G. R. No. 16501. December 22, 1921

FEDERICO LAZARTE, AS CURATOR AD LITEM, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF GUILLERMO LAZARTE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. RICARIX) NOLAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 22, 1921 VILLAMOR, J.:
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VILLAMOR, J.:


This is an action for the annulment of a
contract of purchase and sale of certain real properties described in
the amended complaint on the ground that the vendor Federico Lazarte
was mentally unsound at the time of executing the document by which
said Federico Lazarte on February 11, 1919, sold to Ricardo Nolan all
of the properties described in the complaint.

The defendants Ricardo Nolan and “The Carmen Plantation Co., Inc.”
answered denying each and every allegation in the complaint, with the
exception of those specifically or impliedly admitted in their special
defenses.

The parties presented their respective evidence, and after a
careful analysis of the testimony of the witnesses the learned judge a quo
rendered judgment on February 28, 1920, in favor of the defendants,
dismissing the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff. On March
13, 1920, the plaintiff excepted to this judgment, and filed a motion
for a new trial. This motion was denied on March 27, of which denial
the appellant was notified on the 29th of the same month by registered
mail. On the 10th of April, next, the bill of exceptions was approved,
and three days thereafter, that is, on April 13, 1920, the appellant
filed a motion, excepting to the order denying the new trial.

The first question we have to decide is whether or not the
exception to the order denying the new trial was filed on time, so as
to give this court jurisdiction to review the evidence adduced at the
trial.

In the case of Singayan vs. Mabborang (10 Phil., 601), this court said:

“When a motion for a new trial is denied by the
court below and no exception is taken to such denial, the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction to review the evidence, but must accept the facts
as found and deal only with the questions of law.”

In Sandeliz vs. Reyes (12 Phil., 506), this court said:

“Following the rule laid down by this court in
numerous decisions, when no exception is taken to the ruling of the
court below denying a motion for a new trial upon the ground of the
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence can not be reviewed upon
appeal.”

This same doctrine was confirmed by this court in the case of Buencamino vs. Soriano (29 Phil., 230):

“An exception to the order overruling the motion
for a new trial made on statutory ground is jurisdictional and the
failure to except prevents this court from reviewing the facts.

“Section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure places a limitation on the
appellate power of the Supreme Court by providing that it shall not
review the evidence except under certain conditions. One of the
conditions precedent to the right of this court to review the evidence
is that the appellant shall take an exception to the denial of the
motion for a new trial.”

And in Layda vs. Legazpi (39 Phil., 83), this court held:

“In an ordinary action the aggrieved party has (a) thirty days within which to present a motion for a new trial; (b) after notice of the ruling upon his motion, he has five days within which.to present ‘notice of his intention to present a bill of exceptions;’ (c) after the presentation of ‘notice of his intention to present a bill of exceptions’ he has ten days within which to present his bill of exceptions; (d)
failure to comply with any of the foregoing requirements, within tjie
various periods mentioned, will cause the judgment to become final,
upon which a writ of execution may issue, and the presentation of a
bill of exceptions will not give the appellate court jurisdiction; (e)
each and all of said periods may be extended by order of the court upon
application made prior to the expiration of the original period.”

It appears from the record that the attorney for the appellant was
residing in the city of Iloilo on the 29th of March, 1920, when the
notice of the order denying the new trial was sent to him by registered
mail. On the other hand, the appellant alleges in his motion dated May
14, 1920, that the notice of said order was not received by him until
the 6th of April, 1920. If so, if he desired to except to the order
denying his motion, he should have filed his exception within five days
from the day following the receipt of the notice, that is, on the 11th
of the same month, in accordance with the decision of this court in the
case of Layda vs. Legazpi, supra. But no exception
to the order having been taken by him until April 13, it is evident
that his exception was filed out of time, and it cannot be relied upon
by this court for the purpose of reviewing the evidence adduced at the
trial.

