G.R. No. 16711. December 24, 1963

CRISTINO ORA-A, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. JUDGE JOSE M. ANGUSTIA AND PAZ BAYOT VDA. DE CORPUS, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 24, 1963 BENGZON, C.J.:
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BENGZON, C.J.:


This is an appeal from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Masbate annulling, on certiorari, the
proceedings held in Civil Case No. 163 of the justice of the peace court of
Masbate, same province.

It appears that, on July
19, 1957
,
in the said municipal court, Paz Bayot Vda. de Corpus,
filed against Cristino Ora-a, an action for ejectment from a
foreshore—land and collection of rentals, (Civil Case No. 163). Before
trial, Ora-a orally moved to dismiss, on the ground
that the said court had no jurisdiction over the case because the lot is a
public land, and Bayot’s foreshore—lease application therefore had not
yet been approved by the Government. This motion was denied. 1958, the
following decision was rendered:

The parties went to trial after
which, on March 17,

“From the evidence submitted,
it is gleaned and proven that the plaintiff Mrs. Paz Bayot Vda. de Corpus is the lessee of a foreshore land described under
F.L.A. No. 226. Knowing the same, the defendants Cristino Ora-a asked the permission of the plaintiff to construct a house
therein Exh. ‘A’, putting the defendant in estoppel of
whatever rights he may allege to the contrary.
This was in the month of
October
29, 1955
.
The defendant constructed a house therein since May, 1955 and upon being discovered
by the plaintiff, the former offered to pay a rent of P30.00 a month.

It appears that the defendant since
May, 1955 up to the present time has paid only the total amount of P140.00, and
up to the present time, the defendant is owing the plaintiff the total sum of
P1,020.00 ***.

Premises considered, the
preponderance of evidence leans in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiff the amount of P880.00 as rents of the
premises to the plaintiff and to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of P100.00.
The defendant is hereby likewise ordered to vacate the premises and to remove
whatever improvements he has constructed therein and deliver the same to
plaintiff, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

* * * * * * *

Instead of appealing, Ora-a filed
in the court of first instance of Masbate, on April 2, 1958, certiorari
proceedings alleging, among other things, that the said municipal court had no
jurisdiction over such Civil Case No. 163, because it involved ownership of
landed property; that it had acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
granting the motion to dismiss and in helping a lease applicant for public land
(not yet approved) to commercialize land belonging to the Government.

Appellant Bayot’s responsive pleading
stated that said Civil Case No. 163 was well within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court, and that the decision rendered therein accorded with the
evidence submitted by the parties.

Hearing was held, and the court
delivered a lengthy order, the pertinent part of which says:

“In Civil Case No. 163, it
appeared during the whole proceedings that the question of OWNERSHIP and the
illegality of the collection of rentals were presented as vital questions of
law. The question of possession therefore, cannot properly be determined
without settling that of ownership and when it appeared that the plaintiff is
not and cannot be the owner of said foreshore land on the date of the hearing,
even with her application submitted and her subleasing same being contrary to
law, then the jurisdiction of the COURT IS LOST and the ACTION SHOULD BE
DISMISSED. The moment she subleased the foreshore land, which she had merely
applied for, she placed her ownership in serious ‘jeopardy’ and her ownership
and possession becomes questionable and her act of collecting rents on a land
that is not yet hers is likewise questionable. She not being
the owner as yet of. the property, and not knowing that she would be one, and
coupled with her action of collecting illegal rents and/or subleasing the land
in violation of law which would ’cause the disapproval of her application,
which in fact was disapproved, makes the case one of ownership and thus cause
the judge to have no jurisdiction and these facts being admitted, the Judge in
hearing the case did it in EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. The lower court in the light
of the facts stated above should have dismissed the ease for lack of
jurisdiction and in trying the case did it in excess of jurisdiction.

Premises considered, the Court
hereby gives due course to the petition for Certiorari and likewise believes
and hereby declares that the lower court in trying the case under the facts
existing and admitted by the parties, did it in EXCESS OF JURISDICTION and
orders that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 163 is without any legal force
and effect.

* * * * * * *

Hence this appeal.

We believe that the lower court
erred on two counts:

First.—It
held that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, the issue being the
ownership of Paz Bayot. This is error. The issue was the right of Mrs. Bayot as
lessee of the Government—not ownership. She did not claim to be the owner
of the foreshore land. And Qra-a did not maintain he
was the owner. There was, therefore, no question of ownership which was beyond
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. The right to recover detained
land was the only issue. And the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to pass
on that issue.

Second.—It entertained the
certiorari petition although it was clear that Ora-a’s
remedy was to appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace. The
complaint by its terms, was one of detainer. It
described a contract of sublease, rents paid, subsequent default and refusal to
vacate. It was, therefore, cognizable by the justice of the peace.[1] The defense sought to question the right of
Bayot to sublease, on the alleged ground that the land was public land, and her
application for lease for the same had not yet been approved by the Government.

Such defense did not set up
ownership as issue. As stated, the defendant does not claim ownership in himself, and the plaintiff did not allege ownership in
herself. She asserted the rights of a
lessee of the Government
and wanted to eject Ora-a as sub-lessee.

In the circumstances it was, at
least, doubtful that Ora-a could deny the right of
Bayot to let him occupy the land as sub-lessee. The conclusive legal
presumption says that the lessee may not deny the lessor’s title at the
beginning of the lease.[2] And there’s no reason not to apply the same rule
between sub-lessee and sub-lessor.

At any rate, the question whether
the lease application of Bayot had been approved, was
a question of fact which the justice of the peace had to decide; and his
decision should have been appealed to the court of first instance. The error of
said municipal judge in deciding it—if any—did not have the effect
of depriving his court of the jurisdiction already acquired by it by the filing
of the complain, which was admittedly, in form and allegation one for illegal
detainer.

“Whether title is necessarily
involved in an action for forcible entry and detainer is a question of fact to
be determined from the evidence presented by both parties at the trial, and
that question can be reviewed only on appeal and not by certiorari proceedings
in Court of First Instance. (Moran, Rules of Court (1963 Ed.) Vol. 3, p. 279,
citing Alviar vs. Pampolina, 84 Phil. 45; and De los Reyes vs. Elepano, L-3466,
Oct.
13, 1950
“

By the way, the alleged illegality
of the sub-lease does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

The appealed order is reversed, and
the petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against appellee.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.



[1] Daquioro vs. Vda. de Atas, 71 Phil. 120.

[2] Sec, 67 (b), Rule 123, Rules of
Court.