FELIPE ECO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

In a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 33674) on September 11, 1957, Felipe Eco sought
annulment of all proceedings, orders, and decisions rendered by the
respondents Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources and
Director of Forestry, claiming that the latter committed an abuse of
discretion in suspending his certificate of Private Woodland
Registration No. 1329, covering a tract of land with an area of 700
hectares, 290 hectares of which were forestal, and the former, in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

After the respondents had duly filed their answer justifying the controverted act, the case was heard.

On April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment finding, inter alia
that on January 17, 1956, petitioner Eco obtained from the Bureau of
Forestry a certificate of private wood, land registration under Section
1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, on the strength of a
possessory information title covering 700 hectares but which was made
to appear later on a sketch to contain 290 hectares of forest land, 99
hectares of new logged area and 811 hectares cultivated area; TigMan
Lumber Co., another timber licensee, protested against this
registration and filed a petition for reconsideration which was
apparently granted because the Director of Forestry suspended the
operation of Eco’s certificate; that likewise, it was found that
portions of the area released from the forest zone were under occupancy
by some 80 oppositors; that after a series of protests and
counter-protests, objections and counter-objections between the
parties, the Director of Forestry recommended cancellation of Eco’s
certificate of private woodland and the Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural Resources approved the recommendation; that upon the appeal of
Eco, the Secretary reopened the case and ordered a formal investigation
of the whole controversy to give the parties “ample opportunity to
formally present their respective sides of the controversy and (be)
given their ‘day in court’ “; that petitioner Eco refused to submit to
this reinvestigation, insisting that it was not necessary; that in the
face of this attitude of Eco, the Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural Resources issued a decision, the pertinent part of which reads:

“In the light of the above findings and
circumstances, this Office is of the opinion, and so holds that the
dismissal of the appeal of Felipe Eco is perfectly in order. This is
because of his adamant stand (not) to submit to the formal
investigation duly ordered by this Office. A clear indication of this
attitude is shown by his failure to appear at the investigation on May
2, 1957, when he was duly notified thereof thru his counsel.

“Wherefore,
and as the forested portion of the land in controversy is actually
occupied by the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., the appellee herein, and the
remaining area which was released from the forest zone is under actual
occupation and cultivation by public land applicants who had duly filed
their respective public land applications therefore, the instant appeal
of Felipe Eco should be, as hereby it is, Dismissed. Conformably
herewith, the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., is hereby authorized to resume
its operation inside the land in question.

“However, and in
order to quiet title to the land in dispute once and for all, the
appellant herein is hereby given a period of ninety (90) days from the
date hereof within which to institute voluntary registration
proceedings covering the land; otherwise, this Office will take the
necessary steps to bring the land under the operation of Sec, 53 of the
Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction with. Act No.
496. For this purpose, steps shall be taken by this Office to gather
evidence for the Government with a view to supporting its opposition to
the voluntary registration proceedings that the appellant herein may
institute, or to sustain the move of the Government in the event that
it will be compelled to institute compulsory registration proceedings
pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.

“So Ordered.”

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial court, Judge Magno
S. Gatmaitan presiding, dismissed the petition for certiorari, stating:

* * * * * * *

“The Court believes and so holds that there was
nothing inherently wrong in the actuations of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and of the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry; the Court concurs with, their opinion that in order to
terminate the litigation between all the parties here, the most proper
procedure was for petitioner to institute voluntary registration
proceedings; nor can petitioner claim that equity is with him in the
meantime since as already stated above, much can be said about the
excess in his area. The result will be dismissal. * * *.” Copy of this
decision was actually received by counsel for the petitioner on May 5, 1958.

On June 3, 1958 or 28 days thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, which, was denied on June
14, 1958, for lack of merit. On June 21, 1958, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal and appeal bond. Respondents registered opposition
thereto for the reason that the filing of said notice of appeal and
appeal bond was made out of time. Sustaining this allegation, the
court, by order of July 5, 1950, disapproved petitioner’s appeal bond
and notice of appeal.

On September 6 of the same year, petitioner filed a motion for
relief under Rule 38, praying for the setting aside of the decision on
the ground of excusable negligence. The alleged negligence consisted of
the erroneous computation by counsel’s clerk of the period within which
an appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the
prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days like
in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in Section 17
of Rule 41. The motion for relief was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but this court
certified the case to us, the question involved herein being one of law.

In support of his view, petitioner-appellant cites our ruling in the cases of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446,^[1] and Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., G. R. No. L-2587, promulgated on September 19, 1950.^[2]
The aforecited ruling has no application to the one at bar. The delay
in the filing of the pleadings in those cases was brought about by the
inability to file the same due to the illness either of the clerk or of
the attorney. It is quite different in the instant case. Evidently,
what was delegated by petitioner’s counsel to his clerk was the
computation itself of the period within which the appropriate pleading
may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise. As the lower court
aptly said: “the duty to compute the period to appeal is a duty that
devolves upon the attorney which he can not and should not delegate
unto an employee because it concerns a question of study of the law and
its application, and this Court considers this to be a delicate matter
that should not be delegated.” The negligence here cannot, therefore,
be considered excusable.

Even considering it on the merits, appellant’s cause must also fail.
The petition for relief was predicated principally on the ground that
the court a quo erred in not holding that the ruling of the
respondent Director of Forestry, affirmed by the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture & Natural Resources, suspending his Private Woodland
Registration certificate was made in abuse of discretion, because said
officials allegedly deprived him of his day in court. It is noteworthy
to mention, however, that it is precisely for this reason that the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources ordered a formal
investigation of the matter to enable the parties to present their
respective evidence. Yet, appellant Eco refused to submit to such
investigation. Naturally, the ruling of the respondent Director was
affirmed. How can it be claimed then that the Secretary of Agriculture
& Natural Resources gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
Eco’s appeal?

Furthermore, in his questioned order of June 11, 1957, the respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources provides:

“HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in
dispute once and for all, the appellant (Eco) herein is hereby given a
period of ninety (90) days from the1 date hereof within which to
institute voluntary registration proceedings covering the said land;
otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land
under operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act
141) in conjunction with Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be
taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view
to supporting its opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings
that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the move of the
Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute
compulsory registration proceedings pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public
Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.

“SO ORDERED.”

Apparently, instead of taking this course and thus proving his
alleged right over the property, appellant elected to institute
certiorari proceedings against the abovementioned officials in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. Under the circumstances, it is
evident that appellant’s action has no foundation at all.

Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed order denying
petitioner’s motion for relief, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez David JJ., concur.

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^[1] In the Coombs case, the clerk’s failure, on account of his illness,
to call the attention of his employer-defendant’s counsel—to the time
within which the pleading must be filed, which resulted in the latter’s
failure to file an answer on time, was considered excusable negligence.

^[2] In the Herrera case,
the employee’s inadvertance in placing in one of his drawers the
envelope containing the answer, and the employer’s being prevented, by reason of illness, from verifying whether the answer was actually filed or not, was held to be excusable negligence.