But even supposing that the said exception was filed on time, this
court cannot review the evidence either because the oral evidence is
not before us, since the documentary evidence only has been forwarded
to this court. According to the doctrine laid down in Ferrer vs.
Neri Abejuela (9 Phil., 324) the appellant desiring that the evidence
adduced at the trial may be reviewed must see that all the evidence is
brought up to this court on appeal. He cannot bring a part of the
evidence only, and then ask for a reversal on the ground that the
evidence before this court does not support the judgment.

The want of jurisdiction of this court to review the evidence
introduced at the trial having thus been determined, the only question
that remains for us to decide is whether or not the findings of fact
made by the trial judge fully support the judgment appealed from.

The judge a quo, summing up the evidence introduced during the trial in order to make his findings of fact, says in his decision the following:

“The only question of fact to be decided is whether
or not at the time of executing the deed of option and the deed of sale
Exhibit D, about the middle of December, 1919, and on February 11,
1919, respectively, Federico Lazarte was mentally unsound.

“Aside from the testimony of Federico Lazarte’s mistress, that of his
servant and of Valeriano Medel, Custodio Tiberio and Bernardino
Avellana, and of the vague testimony of Doctor Henares, there is not in
the record any direct evidence tending to show that Federico Lazarte
was about that time mentally insane. The expert opinions of Doctor A.
C. Thomas and Doctor Cullen, both witnesses for the plaintiff, are
contradictory on many important points.

“On the other hand,
there is the testimony of various witnesses who, by reason of their
education and their profession, are better qualified to judge the
mental condition of Federico Lazarte before, during, and after, the
execution of the deeds of option and sale. All of these witnesses
testified that on those occasions they did “not notice, from the acts
and words of Federico Lazarte, anything indicating any mental
derangement in him.

“The testimony on this point of Doctors
Montinola and Yulo, especially that of the latter, who for several
years was the physician of the supposed insane, is entitled to special
credit. The social standing, education and learning of these witnesses
and their lack of interest as to the outcome of this case, render their
testimony more credible than those of the mistress and of the servant
of Federico Lazarte and the other three witnesses for the plaintiff,
including Doctor Henares, who would not give his opinion as to the
mental condition of his patient, under the pretext of not having had
time to examine him

“The very acts executed by Federico
Lazarte for the purpose of realizing a more advantageous sale of his
lands, the measures taken by him to have his rights secured, and his
statements as to having made a satisfactory sale, show in spite of all
the expert opinion to the contrary, that when he executed the deeds of
conveyance of the lands in question, he was in the absolute enjoyment
of his mental faculties.

“Even without the opinion of the
experts, it can be concluded that the preponderance of evidence shows
that Federico Lazarte was in a perfectly sound mental condition, not
only at the time of executing both the document containing the promise
to sell and the deed itself of sale of the lands in question, but also
for some time before and after such acts were performed.”

Such being the findings of fact made by the judge a quo we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that if Federico Lazarte was in a
perfectly sound mental condition when he executed the contract of sale
in question, the court a quo acted in accordance with the law in dismissing the complaint.

It is a well-settled doctrine by the courts that contracts are
binding, whatever be the form in which they may have been entered into,
provided that the essential conditions required by the law for their
validity exist, namely; consent of the contracting parties, a definite
object which is the subject-matter of the contract, and a consideration
for the obligation established. (Arts. 1278 and 1261, Civil Code.) The
action for nullity instituted in this case is based on the alleged
insanity of Federico Lazarte, a defect which vitiates the consent
required by law. (Art. 1263, case No. 2, Civil Code.) The court below
having found that Federico Lazarte was perfectly sane at the time of
executing the contract under discussion, it is evident that the
plaintiff’s action is untenable, and the defendants must be absolved
from the complaint.

The appellant alleges that he was deprived of his right to file an
amended complaint. We believe that this assignment of error is of no
importance, since there appears in the record the amended complaint
filed by the appellant’s counsel on February 3, 1920.

As the other assignments of error made by the appellant are based
on the mental incapacity of Federico Lazarte, they need not be
discussed separately, the principal question having been already
decided in the sense that said Federico Lazarte was in a perfectly
sound mental condition at the time of executing the contract of
purchase and sale in question.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be, and
is hereby, affirmed with the costs of both instances against the
appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.