JOSE M. GALARIO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND RUTH P. PIANO, RESPONDENTS.

Galario versus Office of the Ombudsman

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Jose M. Galario, Jr., the City Mayor of Valencia City, Bukidnon, against the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and Ruth P. Piano. The Mayor asks the Supreme Court to nullify the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause to indict him for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and to restrain his prosecution before the Sandiganbayan. The case matters because it fixes the narrow room a litigant has to attack the Ombudsman's probable cause determination, and because it shows that the offense charged in the information need not be the very offense named in the complainant's affidavit, so long as the facts alleged make out the crime.

Procedural History

Private respondent Ruth P. Piano first brought a complaint for constructive dismissal, reinstatement, and payment of representation and travel allowance before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office. That office ruled in her favor and ordered her reinstated as City Budget Officer. The Mayor's motion for reconsideration was denied, and his appeal to the Civil Service Commission proper was dismissed, with the Commission affirming the regional orders and reinstating Piano. When execution was sought, the Mayor issued a memorandum order reinstating her, but then barred her from signing financial documents and later directed her transfer to another building. The Commission issued further resolutions directing him to allow her to perform all the duties of City Budget Officer.

Piano then filed administrative and criminal complaints against the Mayor before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict the Mayor for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, and denied his motion for reconsideration. The Mayor went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

Jose M. Galario, Jr. was elected City Mayor of Valencia City, Bukidnon, in the May 2001 local elections. On assuming office, he conducted a reorganization and personnel audit and issued two memoranda, both dated 2 July 2001, relieving Ruth P. Piano from her position as City Budget Officer and transferring her to the newly created post of City Liaison Officer, with the task of studying how to improve the city's economic enterprises and revenue. Piano opposed the memoranda and filed a constructive dismissal complaint with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, which ordered her reinstatement as City Budget Officer and payment of her representation and travel allowance.

The Mayor's appeal was dismissed by the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the regional orders and declared the two memoranda null and void. The Mayor then issued a memorandum order reinstating Piano with the benefits of her position, but shortly after instructed her not to involve herself in signing documents relating to the city's financial transactions, citing her pending case with the Ombudsman, and gave that task to Bartolome Barte, who was authorized to sign for the City Budget Officer. He later directed Piano to transfer her office from the City Hall Main Building to the Sangguniang Kabataan Building. The regional office opined that, the administrative case having been dismissed, there was no legal impediment to her performing her duties.

When the Commission issued further resolutions directing the Mayor to allow Piano to perform all the duties of City Budget Officer and to hold office at the City Budget Office, and the Mayor instead issued letters announcing the vacancy of that office, Piano charged him before the Ombudsman with oppression, grave misconduct, and violation of the anti-graft law. The Ombudsman found probable cause under Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the Mayor came to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict the petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Whether or not the petitioner may be charged with violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when the affidavit-complaint charged him with violation of Section 3(e) of the same Act.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licences or permits or other concessions.

This is the offense named in Piano's affidavit-complaint, and the Ombudsman found one of its elements absent, which is why it did not indict under this provision.

Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

This is the offense for which the Ombudsman found probable cause and ordered an information filed, and the Court measures the Mayor's conduct against its language.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause does not require certainty of guilt; it is enough that the facts and circumstances would excite in a reasonable mind the belief that the person charged was guilty of the crime prosecuted. The Court stressed that a finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial and is not a pronouncement of guilt. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Here the Ombudsman based its finding on the memoranda, the complaint, the counter-affidavit, the affidavit-complaint, the answer, and the reply, giving both parties the chance to be heard. A finding of probable cause is a finding of fact generally not reviewable by the Court, and absent grave abuse the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory discretion.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Mayor may be charged under Section 3(f) even though the affidavit-complaint invoked Section 3(e). The Ombudsman had determined that an element of Section 3(e) was absent, barring indictment under that provision, and the facts alleged sufficiently supported the charge under Section 3(f). The variance between the provision named in the complaint and the provision charged in the information did not amount to grave abuse of discretion or a denial of due process, since the Mayor was heard on the very facts that grounded the charge.

Doctrine

Probable cause for purposes of preliminary investigation is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is prosecuted. It does not demand clear and convincing evidence or absolute certainty of guilt; it merely binds the suspect over to stand trial.

The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is essentially a finding of fact, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with it absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, meaning a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The rule rests on respect for the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers and on practicality.

The offense charged in the information is not confined to the provision named in the complainant's affidavit; what controls is whether the facts alleged and established in the preliminary investigation make out the crime charged, as measured against the text of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao finding probable cause against the Mayor were upheld, leaving the prosecution to proceed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial and is not a pronouncement of guilt, and that the Court will not disturb the Ombudsman's finding absent grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case on the standard of probable cause, the non-interference policy, and the rule that the information may charge a provision different from the one named in the complaint so long as the facts support it.