THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN RAQUINIO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The charge is frustrated homicide. ^[1]
The judgment below found defendant guilty thereof, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery offset by voluntary surrender in mitigation.
The court in the exercise of its discretion imposed an indeterminate
corporal penalty – lower by one degree – ranging from 4 months and 1
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 11 months and 11 days of
prision correccional, as maximum. ^[2]
It also ordered defendant to indemnify the offended party, Apolonio
Ravina, in the sum of P170.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant’s appeal is direct to this
Court.

Briefly, the controlling facts found below are:

After lunch, in the early afternoon of November 8, 1957, complainant
Apolonio Ravina, accompanied by his helper, Luciano Reynon, drove his
jeep to the river bank of Gabu, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He was to load and
transport to the market, as usual, the fish catch for that day. Upon
arrival at the place, complainant was told by Agustin Raquinio, local
barrio lieutenant and head-man of a group of fishermen who caught the
fish, that he had already promised Gaspar Retutal to load the fish in
the latter’s jeep in which defendant was helper. Complainant and
Agustin Raquinio engaged in a heated discussion. Complainant then
reminded Agustin Raquinio that he should be given the preference to
transport the fish. Agustin refused and stood pat on his promise to
Gaspar. Apolonio Ravina then told Agustin: “We did not come here to
force ourselves to you.” Fearing trouble, complainant’s mother called
him. Just as complainant turned to go to his mother, defendant stabbed
him at the stomach with a small bolo. Wounded complainant took to his
heels, collapsed to the ground at a distance of about 25 meters.
Defendant wanted to pursue him. But Agustin Raquinio held defendant
fast, grabbed the bolo from his hand.

Complainant was placed in his jeep, brought to the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Hospital. Dr. Maximiano L. Agbayani, associate resident
physician, treated complainant and found the following injuries:
“Stab[bed,] wound, penetrating abdomen 10 cm. to the right of median
line and little below the level of the umbilicus; entrance 2 cm., upper
extremity contused, lower extremity sharp; directed postero-medially
and slightly upwards; puncturing liver”.^[3]
The doctor declared that were it not for the timely medical assistance,
the victim would have died of hemorrhage caused by the stab wound that
penetrated the liver. Discharged from the hospital on November 21,
1957, complainant had to return twice for continuation of the
treatment. He was incapacitated from pursuing his calling up to March
1958.

1. Appellant’s brief ^[4]
recites facts at variance with the findings of the trial court. And
this, in the hope that this Court might spotlight his theory that the
crime committed falls to the level of physical injuries.

Defendant’s notice of appeal before us reads:

“NOTICE OF APPEAL

COMES now the accused, Juan Raquinio, in the above-entitled criminal
case, thru his undersigned attorney, and hereby gives formal notice of
his intention to appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court the Judgment of
conviction rendered by this Honorable Trial Court, – because a question
of law is involved in this appeal.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Record of this case be
elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court, as early as possible.” ^[5]

Note that the appeal was direct to this Court and that the prayer in
the notice of appeal is that the record of this case be elevated here because a question of law is involved in this appeal.
Because of this, counsel’s attempt to inject facts different from those
found below, is impermissible. Having cast aside questions of fact in
his notice of appeal, he may not revive them at will. He is deemed to
have accepted without reservation the facts as found below. He has
waived his right to an inquiry into these facts. He himself has closed
the door to a review of the facts. ^[6] He has chosen to take issue upon a question of law.

This Court has held in a factual context similar to the present that
where an appeal was taken on purely questions of law, we are bound by
the findings of fact below. ^[7] We do not intend to retreat from the doctrine thus forged. It is in line with sound practice. ^[8]

We therefore hold that a direct appeal to this Court on questions of
law – in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is not death or
life imprisonment – precludes a review of the facts.

