PEDRO LADINES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE RAMON, RESPONDENTS.

Ladines versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the case of Ladines versus People of the Philippines, a criminal appeal by Pedro Ladines from his conviction for homicide. He was charged, together with Herman Licup, with stabbing Erwin de Ramon to death during a school homecoming dance in Sorsogon in June 1993. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold onto. First, it is a clean illustration of the limits of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which reaches only questions of law and not the probative weight of evidence. Second, and more useful in the exam room, it is a precise lesson on how the indeterminate sentence must be fixed: a court may not impose the ceiling of a penalty period without stating why, and it must award moral damages and temperate damages in every case of death through crime.

Procedural History

An information for homicide was filed against Ladines and Licup in the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 53. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on February 10, 2003, finding Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and acquitting Licup for insufficiency of evidence. Ladines was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity.

Ladines appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that reasonable doubt existed because Licup, who was also injured, had attacked the victim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the conviction. Ladines then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, insisting that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite Licup's admission, and that Licup's statement was newly discovered evidence creating reasonable doubt.

Facts

On the night of June 12, 1993, during the grand alumni homecoming dance of the Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala were watching the dance together with the victim, Erwin de Ramon. Ladines and Licup appeared and passed by them. Without warning, Ladines approached Erwin and stabbed him below the navel with a machete, then left after delivering the blow.

Licup then attacked Erwin as well, but Erwin stepped back and evaded the blow. Erwin pulled the machete from his own body and struck Licup in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch Erwin, and both eventually fell. Erwin was rushed to the hospital, where he died. The physician who performed the post-mortem examination testified that the victim sustained two stab wounds, one in the chest and one in the abdomen, possibly inflicted by one or two assailants using two distinct weapons.

For his defense, Ladines offered alibi and denial. He claimed he was in the school compound with his wife and minor child, that they did not enter the dance hall because trouble had caused people to scamper, and that they went home. He learned of the stabbing from a barangay tanod who told him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other. He also claimed the prosecution witnesses harbored ill will against him because he had filed a barangay complaint against them for stealing coconuts. Two witnesses corroborated his denial.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction despite the alleged admission of Licup that he had stabbed the victim.
• Whether or not Licup's res gestae statement constituted newly discovered evidence that created reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Ladines.
• Whether or not the lower courts correctly fixed the indeterminate penalty and the civil liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

The petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.

This confines the appeal to questions of law and bars any re-examination of the probative value of the evidence.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes homicide, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

This fixes the penalty for homicide at reclusion temporal, which the Court then applies through the rules on penalties containing three periods.

Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, on the rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods, provides in its first rule:

When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

And its seventh rule provides:

Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

These rules require the court to justify where within a period it fixes the penalty, which the lower courts failed to do.

Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides:

Temperate damages, in cases where the court may deem it just and equitable, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

This authorizes temperate damages for burial and related expenses that cannot be substantiated with receipts.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal raised factual questions improper under Rule 45. A question of law arises when the doubt concerns what the law is on a given state of facts; a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally re-examine the evidence. The findings of the lower courts are received with respect and bind the Court, subject only to well-defined exceptions, and none of those exceptions applied. The Court therefore upheld the affirmance of the conviction.

On the second issue, the Court held that Licup's res gestae statement was not newly discovered evidence. The concept applies only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the reopening of the case in the trial court, and seldom on appeal. The Court laid down the requisites: the evidence was discovered after trial; it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and it is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment. The first two requisites were absent, because Ladines could have obtained a certified copy of the police blotter containing the alleged declaration and produced it during trial with reasonable diligence.

On the third issue, the Court held that the lower courts erred in fixing seventeen years and four months, the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence without specifying any justification. By doing so, the fixing of the sentence became arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of a specification, the maximum should be the lowest of the medium period, which is fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. The Court also corrected the civil liability. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, requiring neither pleading nor evidence, because death through crime always occasions moral suffering on the heirs. Civil indemnity and moral damages were fixed at 75,000 pesos each. Since actual damages were not treated below, the Court allowed temperate damages of 25,000 pesos under Article 2224, and imposed interest of six percent per annum on all items of civil liability from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

Doctrine

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raises only questions of law; the Court does not re-examine the probative value of evidence, and the factual findings of the lower courts bind it absent the recognized exceptions. Newly discovered evidence is proper only on a motion for new trial in the trial court, and must satisfy four requisites: discovered after trial, not discoverable earlier with reasonable diligence, material and not merely cumulative, and of such weight as probably to change the judgment. Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, a court that imposes the ceiling of a penalty period must state its justification; absent such justification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence must be the lowest of the period. In homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are always granted without need of pleading or proof, and temperate damages of 25,000 pesos are warranted where burial expenses are not substantiated with receipts.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of Ladines but modified the judgment, lowering the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, and ordering him to pay the heirs civil indemnity and moral damages of 75,000 pesos each, temperate damages of 25,000 pesos, interest of six percent per annum, and the costs of suit.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a court may not impose the highest of a penalty period without stating why, and in default the lowest of the period is the proper penalty. Examiners use this case to test the fixing of indeterminate sentences under Article 64 and the automatic award of moral and temperate damages in homicide.