LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., SANTA MESA SLIPWAY AND ENGINEERING CO., AND PATRICK J. MACFADDEN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL, RELATIONS, BROTHERHOOD OF SHIPBUILDERS, MARI…

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations, dated November 28, 1959, finding
petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and the resolution dated January 27, 1960 of the same Court, dismissing
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Briefly, the facts, as found by the Court of Industrial
Relations, are as follows:

“The Sta. Mesa Slipway and Engineering Company, the
principal respondent herein is a department of the Luzon Stevedoring
Company Incorporated, and is doing business, among others, of hauling
and pumping of bulk oil in the City of Manila. The complainant union,
on the other hand, is admittedly a legitimate labor organization and
one of its founder is complainant Despabiladeras, a mechanic. He used
to be assigned in the company operations in Lubiran, Sta. Mesa, as
diesel mechanic having been employed since 1946 as a mere operator with
a salary of P6.90 a day. On April 30, 1930. Despabiladeras was
transferred to the Pandacan Terminal, specifically in the Bulk Oil
Section, where his work is more hazardous than his former assignment in
Sta. Mesa, for the reason that it treats of highly inflammable
materials. This transfer is the subject of another unfair labor
practice complaint, Case No. 959-ULP, which is pending adjudication in
another Sala of this Court.

“Complainant
Despabiladeras was assigned as a pump operator in the Bulk Oil Section
of the Pandacan Terminal under the direct and immediate supervision of
a dispatcher who takes charge of the assignments of operators, the
schedule of boats and other personnel. The dispatcher appears to be
responsible to the general superintendent, who oversees the operations
in Pandacan Terminal, among other offices and places of operations. On
January 16, 1958, complainant Despabiladeras was notified over the
telephone by the general timekeeper, Mr. Juan, who was then calling
from the company’s office in Sta. Mesa, that in order that to collect
his salary, he should produce his residence certificates. The following
day, January 17, Despabiladeras reported for work at 6:30 o’clock in
the morning although he was supposed to start to work at 7:00 o’clock.
The dispatcher in-charge then at that very hour was Mr. Villaruz and
Despabiladeras asked him if there was plenty of work for that day;
Villaruz answered that they had only “three points” which meant that
there would be only three pump operators; (whereas, there are times
when pumping operation call for about nine operators). Despabiladeras
then asked permission from dispatcher Villaruz if he could go to the
City Hall to buy residence certificates for 1958, and Villaruz said, go
right away and come back right away. Complainant then punched in his
time card at about 6:59 in the morning. When he returned, after, an
absence of two hours, the General Manager, respondent Patrick
Macfadden, who was then at the gate of the Terminal, saw him and looked
at his watch but did not say anything. Complainant Despabiladeras then
proceeded to his place of work which was 300 meters away from the gate
and went to work immediately. While working on that same day, he was
summoned to go to the Sta. Mesa Office of the company and there, the
general superintendent, Felix Flores, asked him where he went and he
answered that he bought his residence certificates as requested by the
timekeeper. Mr. Juan, who confirmed that he made such a request. After
being questioned by Mr. Flores. complainant claims that respondent
Macfadden began lambasting him with harsh words saying with pointed
fingers toward him, ‘Remember, I will find a way and talk with my legal
counsel by which I can separate you from the service.’ In the afternoon
of the same day, after having been made to sign a certain paper, he was
dismissed.”

After trial, Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista rendered
a decision, dated November 28, 1959, finding petitioners
guilty of unfair labor practice and consequently ordered
them—

“(a) to cease and desist from committing such unfair
labor practice complaint of; and to reinstate Isabelo Despabiladeras to
his former position at the Bulk Oil Section of the respondent in
Pandacan with back wages from January 17, 1958 until actually reinstated without loss of whatever rights, privileges and benefits
including seniority.”

On December 8, 1959, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Judge Bautista, with the
reservation “to file their Memorandum of arguments in
support of the instant motion for reconsideration within
the 10-day period provided by the Rules of Court of Industrial Relations, as amended.” The ten-day period

ended on December 18, 1959, but on December 16, 1959,
petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion asking for an
extension of ten days within which to submit their memorandum of arguments on the ground that Atty. Lucas V.
Simbulan, who was personally handling the case, was ill.
For this purpose, a medical certificate was attached.

In a resolution dated December 18, 1959, the Court of
Industrial Relations denied the motion for extension of
time on the ground that it has a “no-extension” policy.
Petitioners’ counsel received a copy of this resolution on
December 23, 1959. On the same day, petitioners filed
their memorandum of arguments.

On December 24, 1959, petitioners filed a petition praying that the
resolution denying extension of time be reconsidered or modified so as
to grant them five of the ten days originally asked for. This petition
was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in its resolution of
December 28, 1959 which reiterated its “no extension” policy.

On the same day, December 24, 1959, the union moved
for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration, invoking the “no extension” rule. Petitioners opposed the
dismissal of their motion for reconsideration on the ground
that their failures to file their arguments on time was due
to the illness of their counsel, and that even if the supporting argument were considered as having been submitted
out of time, still their motion for reconsideration which
they filed on December 8, 1959, could stand alone, because
the same “already contained a specification of the errors
assigned and (it was) filed within the reglementary period.”

After a hearing en banc, the Court of Industrial Relations issued a resolution, dated January 27, 1960, denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the supporting arguments were not submitted on time
Hence, this appeal.

The rules of the Court of Industrial Relations provide
as follows:

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

“SEC. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same
to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by
registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer
in six (6) copies, duly verified under, oath.