2. Defendant assails the finding of frustrated
homicide. He avers lack of intent to kill. We take a look at the facts.
Appellant used a lethal weapon, a bolo. The thrust – “sudden and
unexpected” – ^[9] was
directed at a vital spot of the body, the abdomen. Were it not for the
fact that Agustin Raquinio held defendant fast and grabbed the bolo
from his hand, he would have finished off with his victim. The wounds
suffered by the latter would have been fatal, were it not for the
timely and adequate medical assistance rendered him. Intention to kill,
a mental process, may be inferred from the nature of the weapon used,
the place of the wound, the seriousness thereof and the persistence to
kill the victim. All these are present in the case at bar. These facts
nail down the question. The crime is frustrated homicide. ^[10]

3.
Appellant claims that treachery should not have been considered as an
aggravating circumstance. His point is that treachery is not alleged in
the criminal charge against him and that he timely objected to the
evidence tending to prove it.

Had treachery been averred, unquestionably, the crime would have risen to the level of frustrated murder. ^[11]
But the information did not allege treachery. The crime charged is
merely frustrated homicide. Evidence of treachery then would not make
the crime one of frustrated murder. ^[12] This is axiomatic.

In said frustrated homicide charge, the prosecutor alleges that
defendant “with evident intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed” Ravina with a bolo. How
that act was perpetrated has to be proved. To achieve this end, it is
inescapable that the attack be described. To show the conditions under
which the attack was perpetrated, an aggravating circumstance – which
is part of the act – may be related. Else, a gap may result, the
narrative incomplete. So it is, that evidence of an aggravating
circumstance is not intended to bring about a change in the nature of
that crime averred, for the worse. Rather, it serves the purpose of
aiding the court in assessing the penalty to be imposed “in a more or
less severe form, within the limits prescribed for the offense charged
in the complaint or information”. Therefore, the rule has been laid
down that generic aggravating circumstances, although not alleged in
the information may be proved. Because, the ponderous impact of this
rule is to show precisely the manner in which the offense actually
charged was committed. ^[13]
The accused may not object to such evidence. For, it does not violate
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. ^[14]

The decision appealed from is not infirm. It is accordingly affirmed. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, and Zaldivar, JJ., no part.

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^[1] Criminal Case No. 2909,
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, entitled “People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, versus Juan Raquinio, accused.”

^[2] The penalty for
frustrated homicide is prision mayor, i.e., one degree lower than
reclusion temporal which is the penalty for consummated homicide. Art.
250 in relation to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code. Art. 250 of
the said Code, however, declares that “The courts, in view of the facts
of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime
of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the
preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which
should be imposed under the provisions of Article 50”.

^[3] Exhibit A; record below, p. 65.

^[4] Pp. 4-8.

^[5] Record below, p. 100.

^[6] Under Section 29 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this case should have been taken
to the Court of Appeals, if a review of the facts were desired.

^[7] People vs. Ponelas, et al., L-10853, May 18, 1959.

^[8] See the following
civil cases where a similar rule has been adopted: Aballe, etc., et
al., vs. Santiago, L-16307, April 30, 1963; Cason, etc., vs. San Pedro
and Favila, L-18928, December 28, 1963; GSIS vs. Cloribel, etc., et
al., L-22236, June 22, 1965; DBP vs. Ozarraga, etc., L-16631, July 20,
1965.

^[9] Decision, Record below, p. 93.

^[10] People vs. Mercado,
51 Phil. 99, 101-102; People vs. Orongan, 58 Phil. 426, 429; People vs.
Reyes, 61 Phil. 341, 343; People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331, 334; People
vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964.

^[11] Article 248(1), Revised Penal Code.

^[12] U.S. vs. Campo, 23
Phil. 369, 371, citing cases; People vs. Pineda, et al., 56 Phil. 688,
690; People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708; People vs. Tagaro, L-18518,
January 31, 1963.

^[13] U.S. vs. Campo, supra, p. 374; People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610, 614; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729, 737-738.

^[14] Article III, Section 1 (17), Constitution; Section 1(c), Rule 115, Rules of Court.