A. SORIANO AVIATION, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION, JULIUS S. VARGAS IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNION PRESIDENT, REYNALDO ESPERO, JOSEFINO ESPINO, GALMIER…

Soriano Aviation versus Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation

The Case

This is a labor case between A. Soriano Aviation, a company engaged in flying guests to and from the Amanpulo and El Nido resorts in Palawan, and the Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, the certified exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees, together with its union president and several mechanic-members. The company asks the Supreme Court to declare the union's strike illegal and to uphold the loss of employment of the individual strikers. The case matters because it draws the precise boundary between two things students often confuse: the validity of a strike's purpose, and the legality of the means used to carry it out. It also teaches that a no-strike clause cannot be raised against a strike grounded on unfair labor practice, and that the penalty for an illegal strike must be fixed individually, not collectively.

Procedural History

The dispute produced two separate complaints before the labor arbiters. In the first, the company sought a declaration that the mechanics' refusal to render overtime was an illegal strike; the labor arbiter ruled in the company's favor, declaring the refusal a concerted action and the strike illegal for failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Labor Code. The union appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which dismissed the appeal, and denied reconsideration.

In the second complaint, the company sought a declaration that the later strike was illegal because of the widespread use of force and violence, and asked that the strikers lose their employment. The labor arbiter declared the second strike illegal and held that the individual respondents had lost their employment. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed in full, and denied reconsideration. The union then went up to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the Commission's ruling, holding that the acts of violence were not as serious or pervasive as those in the earlier cases and did not warrant loss of employment. The Court of Appeals denied the company's motion for reconsideration, so the company filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The company and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective from January 1997 to December 1999, and that agreement contained a no-strike, no-lockout clause. On three legal holidays in May and June 1997, which were peak season for the company, eight mechanic-members of the union refused to render overtime work. The company treated the refusal as a concerted action violating the no-strike clause and meted out a thirty-day suspension. It also filed a complaint for illegal strike, which it later withdrew at its own instance to give way to settlement, without prejudice to refiling should settlement fail.

Settlement proved futile. The union filed a notice of strike, attributing to the company union busting, illegal dismissal of a union officer, illegal suspension of the eight mechanics, violation of a memorandum of agreement, coercion and interrogation of newly hired mechanics regarding union affiliation, discrimination against aircraft mechanics, harassment through systematic fault-finding, contractual labor, and constructive dismissal of the union president. Conciliation failed, and the union went on strike. The company then revived its first complaint, and the labor arbiter ruled that the new work-shift schedule was a valid exercise of management prerogative, that the refusal to work was a concerted action, and that the strike was illegal for non-compliance with the formal requirements of the Labor Code.

Eight months into the strike, the company filed the second complaint, asking that the strike be declared illegal on account of the pervasive and widespread use of force and violence, and that the strikers lose their employment. The acts alleged and later established included public shouting of foul and vulgar words at company officers and non-striking employees, threats of bodily harm, dousing officers with water, throwing gravel and sand at a car, lighting and throwing firecrackers during the company Christmas party, and putting up placards and streamers imputing criminal negligence and unsafe operations to the company. The labor arbiter declared the second strike illegal and held that the individual respondents had lost their employment, and the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed in full.

Issues

• Whether or not the strike staged by the respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and the violation of the no-strike, no-lockout clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
• Whether or not, if the strike is illegal, the individual respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status on account thereof.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides:

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

This is the source of the right to strike, and the phrase "in accordance with law" is what makes the right limited rather than absolute.

Article 264 of the Labor Code, paragraph (a), provides:

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during an illegal strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

This is the provision that fixes who may be penalized and on what basis, and it is the provision the Court applies to the individual respondents.

Article 264, paragraph (e), on picketing, provides:

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

These are the prohibited acts whose commission the Court weighs against the strikers.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in the affirmative. As to the first strike, the mechanics' refusal to work on three consecutive holidays was prompted by disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without compliance with the procedural requirements, it violated the no-strike, no-lockout policy in the collective bargaining agreement. As to the second strike, the Court held that the union complied with the procedural requirements, and that a no-strike, no-lockout provision, while a valid stipulation, may be invoked only by the employer when the strike is economic in nature, that is, one conducted to force wage or other concessions not mandated by law. It is inapplicable to prevent a strike grounded on unfair labor practice. Here the union believed in good faith that the company committed unfair labor practice when it struck on account of the thirty-day suspension, the dismissal of a union officer, and perceived union busting. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are later found untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the second strike became invalid because of the commission of illegal acts in its course. The exercise of the right to strike is not absolute, and even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. The employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted activities injurious to the right to property renders a strike illegal, and so does picketing accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence and coercion. The Court found that the union's repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm against company officers and non-striking employees, and more significantly the placards and banners imputing criminal negligence to the company and putting its reliability in doubt, fell within the prohibited acts under Article 264 and jurisprudence. That the violence occurred on only nine non-consecutive days did not make it less pervasive, for Article 264 nowhere requires that violence be continuous or last the entire strike. Nor did the company's delay of almost eight months in filing its complaint matter, since Article 264 only lists what acts are prohibited and does not require immediate reporting.

On the second issue, the Court held that liability for prohibited acts must be determined on an individual basis. An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and, like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during an illegal strike. In all cases the striker must be identified, and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, substantial evidence being sufficient. The labor arbiter, affirmed in full by the Commission, had deemed all the individual respondents to have lost their employment without distinction as to their respective participation. The records did not indicate who among them knowingly participated in the illegal strike as union officers, or who knowingly committed violent acts as members. The Court, not being a trier of facts, remanded the case to the Commission solely to determine the status in the union of the individual respondents and their respective liability, if any.

Doctrine

A no-strike, no-lockout clause in a collective bargaining agreement is a valid stipulation, but it may be invoked only by the employer against a strike that is economic in nature, that is, one conducted to force wage or other concessions not mandated by law. It cannot be invoked to prevent a strike grounded on unfair labor practice, and even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are later found untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.

The right to strike is not absolute. Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be declared illegal where the means employed are illegal, such as the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion, or picketing accompanied by threats and coercion. Article 264 does not require that the violence be continuous or span the entire strike, and it does not require the employer to file its complaint immediately.

Under Article 264, paragraph (a), an ordinary worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. A union officer may be terminated when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and, like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during an illegal strike. The striker must be identified, and substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, suffices.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed and set aside, the National Labor Relations Commission resolutions were reinstated, and the case was remanded to the Commission solely to determine the status in the union of the individual respondents and their respective liability, if any.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is this: even if the purpose of a strike is lawful, the strike may still be declared illegal where the means employed are illegal. Examiners like to use this case on the limits of the no-strike clause, which cannot defeat a strike grounded on unfair labor practice, and on the individual determination of liability under Article 264, where workers and union officers are treated differently.