J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CORNELIO M. AGUILA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

J. M. Tuason and Company versus Aguila

The Case

This is a case about the finality of judgments and the strict deadlines that surround a motion for relief from judgment. J. M. Tuason and Company, Incorporated, the plaintiff, sued Cornelio M. Aguila, the defendant, to recover possession of a parcel of land in Quezon City. The defendant lost before the trial court, failed to appeal on time, and then sought relief from the judgment long after the period allowed by the Rules. The Supreme Court's decision matters to every bar candidate because it illustrates how the reglementary period for relief from judgment is counted, and why a litigant cannot convert a time-barred motion for relief into a second motion for new trial simply by asking the court to disregard technicalities.

Procedural History

By authority of an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated March 31, 1959, the plaintiff filed an action for recovery of possession against the defendant on May 7, 1959. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had no cause of action, since the plaintiff itself had acknowledged the defendant's right to possess the property in a compromise agreement approved in an earlier case. The motion was denied. After answer and trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on September 8, 1959, ordering the defendant to vacate the property.

The defendant received a copy of the decision on September 14, 1959, and filed a motion for new trial on September 30, 1959, which was denied on December 28, 1959. The defendant then attempted to appeal from the decision on the merits, but the appeal was disapproved for having been perfected beyond the reglementary period, so the decision became final and executory. On January 5, 1960, the defendant filed an urgent motion for relief from the decision of September 8, 1959. The trial court denied that motion on January 9, 1960, on the ground that it was filed more than sixty days after counsel for the defendant received a copy of the decision. The defendant gave notice of his intention to appeal from the order denying relief on February 3, 1960, and this time the trial court gave due course to the appeal because it was filed within the reglementary period. The case then went directly to the Supreme Court.

Facts

The plaintiff held authority from the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to bring an action to recover possession of a parcel of land located in that city. It sued the defendant, Cornelio M. Aguila, who resisted on the ground that his right to possess the property had been acknowledged by the plaintiff in a compromise agreement approved in an earlier case. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, received the answer, and after trial rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to vacate the property.

Counsel for the defendant received a copy of that decision on September 14, 1959. The defendant moved for a new trial on September 30, 1959, but the motion was denied on December 28, 1959. His appeal from the decision on the merits was then disapproved for being perfected beyond the reglementary period, and the decision became final and executory.

On January 5, 1960, the defendant filed an urgent motion for relief from the decision of September 8, 1959. The trial court denied it on January 9, 1960, because it was filed more than sixty days from the date counsel for the defendant received a copy of the decision. The defendant appealed from that order of denial, and the appeal was given due course.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court correctly denied the defendant's urgent motion for relief from judgment as having been filed beyond the reglementary period of sixty days from receipt of a copy of the decision.
• Whether or not the defendant's motion for relief from judgment may be treated as a second motion for new trial in the interest of substantial justice.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court governs the time within which a motion for relief from judgment must be filed, and the Court expressly held that the denial of the motion was in accordance with this provision:

Section 3. Time for filing petition. The petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered.

This provision bears directly on the case because the defendant's motion for relief was filed beyond the sixty-day period counted from his counsel's receipt of the decision, which is the very period the rule fixes.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no merit in the appeal. It observed that the decision on the merits was rendered on September 8, 1959, and that counsel for the defendant received a copy on September 14, 1959. The attempted appeal from that decision was disapproved for having been perfected beyond the reglementary period. The urgent motion for relief was then filed on January 5, 1960, and denied on January 9, 1960. The Court noted that the record, as well as the order of the trial court, showed that the motion for relief was filed beyond the reglementary period of sixty days from receipt of the decision. It therefore found no plausible reason to disturb the order of denial, which it held to be in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 38.

On the second issue, the defendant admitted that his former counsel had committed several mistakes in handling the case, one of them being the filing of a motion for relief instead of a second motion for new trial, which, he argued, would still have been within the period allowed by the rules. He asked the Court to consider the motion for relief as a second motion for new trial, invoking the rule that technicalities of procedure should be disregarded to obtain substantial justice. The Court refused. It found no justifiable reason to accede to the request, since the motion for relief contained grounds other than those allowed in a motion for new trial. It concluded that the appeal was clearly without merit and should be dismissed.

Doctrine

A motion for relief from judgment must be filed within the period fixed by the Rules, counted from the date the petitioner learns of the judgment or order to be set aside, and the Court will not disturb a denial that conforms to that period. The negligence or mistakes of counsel in handling a case do not justify treating a time-barred motion for relief from judgment as a second motion for new trial, especially where the motion for relief rests on grounds other than those allowed in a motion for new trial. The plea to disregard technicalities in the interest of substantial justice cannot be used to circumvent the mandatory periods that make judgments final and executory.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying the motion for relief from judgment, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a motion for relief from judgment filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period is barred, and it cannot be recharacterized as a second motion for new trial to escape that deadline. Examiners use this case to test the finality of judgments, the strict counting of the period for relief from judgment, and the rule that counsel's mistakes do not excuse compliance with procedural deadlines.