“SEC.
16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. If the arguments can not be submitted
simultaneously with said motion, upon notice to the Court, the movant
shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his
motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his
answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the
arguments submitted by the movant.

“SEC. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after
ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of
said motion by the adverse party without any answer having been
filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the
Court en banc, unless it is considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding order
or notice to that effect.

“Failure to observe the above specified periods shall be sufficient
cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking
out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case
may be.”

Under the rules, a period of five days is allowed for
the filing of a pro forma motion for reconsideration, although the arguments in support thereof may be filed
within ten (10) days after the filing of the motion itself.
Failure to observe the periods for filing the motion for
reconsideration and its supporting arguments is sufficient
cause for dismissing either or both. (Bien, et al. vs. Castillo, et al., G. R. No. L-7428, May 24, 1955)

It is contended that the Court of Industrial Relations
abused its discretion in denying petitioners an extension
of time for filing arguments in support of their motion
for reconsideration despite the fact that their motion
was supported by a medical certificate attesting to the
illness of their counsel.

It appears that the Court of Industrial Relations, obviously to speed up the disposition of cases, has a standing
rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing
supporting arguments and that it was in pursuance of this
rule that it denied petitioners’ request. This being the
case and considering that the lower court is fully empowered to adopt its own rules (Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103,
as amended), the denial of the petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file supporting arguments cannot be held
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.

The “no extension” policy of the Court of Industrial
Relations is similar to Section 1, Rule 54 of the Rules of
Court, under which it was held that the court has no
power to grant a new period besides the fifteen days therein
provided, for filing a second motion for reconsideration
unless of course, the period of fifteen days, after deducting
the period during which the first motion for reconsideration
was pending, expires without leaving more than two days
for the movant to file his second motion in which case
ho is given full two days. (I Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court 744, 1957) citing Clauna et al. vs. Clauna
et al., G. R- No. L-4785, September 15, 1951)

It is next contended that, even without the supporting
arguments, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, which
they filed on December 8, 1959, was sufficient in itself so
that its denial by the Court of Industrial Relations was
improper. The question then is whether or not the motion
for reconsideration is pro forma.
If it is, then its dismissal was proper; otherwise, the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in dismissing it. The motion reads in part
as follows:

“COME NOW the respondents, by their undersigned counsel, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully move for the reconsideration of
the Decision of this Court dated November 28, 1959, copy of which
was received by the herein movants on December 3, 1959, on the
following grounds, to wit:

“I. That the decision is contrary to law; and

“II. That the decision is contrary to the facts adduced.

“The legal conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
unfair labor practices charged seems to have been based, among
others, on the following erroneous findings of facts:

“(1) That the work of a dispatcher, like Juan Villaruz, includes
the authority to assign pump operators, the scheduling of boats
and other personnel to leave their place of work during office hours;

“(2) That Exhibit ‘1’ had no evidentiary value, it having been
signed ‘against his (Despabiladera’s) heart and after the signor
had been told that ‘it was nothing.’

“(3) That complainants’ witness, Juan Villaruz, was never investigated for giving permission to Despabiladeras;

“(4) That an unauthorized leave on company’s time is in no
way prejudicial to the respondents;

“(5) That respondents’ regulation regarding the giving of permission to leave during working hours and as to who can give said
permission was promulgated only on January 17, 1958;

“(6) That the statement imputed to respondent Mr, Patrick Macfadden
stands undented and uncontradicted; and that, as a consequence thereof,
there was already deliberate desire on the part of the said respondent
to dismiss complainant Despabiladeras because of the latter having
filed unfair labor practice charges in Case No. 959-ULP;

“(7) That the personal business attended to by complainant Despabiladeras was urgent and same could be done on company’s time
even without being properly permitted to leave the premises of
the company;

“(8) That complainant Despabiladeras’ purpose in leaving his
place of work on company’s time, was to get a residence certificate
and that he, in fact, did get such certificate.”

While the motion singles out the portions of the decision
that are claimed to be erroneous, the motion, aside from
stating that the decision was contrary to law and the
evidence, does not explain why. Obviously, it was because
of this failure of their motion to point out why the portions
thus singled out were erroneous that petitioners reserved
their right to file supporting arguments. For it is not
enough that a motion should state what part of a decision
is contrary to law or the evidence; it should also point
out why it is so, as claimed by the movant.

“Where the motion for reconsideration was based on
the claim that the finding of the trial court as to the authenticity of
the disputed signature, Exhibit ‘A’, was not justified by the evidence
submitted which is the testimony of the expert witness denying such
authenticity, and said motion points out why the findings of the
court is not justified by the evidence, said motion is clearly not a
pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration.” (Pandes vs. Hon. Teodoro, et al., 94 Phil., 942).

We therefore hold that the Court of Industrial Relations
committed no error in dismissing petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. As a consequence, the decision of Presiding Judge Bautista became final and unappealable. For
when the Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act No. 875) authorizes an appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations to the Supreme Court, the decision that can be
appealed is that rendered by the court en banc and not that
rendered by any judge thereof. (Broce, et al. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 106 Phil., 388). We feel it
unnecessary to pass upon petitioners’ third assignment of error dealing
with the merits of the decision. At any rate, we have gone over the
decision and we find the same to be supported by substantial evidence;
we are not wont to review questions of fact, as petitioners urge us to.
The Court of Industrial Relations is governed by the rule of
substantial evidence rather than by the rule of preponderance of
evidence as in ordinary civil case. (Iloilo Chinese Commercial School vs. Fabrigar, et al. G. R. No.
L-16600, December 27, 1961).

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 28, 1959 and
the resolution dated January 27, 1960 of the Court of
Industrial Relations are hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.