JOSE MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. NARCISO GERMINO AND BENIGNO GERMINO, RESPONDENTS.

Mendoza versus Germino

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Mendoza against Narciso Germino and Benigno Germino, arising from a forcible entry complaint over a five-hectare parcel of agricultural land in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. The case matters because it draws the boundary line between the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court over ejectment suits and the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board over agrarian disputes. The Court reminds every reviewee that jurisdiction over the subject matter is fixed by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses a defendant raises in his answer.

Procedural History

On June 27, 1988, Jose Mendoza and Aurora Mendoza filed a complaint for forcible entry with the Municipal Trial Court of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija against Narciso Germino. Narciso answered and claimed that his brother Benigno was the agricultural lessee and that he merely helped in cultivation. The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and the Municipal Trial Court, without conducting a hearing, issued an order on October 27, 1995 remanding the case to the Board in Cabanatuan City.

On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, impleading Benigno as additional defendant. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled on March 19, 1996 that the respondents were mere usurpers and ordered them to vacate and pay damages. The respondents appealed to the Board, which affirmed on July 22, 1998, holding that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint. The respondents then went to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals decided on October 6, 2003 that the Municipal Trial Court erred in transferring the case, since the complaint showed forcible entry and not an agrarian dispute, and it set aside the Board's decision and remanded the case to the Municipal Trial Court. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, and the petitioner came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The plaintiffs claimed to be the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 34267. Sometime in 1988, Narciso Germino allegedly entered the property by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge or consent, and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.

In his answer, Narciso claimed that his brother Benigno was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and that he merely helped the latter in cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. Because of this tenancy defense, the Municipal Trial Court remanded the case to the agrarian adjudication system without holding a hearing.

In the amended complaint before the Provincial Adjudicator, the plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo had been the agricultural lessee, that Benigno unlawfully entered in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and that in 1987 Benigno transferred possession to Narciso. The respondents denied the allegations and claimed that the plaintiffs had agreed to sell the land to Benigno for 87,000 pesos, with 50,000 pesos already paid as partial payment.

Issues

• Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has jurisdiction over the case.
• Whether or not the allegation of tenancy in the defendant's answer divests the Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction over a forcible entry complaint.
• Whether or not the filing of the amended complaint conferred jurisdiction on the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

Applicable Provisions

Section 50 of Republic Act Number 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, provides:

Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

This provision defines the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which the petitioner invokes but which the Court finds inapplicable to a forcible entry complaint.

Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 316 provides:

Sec. 2. Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance, municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed, these cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.

This is the referral rule that the Municipal Trial Court relied on, but the Court holds that it was already repealed at the time of the remand.

Section 76 of Republic Act Number 6657 provides:

Sec. 76. Repealing Clause. — Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two paragraphs of Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential Decree No. 1038, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, issuances or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

This repealing clause expressly withdrew Presidential Decree Number 316, removing the basis for the automatic referral of ejectment cases to the agrarian authorities.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the petition and held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and by the law, not by the voluntary act of the parties. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act Number 7691, the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which require the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship: the parties are landowner and tenant, the subject is agricultural land, there is consent, the purpose is agricultural production, there is personal cultivation, and there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. The complaint here alleged ownership, entry by strategy and stealth, demands to vacate, and a prayer for injunction and damages. These allegations make out forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute.

On the second issue, the Court held that the tenancy defense in the answer did not divest the Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or theories set up by the defendant, otherwise it would depend on the whims of the defendant. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Municipal Trial Court is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary, receive evidence to determine whether tenancy is truly the real issue. If tenancy is shown, the court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Here, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial Court immediately referred the case to the Board, contrary to the rules. Moreover, the referral rule in Presidential Decree Number 316 had been repealed by Republic Act Number 6657 in 1988.

On the third issue, the Court held that the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction on the Board. The amended complaint alleged that the property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo and that the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The action remained one for recovery of possession of real property within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The Court acknowledged the lapse of time but explained that it could not resolve the dispute itself, since the evidence required in courts differs from that of administrative agencies.

Doctrine

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the allegations of the complaint and by the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, nor acquired, waived, enlarged, or diminished by their acts or omissions, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court.

A defendant's assertion of tenancy in his answer does not automatically divest the Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction over a forcible entry case. The court retains authority to hear the case to determine whether it has jurisdiction, and under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure it must conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary, receive evidence on the tenancy defense. If tenancy is truly the issue, the court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction.

For a case to involve an agrarian dispute under Section 50 of Republic Act Number 6657, the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present. Absent an allegation of tenancy in the complaint, the action is one for recovery of possession cognizable by the regular courts. The referral rule under Presidential Decree Number 316 no longer exists, having been expressly repealed by Section 76 of Republic Act Number 6657.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses in the answer. Examiners use this case to test the boundary between the Municipal Trial Court's ejectment jurisdiction and the agrarian adjudicator's jurisdiction, and to test whether a tenancy defense automatically ousts the court of jurisdiction.