P200.00, but
denying the allegation that the balance of P2,084.90 has not been paid. The
answer also contains a counterclaim for attorney’s fees and for moral damages in
the amount of P5,000.00, alleged as a result of the filing of the action.

The original complaint bears date of April 3, 1956, and the answer to
defendant’s counterclaim was filed on May 29, 1956. On the same date, a motion
to set the case for hearing was presented by attorney for the plaintiff, and in
accordance therewith the court set the case for trial on July 19, 1956. However,
the judge presiding in the sala in which the case was pending was on vacation,
so counsel for the plaintiff again asked that the case be set for another
hearing, and in accordance therewith the court set the case for trial on October
25, 1956. On October 22, 1956, counsel for the defendant moved for a
postponement of the trial, which the court granted in open court on October 25,
1956, setting the trial on December 6, 1956.

On December 4, 1956, the defendant again filed a motion for postponement,
alleging that the officers of the defendant company were attending another
trial, of a criminal case, and that counsel had to attend also to a trial of
another criminal case. The motion is sworn to, so the court postponed the
hearing to January 3, 1957, in an order dated December 6, 1956.

On January 3, 1957, the date of the trial, the defendant again filed a
petition for postponement, alleging that the defendant’s witnesses, officers of
the company, had not come because it was already the beginning of the milling
season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental, and their presence
in the central was very necessary. This motion is dated December 29, 1956 but a
copy thereof was received by the attorney for the plaintiff only on January 2,
1957.

When the case was called for hearing on January 3, 1957, the defendant failed
to appear, and so the court ordered the plaintiff to present its evidence. On
that same date, the court rendered the judgment appealed from.

Appeal was taken directly to the Court of Appeals, which court endorsed it to
Us for decision, as the appellant’s brief does not raise questions of fact, but
only a question of law. It is its contention on this appeal that the lower court
erred in not granting the postponement, as prayed for by the defendant, and in
allowing the plaintiff to present its evidence, thus depriving appellant of its
day in court.

We find the appellant’s contention to be without merit. Various postponements
were secured by the defendant prior to the last day set for the hearing, showing
an intention of defendant’s part to delay the termination of the case. Its
answer shows that it has no apparent defense; it even admitted purchasing the
materials and in paying only P200.00 upon delivery. The defense is a mere denial
of the allegation of the plaintiff that the balance of the account has not been
paid.

The reason adduced in support of the motion for postponement is not
unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen. Defendant ought to have
known long before the date of trial that the milling season would start when the
trial of the case would be held. The motion should have been presented long in
advance of the hearing, so that the court could have taken steps to postpone the
trial without inconvenience to the adverse party. As it is, however, the motion
was presented on the day of the trial. Knowing as it should have known that
postponements lie in the court’s discretion and there being no apparent reason
why the defendant could not have presented the motion earlier, thus avoiding
inconvenience to the adverse party, the appellant can not claim that the trial
court erred in denying postponement. Under all the circumstances we hold that
the court was perfectly justified in denying the motion for postponement.

Wherefore, the appeal is hereby dismissed, and decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla,
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and
Natividad, JJ., concur.