GREGORIO DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO E. SANTOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, AND MANUEL PANER, RESPONDENTS.

Gregorio de Guzman (herein petitioner), was owner of a parcel of agricultural
land (rice land), of about two (2) balitangs, situated in Antipolo,
Rizal, admittedly the only property belonging to him. He was personally
cultivating the land, when he mortgaged it in favor of his brother Florentino de
Guzman, who, as creditor, had the land cultivated, thru his own tenants, one of
whom was Nicolas Angeles, father-in-law of respondent herein, Manuel Paner, who,
upon the former’s death on May 21, 1957, succeeded him.

Sometime in February, 1959, petitioner redeemed the land from his brother and
expressed his desire to cultivate it personally beginning the agricultural years
1959-1960. Informed of such desire, Paner voluntarily surrendered the possession
of the land to petitioner, who thereafter commenced the preparation of the land
for the said agricultural year.

On August 7, 1959, respondent Paner filed a complaint (dated July 31, 1959),
before the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), Case No. 77 (Rizal
’59), alleging that he was dispossessed, for no legal or justifiable reason at
all, in the cultivation of the land, beginning said agricultural year, and
prayed that he be restored in the possession thereof and awarded the sum of
P300.00 as attorney’s fees. Answer was filed and after due trial on December 11,
1959, a decision was rendered, ordering Gregorio de Guzman to reinstate
petitioner Manuel Paner in the landholding, with all the rights accorded and
obligations imposed upon said petitioner, by R. A. 1199, as amended by R. A.
2263; to pay Paner thirty-eight (38) cavans of palay or its equivalent in money
at P10.00 per cavan or P380.00; and to pay to petitioner the amount of P100.00
as attorney’s fees. A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, asking that the decision of the
lower court be set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In his brief, the petitioner alleged that the Court of Agrarian Relations
erred (1) In declaring that the tenancy relation between the respondent Paner
and the petitioner was not extinguished and/or terminated when said Paner
surrendered the possession of the landholding in question to the petitioner; (2)
In declaring that petitioner acted in bad faith and with fraudulent
representation, when he informed respondent Paner that he (petitioner) was
personally going to cultivate the land, beginning the agricultural years
1959-1960; (3) In declaring that petitioner did not personally cultivate the
landholding in question, during the same period; and (4) In awarding damages to
respondent Paner.

The trial court found as fully, established that the petitioner did not
commit an unlawful act of dispossession, as contemplated in Section 49, R.A.
1199, because the land was voluntarily surrendered to petitioner by Paner but he
failed to comply with the condition to work the land himself; for instead of
personally working the land, and performing the labor which should devolve upon
the tenant he displaced, petitioner entrusted the major phases of farm labor to
other persons, his (petitioner’s) only participation in the cultivation of the
holding, consisted of the superficial task of repairing and weeding the dikes
and ditches and that in inducing petitioner to surrender the holding, herein
petitioner acted in bad faith and committed fraudulent representations.

While as a general rule, the factual findings of the trial court should not
be disturbed. We are, however, constrained to deviate from said rule in this
particular case, because the record does not sustain with substantial evidence,
the pretensions of respondents Paner. The pertinent provision of law which
governs the situation at hand, is the following section of Act No. 1199:

“SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant.—Any of the
following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant his
holdings:

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the
land himself personally or through the employment of farm machinery and
implements: Provided, however, That should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself or should fail to employ mechanical farm implements for a
period of one year after the dispossession of the tenant it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession: * * *”.

The imputation of bad faith and fraudulent representations is premised on the
fact that when the land-holding in question was plowed and harrowed, preparatory
to planting, petitioner was aided by his cousins Eugenio de la Rosa and Pastor
Legaspi, and their sons, and by Aquilino Podia, a member of petitioner’s
household. It has, however, been fully shown, that the working animals and
agricultural implements employed by them, during the harrowing and plowing
stages, belonged to the petitioner and that during the plowing and harrowing,
the petitioner was within the premises, and subsequent to the planting of the
land, petitioner personally attended to the care of the growing plants. The
respondent Court stated that the petitioner’s work was confined merely to
repairing and weeding the dikes and irrigation canals. Cultivation, however, is
not limited to the plowing and harrowing the land alone. Among the various
phases of farm labor provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of
dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding, are included (Sec. 38, R.A.
No. 1199, No. 3). The findings made by the trial court that petitioner had
appointed new tenants to the landholding are not supported by competent,
reliable or preponderant evidence. Respondent Paner himself declared that said
de la Rosa and Legaspi worked in the land, but he was “not in a position to
state whether they were hired tenants or helpers of Gregorio de Guzman” (Test.
of Paner, Sept. 18, 1959, t.s.n. p. 16), and “did not know if they were working
in the form of bayanis” t.s.n. p. 4, No. 4, 1959. And they were only seen
to have worked three times. On the other hand, De la Rosa testified that he was
not a tenant of the petitioner; that he was not paid and that if he and Legaspi
ever helped in the plowing and harrowing of the land, it was because of previous
favors extended to them and their families by said petitioner and under the
“Bayanihan” or cooperative system of farm labor. Petitioner testified to
the same effect.

The “bayanihan” is a laudable Philippine cooperative practice, specially true
in rustic areas. The members of the bayanihan are not tenants, they do
not receive pay and their work are utilized on temporary basis. The law does not
prohibit the practice of bayanihan, either on the part of a tenant or the
land holder. As appropriately commented by a well known author:

“The mere fact that respondent did not do all the work himself but
temporarily utilized the services of others to help him, does not mean
that he violated the condition imposed by the Court; it would have been
otherwise had the respondent entirely entrusted the work to other persons
and employed laborers on a permanent basis. The law does not prohibit the tenant
or the landowner who works the land himself to avail occasionally of the help of
the others” (The Law on Agricultural Tenancy by Judge G. S. Santos, pp. 28-29,
italic ours).

“The requirement that the landholder must work the land himself personaly
does not preclude him from entrusting the cultivation of the holding to another
person or persons, in case of illness or temporary incapacity, or to avail
himself of the labor of the practice of exchange labor system, commonly known as
the ‘amuyo’ or ‘tagnawa’ in the Ilocos regions, ‘palusong’ or ‘bayanihan’ to the
Tagalogs and ‘salibot’ or ‘ayon-ayon’ in the Western Visayas. * * *” (The Law on
Agricultural Tenancy by Santos, 1959 ed., p. 108).

Moreover, if a tenant is allowed to cultivate the land by himself or by the
immediate members of his family or immediate farm household, there can be no
plausible reason why the owner or landholder, if he cultivates the land himself,
should not be permitted to do the same thing (Saclolo, et al. vs. Court of
Agrarian Relations, et al. 106 Phil., 1038).

Because of the failure of respondent Paner to satisfactorily show that
petitioner acted in bad faith in his dealings with him, the award of damages in
his favor, made by the respondent Court, is unauthorized and constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, respondent Paner did not ask for damages, and
even if he did, he failed to prove the same. Whether arising from a breach of
contract or whether the result of some provision of the law, judgment for
damages suffered, must rest upon satisfactory proof thereof.

The writ is granted, and the decision, subject of the present appeal, is
reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.