PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NESTOR VELUZ, ACCUSED-APPELANT.

People versus Veluz

The Case

People versus Veluz is a criminal appeal in a rape case. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Nestor Veluz for having carnal knowledge of a thirteen year old girl four times, a girl whose mental age was only that of a four to five year old child, and who the accused knew to be mentally disabled. The case matters for two reasons a bar candidate must hold onto. First, it shows how the Court treats the testimony of a child victim, and especially a mentally retarded child victim, in a rape prosecution. Second, it settles how the qualifying circumstance of mental disability may be proved, and it settles the penalty that follows when that circumstance is established.

Procedural History

Veluz was charged by Information with one count of rape before the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. When arraigned he pleaded not guilty, and trial followed. The prosecution presented eight witnesses, among them the victim herself, her aunt, her father, a neighbor who witnessed the act, the barangay kagawad who responded, the police officer who investigated, the examining physician, and a clinical psychologist. The defense presented only two witnesses, the accused and his twelve year old daughter.

The trial court found Veluz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, subparagraph d, and punished under Article 266-B, subparagraph 10. It sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay seventy five thousand pesos as civil indemnity, plus costs. Veluz appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and the death penalty but modified the damages, awarding seventy five thousand pesos as actual damages, fifty thousand pesos as moral damages, and thirty thousand pesos as exemplary damages. The case then came before the Supreme Court on automatic review, and the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Facts

On the morning of October twenty third, nineteen hundred ninety nine, a neighbor, Corazon Rivera, went to the house of Veluz to ask for saluyot. Peeping through the window, she saw Veluz and the victim lying on the elevated bamboo platform. Veluz was naked and his buttocks were moving up and down, while the victim's blouse was rolled up. Rivera watched the pumping motion for about three minutes, then left to call the victim's aunt.

The aunt came, saw the two inside, and called out to Veluz to let the victim go out. When he did not answer at once, she said she would call a barangay tanod. Instead she found a barangay kagawad, Loreto Cuaresma, who told her to go ahead and that he would follow. When the aunt returned, she saw the victim at the back of the house, sitting on the ground and perspiring. Asked what happened, the victim answered that she had been sexually abused for a long time, and that it had just happened. Asked how many times, she raised four fingers. Cuaresma likewise saw the victim, asked her what Veluz did, and she answered that she had been abused; asked how many times, she again raised four fingers, and she named Veluz as the one who molested her.

The victim was brought to the police station and then to a hospital, where Dr. Rodolfo Eligio examined her. He found incomplete lacerations of the hymen at the three o'clock and seven o'clock positions, but these were old. He concluded that she could have been used a week or two earlier, and that without seminal fluid he could not tell whether she was raped on the day she was examined. A clinical psychologist, Nimia de Guzman, later examined the victim and found that while she was then fourteen years old, her mental capacity was only that of a four to five year old child. For the defense, Veluz claimed he was asleep, that the victim entered his house uninvited and refused to leave, and that he was too tired and sleepy to have had intercourse with her.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged incredibility and inconsistency of the testimonies of the victim and the prosecution witnesses, and given the physical evidence.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty, the qualifying circumstance of mental disability not having been proven in accordance with controlling case law.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding civil indemnity to the victim.

Applicable Provisions

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 1, subparagraph d, defines the crime charged:

Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious, or when the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

This is the definition under which Veluz was charged and convicted, the victim being demented or deprived of reason by mental disability.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, subparagraph 10, provides the qualifying circumstance and the penalty:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating or qualifying circumstances: When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

This is the provision that raised the penalty to death, and the Court required proof that Veluz knew of the victim's mental disability at the time of the crime.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal had no merit. It reaffirmed the settled precepts in the review of rape cases: an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since only two persons are normally involved; and if the complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted. The Court deferred to the trial court's findings on credibility, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment. It found the victim's testimony clear that Veluz removed her clothes, placed his penis in her vagina, and that she felt pain. The Court held that testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. It rejected the argument that the victim's account was a stereotypical narration, noting that children, particularly very young children, make perfect victims of rape, and that a child with a mental capacity of four to five years cannot be expected to narrate exact details. It likewise rejected the argument that the word used for placing was not the same as inserting, holding that where penetration was not fully established, rape is nevertheless consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. The Court also held that inconsistencies on minor details do not affect the weight of the testimonies, and that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Finally, it held that proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape, that healed lacerations do not negate rape, and that the absence of spermatozoa or of external physical injuries does not cancel out the commission of rape.

On the second issue, the Court held that mental retardation may be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimonies of witnesses and the observation of the trial court. The trial court had observed the victim's mental retardation from her demeanor and deportment during trial, and the psychologist assessed her mental capacity as that of a four to five year old child. More importantly, Veluz knew of her mental disability, being her longtime neighbor, and he even acknowledged it during his testimony. The qualifying circumstance was therefore established, and the death penalty was proper.

On the third issue, the Court found no error in the award of civil indemnity, and it affirmed the damages as modified by the Court of Appeals.

Doctrine

First, the testimony of a child victim of rape, and especially a mentally retarded child, is given full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. Such a victim cannot be expected to recount the details of the crime with the clarity and consistency of an adult, and inaccuracies and inconsistencies are to be expected.

Second, proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape, a medico legal report is merely corroborative, and healed lacerations, the absence of spermatozoa, and the absence of external physical injuries do not negate rape.

Third, mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code may be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimonies of witnesses and the observation of the trial court, provided the offender knew of the mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding Veluz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to death, with the damages as modified.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that mental retardation may be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimonies of witnesses and the observation of the trial court, and that the death penalty attaches when the offender knew of the mental disability at the time of the crime. Examiners like to use this case on the credibility of a child or mentally retarded rape victim, on the sufficiency of proof of mental disability as a qualifying circumstance, and on the rule that healed lacerations and the absence of spermatozoa do not negate rape.